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Patient safety incidents have been suggested to occur in approximately 20% of 
organisational care transfers, based upon healthcare professional reporting. In other areas 
of healthcare, service users have been reported to define safety differently to healthcare 
professionals and identify more and different types of safety incidents. This study explored 
patient perceptions of safety, which informed the development of a mechanism that allowed 
service users to report on their safety during an organisational care transfer.  
 
Methods 
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) and Action Research (AR) were utilised over 2 phases. Phase 1 
(AI) explored perceptions of safety with 14 service users recruited from 3 NHS community 
care teams, 2 social care homes and 2 private nursing homes. Phase 2 (AR) developed the 
reporting mechanism, a safety survey, through 2 workshops with healthcare professionals 
and service users. 240 surveys were distributed to the 3 NHS community care teams, 2 
social care homes and 1 private nursing home during two rounds of piloting.  
 
Findings 
Service user perceptions indicated 4 different domains of safety; communication, 
responsiveness, traditional safety issues and trust. The safety survey was based upon these 
perceptions, capturing how safe service users felt over three stages of an organisational 
care transfer; departure, journey and arrival. Over two rounds of piloting, 152 surveys were 
distributed to service users, with 63 (41%) responding. 19 (30%) reported feeling unsafe in 
at least one domain over the three stages. This was greater than the 20% of incidents 
reported by healthcare professionals. 
 
Discussion 
Service users perceived safety differently to and reported more incidents than healthcare 
professionals. The domains of safety that were identified formed additional safety buffers 
within the Swiss-Cheese model of safety. Although the reporting mechanism was inhibited 
by organisational changes, it performed the function of highlighting safety concerns; an 
essential process in uncovering recurrent error traps. Organisations should attempt to 
capture how safe service users have felt when arriving or departing from their service to 
provide a detailed analysis of safety in order to reduce the recurrent errors.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an introduction to the study, beginning with a brief overview of the 
research topic and how it was identified through meetings between the researcher, the 
supervision team and the North East Strategic Health Authority (SHA). The research 
question is then stated, followed by a clarification of the different terminology used 
throughout the study. Finally the content of each chapter is described. 
 
1.2 Background 
Patient safety is a relatively new, but now widely recognised term within modern healthcare. 
The increased recognition is due in part to the release of influential reports by the UK’s 
Department of Health and USA’s Institute of Medicine, and previously to these reports, work 
by influential pioneers such as Bill Runciman, Charles Vincent, James Reason and Sir Liam 
Donaldson to name a few, which have spurred on what can be called a social movement. 
The result of this movement is a relative increase in the safety of healthcare, but it is the 
awareness of safety issues that is the most important, as without this it would not be 
possible to drive improvement.  
 
Despite the advances that have been made, this movement is still relatively in its infancy. As 
such there are still many gaps that require further exploration, in part a result of the vast and 
complicated nature of modern healthcare. These gaps are further expanding as the health 
needs of the population change, technology advances, healthcare roles develop and 
healthcare policy encourages an increased emphasis on patient and public involvement.  
 
It is partially for these reasons that this research project developed as it did. Although there 
is an increasing amount of research exploring how patients can become involved in their 
own safety, there have been fewer studies focusing on how patients perceive safety, and the 
role that they can play in reporting instances of their experiences of safety.  
 
Discussions between the researcher, supervision team and the North East SHA at the outset 
of the study highlighted the need for research into the clinical theme of ‘care transfers, 
handovers and discharges (inter-disciplinary and inter-agency working)’. In the UK, most 
service users undergo a transfer of some type, including admissions, discharges and 
handoffs both within and between organisations. These care transfers are an area of 
healthcare particularly high in risk, and one in which the patient perspective is critical to any 
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attempt to measure quality of care. This study focused specifically on transfers between 
organisations. It was these considerations that helped to frame the research aims, objectives 
and design, and from which the study developed. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
Underpinned by the points above, two research questions were developed that were 
intrinsically linked together; 
1. How do service users who have undertaken an organisational care transfer perceive 
safety? 
2. What would facilitate service users to report instances of safe and unsafe care? 
 
1.4 Terminology Used in the Study 
Within healthcare there is an on-going debate regarding the most appropriate term to use 
when referring to a recipient of healthcare (McLaughlin, 2009). Two common names include 
patient and service user, however the terms client, customer or consumer are also referred 
to in the literature, with each having slightly different meanings (McLaughlin, 2009). Service 
user is used mainly in this study as it draws comparisons with the philosophical approaches 
of the study, whilst patient is used to create continuity with the body of existing literature. As 
a result, these two terms are often used interchangeably throughout. Service user can also 
include those not directly receiving the healthcare but are impacted upon by it or a witness to 
it, such as family members, carers or advocates.  
 
Similarly there is a plethora of terms for those that provide healthcare; too many to list here. 
Therefore the term healthcare professional will be used throughout this study to refer to 
anyone involved in the provision of healthcare, such as but not limited to doctors, healthcare 
managers, nurses, and paramedics.  
 
Finally it is important to define a care transfer; a relatively simple term that has more 
complicated implications. Within health services, a service user’s care is often passed from 
one team or organisation to another; sometimes without the patient needing to physically 
move and other times having to be transported to and from wards, hospitals, community 
settings and care homes. It is for this reason that an organisational care transfer, the focus 
of this study, refers explicitly to care transfers where the service user moves between 
organisations, such as but not limited to being discharged from hospital into community care, 
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being admitted to hospital from a care home or being discharged from a care home to their 
own private home, with or without support.  
 
Within this study the common terms of admission (entering a service), discharge (exiting a 
service) and handovers (moving between services) are all given the encompassing title of an 
organisational care transfer when discussed as a single entity. However in places they are 
still referred to as their individual components, for example in some studies only one 
component was explored. The reporting mechanism developed in this study also breaks the 
organisational care transfer down to three components; the departure (discharge), journey 
and the arrival (admission).  
 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 has given a general introduction to the thesis and an overview of the structure. 
Chapter 2 provides a broad and in-depth analysis of the literature relating to the study; both 
academic- and policy-related. Safety is explored from a historical perspective, focusing on 
lessons that have been learned from aerospace and engineering industries, before 
progressing onto the recent patient safety movement. Included in this is an overview of 
quality improvement, organisational cultures and psychology and the role that social 
sciences can play in patient safety, as well as widely cited models of patient safety. 
Organisational care transfers as outlined above are then discussed. The different types of 
transfer are explored along with the many potential risks that exist and the current initiatives 
within the region to make them safer. Patient and public involvement is also explored with an 
overview of the theory and policies on involvement, moving into the related areas of patient 
satisfaction, the role that expert patients play in their healthcare and how patients can 
become involved in their own safety. Finally the chapter concludes with a summary of how 
each of these individual aspects tie together to give a rationale for this study, along with a 
restatement of the aims and objectives framed within this rationale.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the study which sit 
within critical realism. These are framed within the methodological approaches of 
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) and Action Research (AR) that have been utilised, and provides 
reflections on the process of working in a collaborative environment with various 
organisation types. Also addressed in this chapter is how AI, a form of AR itself, has been 
combined with a more traditional AR process. A diagram of how the different stages link 
together is provided, which is also reintroduced throughout each of the findings chapters to 
depict where each finding fits within the methodological framework. 
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Chapter 4 presents the methods that were used in each of the individual phases and stages 
of the study. Firstly these relate to Phase 1, where the recruitment of participants, the 
sampling framework and the data collection and methods of analysis are discussed. These 
particularly focus on the exploration of safety with service users through appreciative 
interviewing. Phase 2 then focuses on the process of developing the reporting tool, 
accomplished through two workshops with a wide range of stakeholders; predominantly 
healthcare professionals and service users. How the tool was piloted by these healthcare 
professionals is then discussed, along with an overview of the evaluation that was conducted 
simultaneously. Following this, the ethical considerations are discussed along with an outline 
of the required ethical approvals that were required for the study to progress. Finally an 
overview of how the findings are presented over the following three chapters (5, 6 and 7) is 
provided via a flow chart depicting the study phases, the methodology and methods that 
were utilised and the chapter each of these is reported in. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 explore the findings of the first and second phases of the study. In 
Chapter 5 a thematic overview of Phase 1 is provided, along with a discussion of the 
implications of these findings and how they link in to the philosophical framework. In 
Chapter 6 the findings from the development of the reporting tool are explored over the two 
workshops, along with a detailed analysis of how the reporting mechanism came together 
from the data. In this chapter the data is used as a resource to evidence why the reporting 
mechanism took the form that it did. Chapter 7 provides the findings from the reporting 
mechanism which are detailed within the cyclic processes of AR; exploring how the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to service users (Action), the reports of safety provided by 
service users (Observation) and how the reporting mechanism was revised over two cycles 
based upon an evaluation (Reflection).  
 
Chapter 8 restates the aims and objectives of the study before providing a discussion of the 
findings. It is here that the findings are interpreted to present meaning, along with possible 
alternative explanations. The findings are also discussed in relation to models and theories 
of safety, with an explanation of how the findings contribute to the further development of 
these. The implications that this has upon practice and explicit areas of the study that require 
future research are then presented along with the limitations of the study. Finally the thesis is 
framed in a time within the current political landscape of changes to healthcare. This 
receives particular attention due to the time of writing the thesis; a time when economic 
recession and a change in Government have brought about unprecedented and far reaching 
changes to healthcare in the UK. 
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1.6 Contributions to Knowledge 
This study provides original contributions to knowledge on three levels: conceptual, practical 
and methodological. At the conceptual level, patient perceptions of safety when going 
through an organisational care transfer are presented and applied to the Swiss-Cheese 
model of safety. Patient perceptions of safety, in particular communication and 
responsiveness, formed additional barriers, defences and safeguards. The reporting 
mechanism developed thus allowed patients to report on any holes in these safety barriers 
that may have impacted upon their safety, which offers a new practical solution to patient 
reporting of safety during organisational care transfers. The applicability of the patient 
perceptions of safety to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety have since been published (Scott, 
Dawson, & Jones, 2011, Appendix 15).  
 
The use of Appreciative Inquiry offers a unique methodological contribution to knowledge by 
approaching patient safety research from a positive stance, which helps to reduce cultural 
and personal barriers often associated with researching safety, where patients may be 
unwilling to be critical of their healthcare. The novel combination of Appreciative Inquiry and 
Action Research adds to the methodological contribution through the process of 
development and piloting of the reporting mechanism, which provided an opportunity for 
healthcare professionals and service users to contribute equally, whilst ensuring it was still 
based upon service user perceptions of safety.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1  Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the literature relating to three key aspects 
of the study; patient safety, organisational care transfers and patient and public involvement. 
Although all three of these are intrinsically linked, they are reported individually. Both theory 
and policy are discussed in these sections. The chapter ends with a summary and a 
statement of how the aims and objectives link in to the current literature. 
 
2.2  Introduction to Patient Safety 
2.2.1  What is Patient Safety? 
Patient safety has been a long-standing feature within the field of medicine dating as far 
back as the Ancient Greeks; in particular with the Hippocratic Oath, that when translated into 
modern healthcare has come to mean ‘first do no harm’. Despite this ethical stance, patient 
safety was either unrecognised by healthcare professionals as a serious risk to the patient or 
its seriousness was previously not acknowledged (Vincent, 2010).  
 
Other critical perspectives of iatrogenic harm include the likes of Illich (1977), who whilst 
comparing healthcare to Greek mythology suggested that direct iatrogenic harm (clinical 
iatrogenesis), along with increasing healthcare costs (social iatrogenesis) and an increased 
inability to cope with pain and death (cultural iatrogenesis) were the result of the 
medicalization of society. These can come from direct medical care, healthcare policies, 
industry, an increased reliance upon healthcare and medicine and the restriction of individual 
autonomy. An alternative way to see iatrogenic harm is that failure is inevitable (Bosk, 1979), 
with learning from past experiences being the most effective way of reducing failure. It is this 
approach that resonates most closely with existing work on patient safety that attempts to 
reduce iatrogenic harm in a manner similar to epidemiological studies.  
 
Although it is recognised that societal and cultural factors, similar to those identified by Illich, 
can have a large impact upon patient safety, these are not the focus of this chapter, nor 
subsequently the thesis as a whole. Similarly this thesis does not attempt to develop or 
incorporate theories of learning or socio-cultural conflict (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
Instead this study addresses patient safety from a practice-based stance, developing a 
patient reporting mechanism based upon patient perceptions of safety in a manner similar to 
existing methods of incident identification, such as healthcare professional reporting. More 
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specifically, patient safety in this study is seen as the prevention or avoidance of harm to 
service users during their episode of healthcare, as perceived by the service user, which 
incorporates organisational improvement. 
 
Such epidemiological studies are based on early research into patient safety that not only 
attempt to identify safety incidents but also to resolve the underlying causes. An early 
example is that of Florence Nightingale who, whilst widely recognised for her contribution to 
nursing was also a pioneering medical statistician. During the Crimean War in 1855 she 
decreased death rates in her hospital from 42.7% to 2.2% within months by introducing 
sanitary reforms (Neuhauser, 2003). A more recent example is provided in the work of 
Barrett-Connor (1972), who after a comparison of healthcare acquired infection rates 
amongst short- and long-stay patients, identified that those in short-stay hospital care 
suffered from fewer infections. Healthcare acquired infections remain a prevalent issue on a 
worldwide basis, with the World Health Organisation (WHO) initiating a global patient safety 
challenge aimed at tackling the issue, emphasising hand-washing to reduce the number of 
healthcare acquired infections (Pittet, 2010).  
 
These examples of patient safety highlight one aspect of the continuous drive to improve the 
quality of healthcare, and is summarised by the WHO, who define quality as ‘a process of 
meeting the needs and expectations of patients and health service staff’ (WHO, 2000). 
Buetow and Roland (1999) present an overview of the different terms and definitions of 
quality that appear within healthcare, such as quality assessment, quality assurance, clinical 
audit and continuous quality improvement. Although slightly different in their philosophies 
and methods, they each have a similar aim of increasing the standard of care or 
performance of healthcare professionals. It is recognised that each has its own philosophies 
and methods that reflect particular disciplinary tensions, in particular between managers and 
professionals (Buetow & Roland, 1999).  
 
Avedis Donabedian, who has been recognised to be one of the most instrumental figures in 
the field of quality assurance (Best & Neuhauser, 2004), has given a brief account of some 
of the differing terms. He argues that as one cannot assure or guarantee quality, and that 
perfect quality is unattainable, the term assurance is a fallacy. Instead, healthcare 
professionals should strive to continuously increase quality with an unachievable end target 
in sight (Donabedian, 2003).  
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Donabedian also states that there are seven components of healthcare quality; efficacy, 
effectiveness, efficiency, optimality, acceptability, legitimacy and equity (Donabedian, 2003), 
as defined in Table 2.1.   
 
Components of Quality 
 
Definition 
Efficacy Ability of science and technology to bring about improvements in 
health when used under the most favourable circumstances 
Effectiveness The degree to which attainable improvements in health are, in 
fact, attained 
Efficiency The ability to lower the cost of care without diminishing 
attainable improvements in health 
Optimality The balancing of improvements in health against the costs of 
such improvements 
Acceptability Conformity to the wishes, desires and expectations of patients 
and their families 
Legitimacy Conformity to social preferences as expressed in ethical 
principles, values, norms, mores, laws and regulations 
Equity Conformity to a principle that determines what is just and fair in 
the distribution of healthcare and its benefits among members of 
the population 
 
Table 2.1: Seven components of healthcare quality (Donabedian, 2003). 
 
Although Donabedian does not explicitly discuss patient safety as being part of these seven 
components of healthcare quality, it still appears to fall within the definition of effectiveness. 
Any iatrogenic harm to a patient invariably results in a decline of health despite aiming for an 
attainable improvement. As such this decline in health would result in a poorer quality of care 
than if the healthcare had been unsuccessful but without harm. A graphical representation of 
a patient’s wellness can be found in Figure 2.1, where the blue line represents best care and 
the red line represents the effectiveness of the same care if the patient was to experience 
iatrogenic harm, such as having a fall during their hospital stay. This is not a definitive 
statement that the patient can or will return to the same health status as iatrogenic harm can 
result to permanent morbidity or even mortality. This matches closely with the Department of 
Health’s (2008a) definition of quality, which states that quality care is clinically effective, 
personal and safe. Donabedian also produced a model of healthcare quality measurement 
(Structure-Process-Outcome), which will be discussed later in the chapter. 




Figure 2.1: Graphical presentation of effectiveness of care pre- and post-patient safety incident 
(adapted from Donabedian, 2003, p. 7). 
 
Patient safety generally has a single definition with constituent parts (Table 2.2), although it 
has been identified that this can vary between organisations (Donaldson, 2009). The single 
definition states that a patient safety incident is ‘any unintended or unexpected incident 
which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS care’ (National 
Patient Safety Agency, 2009). This includes both adverse events, an ‘event or omission 
arising during clinical care and causing physical or psychological injury to a patient’ (2000b, 
p. xii),  and near-misses, a ‘situation in which an event or omission, or a sequence of events 
or omissions, arising during clinical care fails to develop further, whether or not as the result 
of compensating action, thus preventing injury to a patient’ (Department of Health, 2000b, p. 
xii).  
  




Patient safety incident Any unintended or unexpected incident 
which could have or did lead to harm for one 
or more patients receiving NHS care 
Adverse event An event or omission arising during clinical 
care and causing physical or psychological 
injury to a patient 
Near-miss A situation in which an event or omission, or 
a sequence of events or omissions, arising 
during clinical care fails to develop further, 
whether or not as the result of compensating 
action, thus preventing injury to a patient 
Never event Serious, largely preventable patient safety 
incidents that should not occur if the 
available preventative measures have been 
implemented 
 
Table 2.2: Definitions of common terms used in patient safety literature. 
 
Although these definitions are generally accepted within the UK, there are still discrepancies 
that arise on local, national and international levels. The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
World Alliance for Patient Safety have aimed to define each of the terms that are used in 
patient safety research in an attempt to create congruence in the systematic collection, 
aggregation, and analysis of relevant information (Runciman, et al., 2009; Sherman, et al., 
2009; Thomson, et al., 2009). The terms listed above and used in this study reflect those 
that make up the International Classification of Patient Safety.  
 
As well as the different terms used to explain what a patient safety incident is, there are also 
different levels of harm that can arise from an incident. These range from no harm incidents 
through to death (Table 2.3), and are used by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) 
and individual organisations when analysing the number of patient safety incidents that have 
been reported. There are also a number of ‘never-events’ (Department of Health, 2011), 
which at the time of writing are 25 “serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that 
should not occur if the available preventative measures have been implemented” (NPSA, 
2010a, p. 3), independent of their level of harm to the patient.  
  
Page | 25  
 
Severity of Patient Safety Incident Definition 
 
No harm: Impact prevented Any patient safety incident that had the 
potential to cause harm but was prevented, 
resulting in no harm 
No harm: Impact not prevented Any patient safety incident that ran to 
completion but no harm occurred 
Low harm Any patient safety incident that required 
extra observation or minor treatment and 
caused minimal harm 
Moderate harm Any patient safety incident that resulted in a 
moderate increase in treatment and which 
caused significant but not permanent harm 
Severe harm Any patient safety incident that appears to 
have resulted in permanent harm 
Death Any patient safety incident that directly 
resulted in death 
 
Table 2.3: Definitions of levels of harm (NPSA, 2011a) 
 
2.2.2  Healthcare Policy on Patient Safety 
Quality and in particular patient safety is now a central tenet of the NHS, with the NHS Plan 
(Department of Health, 2000a) and the recent white paper ‘Equity and excellence: Liberating 
the NHS’ (Department of Health, 2010a) both emphasising the objectives of reducing 
mortality, increasing safety and improving patient experiences that are a common discourse 
in healthcare policies. 
 
Although these are now clearly defined objectives of the NHS, patient safety has only 
recently received this level of attention. At the turn of the millennium the Department of 
Health (2000b) published ‘An Organisation With a Memory’, whilst in America the Institute of 
Medicine released ‘To Err is Human’ (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). Both of these 
reports have been hugely influential and are generally regarded as catalysts for the 
improvement in patient safety that is becoming synonymous with 21st century medical care. 
It is these reports that were the first to widely acknowledge the potential for healthcare to 
harm those that it is trying to help and shift the focus of healthcare policy and practice 
towards providing safe care. 
 
From ‘An Organisation With a Memory’, the Department of Health outlined four key areas 
that must be addressed; mechanisms for reporting and analysing incidents, an open culture 
instead of a blame culture, mechanisms to implement safety recommendations and an 
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improved awareness of the system approach to safety. The arms-length body named the 
National Patient Safety Agency was formed on the back of ‘The NHS Plan’ (Department of 
Health, 2000a) to achieve these aims. In particular they state that their aims are to “lead and 
contribute to improved, safe care by informing, supporting and influencing organisations” 
(NPSA, 2011b). 
 
A later review of patient safety, ‘Safety First’ (Department of Health, 2006), aimed to assess 
if the organisational structures for patient safety placed safety at the centre of all healthcare. 
The review claimed that although there had been large improvements in awareness of 
patient safety issues, they were not receiving the same levels of attention as other initiatives 
such as waiting times, financial balance and the implementation of National Service 
Frameworks. It was highlighted again that patient safety needs to be at the core of all policy 
and delivery from the policymakers to clinicians on the frontline. The NPSA was seen as 
being central to policy by improving its ability to influence learning at a local level and 
influencing the change from a blame culture to one of being open. A ‘culture of open 
information, active responsibility and challenge’ is encouraged in order to stop major 
incidents from occurring (Department of Health, 2009b). 
 
A fundamental change to the structure of the NHS was proposed by the coalition 
government in the White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ (Department of 
Health, 2010a), despite the previous Secretary State for Health stating shortly before that the 
‘NHS is in good health’ (Department of Health, 2008a, p. 3). The new structure of the NHS 
proposes to make commissioning of services the responsibility of Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs); multiple consortia consisting mostly of General Practitioners (GPs) along 
with other healthcare professionals instead of the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), with the 
intention of making services more responsive to patient needs. Spending will continue to 
increase in real terms year-on-year, although efficiency savings of around £20 billion are 
required by 2014. At the same time the White Paper emphasised the need for the NHS to 
remain free at the point of use and based on clinical need, not the ability to pay. A wider 
discussion of the reforms to health and social care and the political landscape of patient 
safety is provided in the discussion chapter, focusing in particular on how they relate to the 
findings from this study. 
 
With regards to patient safety, the NPSA is currently being dissolved in its current form 
(Department of Health, 2010b), with individual functions being moved to other organisations. 
In particular, the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), the central system for 
healthcare organisations in the UK to report and learn from patient safety incidents, will still 
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function as a sub-committee of the NHS Commissioning Board (Department of Health, 
2010b). Other functions, such as research ethics and confidential enquiries will not be part of 
the NHS Commissioning Board’s functions, but as part of a Health Research Agency and the 
Healthcare Quality Improvement Partnership respectively. 
 
The continued presence of quality and safety at the forefront of healthcare policy, despite the 
extensive restructuring of the NHS, emphasises that they are both central components of 
modern healthcare. However this raises the question of why there is a need to improve 
patient safety. 
 
2.2.3  The Need to Improve Patient Safety 
When compared to other risky organisations and activities, such as chemical and nuclear 
industries, chartered flights and road safety, healthcare has been reported to be higher in 
risk (Amalberti, et al., 2005). Both the Department of Health (Department of Health, 2000b) 
and Institute of Medicine (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000) reported that safety incidents 
occur in around 10% of all admissions, citing Vincent, Neale and Woloshynowych (2001) 
who conducted a retrospective record review of 1014 medical records. From these incidents 
they found that around half were preventable, whilst Smits et al. (2010) in a similar 
retrospective patient record review found 61% of adverse events were preventable. 
 
Over time these estimations have remained relatively stable, and similar rates of patient 
safety incidents can be found in other healthcare systems regardless of how they are 
composed, such as America (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000) , Australia (Wilson, et al., 
1995), Brazil (Mendes, et al., 2009), Canada (Baker, et al., 2004), New Zealand (Davis, et 
al., 2002) and Sweden (Soop, et al., 2009). This research also supports Vincent et al. 
(2001), and more recently Smits et al. (2010), who found that around half of the adverse 
events identified are preventable. Developing countries fare even worse, with research 
suggesting that their levels of healthcare acquired infections are considerably greater than 
developed counties (Allegranzi, et al., 2011).  
 
Within the UK, it has been estimated that patient safety incidents affect between 850,000 
(Department of Health, 2000b) and 974,000 (National Audit Office, 2005) patients. There is 
the potential for many more to be included, with the National Audit Office (2005) recognising 
that these are only the number of reported incidents, excluding hospital acquired infections 
which may increase the figure by a further 300,000. 
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As would be expected, there are a number of fiscal costs in addition to the human costs 
associated with adverse events, which include litigation and also the cost of care to treat the 
iatrogenic illnesses. In 2000, around £400 million a year was paid out in litigation, with a 
potential liability of £2.4 billion for cases that didn’t result in litigation (Department of Health, 
2000b). Again, this does not include hospital acquired infections, which cost a further £1 
billion a year. The exact value is not known as identifying every incident and their costs is 
not possible due to a number of reasons, including the sheer scale of the problem and 
issues around accurate reporting by healthcare professionals. 
 
A further complication is that due to the complex nature of modern healthcare, there are 
many different types of patient safety incidents that occur in many different healthcare 
settings and for a variety of reasons (Zegers, et al., 2011). Some examples of incident 
categories include healthcare acquired infections, falls, medication, missed- or mis-diagnosis 
and surgery-related incidents. Each of these can be broken down further, for example 
medication can focus on errors in prescribing, dispensing or administering drugs. Efforts to 
reduce the number of incidents have been relatively successful, such as checklists (Ko, 
Turner, & Finnigan, 2011), which reduce the number of patient safety incidents in surgery by 
36% (Haynes, et al., 2009) and healthcare acquired infections by almost 50% (Fuchs, et al., 
2011). However in order to reduce safety incidents on a large scale, it is necessary for 
healthcare professionals to identify and report them. Without doing so, the incidents can 
often go unnoticed, their root causes may not be accurately identified or they may be actively 
hidden.  
 
Despite some clear progress such as the introduction of checklists, Vincent et al. (2008) 
summarise that there is insufficient data to accurately state if healthcare is becoming safer, 
partly due to inadequate measures of safety. A further reason is that the number of incidents 
reported each year are increasing, although it is unknown if this is a result of healthcare 
becoming less safe, or paradoxically from becoming more safe as a result of changing 
cultures and increased reporting of incidents.  
 
2.2.4  Role of Patient Safety Cultures and Systems 
There are a number of models of patient safety that aim to identify the causes, components, 
processes and structures that are involved in patient safety incidents. The models discussed 
below include the Structure-Process-Outcome (SPO) model of quality, the Swiss-Cheese 
model of safety and the ICPS which display similar characteristics to each other. These are 
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discussed due to their prominence in the patient safety literature and because they draw 
from the interlinked constructs of safety and quality. 
 
The Structure-Process-Outcome (SPO) model of quality that was proposed by Donabedian 
(1966) factors in the structural aspects of a healthcare organisation (material resources, 
human resources and organisational characteristics), the processes of healthcare (activities 
such as diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation) and the outcomes of healthcare, either desirable 
or undesirable (changes in health status, knowledge, behaviour and satisfaction). It has 
since been applied to patient safety by Battles and Lilford (2003) who state that patient 
safety research needs to focus on the causes of safety incidents (both the structures and 
processes) in order to minimise harm to patients (the outcome), and by doing so it is 
possible to identify and address these causes.  
 
By applying Donabedian’s SPO model of quality to patient safety in a cultural context, the 
organisational culture can be interpreted as the structure in which safety exists. Therefore 
the implementation of a systems approach is the process by which safety is explored and 
the reporting of incidents can be seen to be the outcome.  
 
In many instances, human error has been identified as the cause of safety incidents both 
inside and outside of healthcare. There are two different approaches that can be taken to 
human error; the person-centred and the systems approach. The person-centred approach 
states that if a human error is made, it is at the fault of the individual, either for forgetfulness, 
inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence or recklessness (Reason, 2000). In 
order to stop future errors from occurring, any variability in behaviour is discouraged and the 
individual is often reprimanded for their mistake. Other sanctions include the threat of 
litigation and the attempt to embarrass the individual through ‘naming and shaming’ so that 
they will not make the same mistake again. Organisations that adopt this approach are said 
to have a blame culture, which remains very common in healthcare in the UK (Woodward, 
Lemer, & Wu, 2009). 
 
Collins et al. (2009a) suggest that there are three types of blame; self-blame, blame of 
impersonal forces (the system) and blame of others. When a human error occurs, it is 
argued that self-blame is the most prevalent of these, with blaming others only occurring 
when a clear violation of care has occurred and only as a last resort. Furthermore Collins et 
al. (2009a) claim that blame can be beneficial to the learning and growth of physicians. 
However a major flaw of this study is that they only take into account blame from physicians 
without considering that physicians are part of a multidisciplinary team consisting of many 
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different healthcare professionals and managers, which generate issues around power and 
authority. In a later article the same authors (Collins, et al., 2009b) state that a cultural 
combination of openness and blame is the most effective way of improving safety, which has 
been supported by Mardon et al. (2010). Woodward, Lemer and Wu (2009) refute this, 
stating that a widespread move towards a systems approach is necessary in order to break 
away from the many negative outcomes that a blame culture brings with it. 
 
Despite some opposing research such as by Collins et al. (2009a, 2009b) and Mardon et al. 
(2010), it is widely accepted that a blame culture results in a greater chance of individuals 
covering up errors due to a fear of retribution, acting as a barrier to the true cause of the 
error being uncovered. It is for this reason that the move away from a blame culture to one of 
being open has received much support in both literature and policy (e.g. Department of 
Health, 2000b; Reason, 1998, 2000; Waring, 2005; Woodward, Lemer, & Wu, 2009). In 
particular, a patient safety culture, defined as ‘the willingness and ability of an organisation to 
understand safety as well as the willingness and ability to act on safety’ (Reiman, 
Pietikainen, & Oedewald, 2010), is necessary for the effective reporting of safety incidents 
that is central to the systems approach to safety.  
 
The systems approach still recognises that human error is a major cause of safety incidents, 
however instead of attributing blame to individuals, the blame is instead attributed to the 
systems in which the individuals work. Reason (1995) states that human error is “more a 
matter of opportunity than the result of excessive carelessness, ignorance, or recklessness” 
(p.3), and by removing the opportunity the error is less likely to occur. Comparing the 
systems approach to the SPO model results in a similar conclusion, where human error is an 
outcome of poor structures and processes. The emphasis of the systems approach is on 
identifying the systems that cause an incident to occur, which requires the reporting of 
incidents and near misses so that the root causes can be analysed and addressed. Without 
doing this, “we have no way of uncovering recurrent error traps or of knowing where the 
“edge” is until we fall over it” (Reason, 2000, p. 768).  
 
It has previously been acknowledged that within healthcare there is currently a blame culture 
(Olsen & Aase, 2010; Waring, 2005), and as such there have been many attempts to 
manufacture a culture of being open with consistent reporting of safety incidents 
(Department of Health, 2000b). Because organisational cultures do not appear out of 
nowhere, but instead are dynamic entities that evolve over time (Reason, 1998) either 
through natural growth or systematic alteration by management (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985), it 
has been shown that it is possible for them to be transformed. This is made more difficult 
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because regardless of the type of culture inherent in institutions, Deilkas and Hofoss (2010) 
suggest that individual cultures can exist in individual departments, meaning that any 
exploration of cultures needs to occur as closely as possible to the patient, therefore 
reinforcing the role of the patient voice.  
 
A central component of the systems approach to safety is the Swiss-Cheese model 
(Reason, 2000) which proposes that defences, barriers and safeguards are essential in 
reducing the impact of any error that may occur. These can come in many forms, such as 
engineered (alarms, physical barriers etc.), human (physicians, nurses etc.), procedural 
(checklists, medication instructions etc.) and administrative controls (medication dispensing 
etc.). However the different types of defences (layers of Swiss-Cheese) are not perfect, but 
in fact have holes in them which are constantly changing and moving.  
 
According to this model of safety, an incident will occur when the holes in each layer line up, 
allowing a hazard to come into contact with the patient. These holes occur for a number of 
reasons, but are categorised into active and latent failures. Active failures are described as 
being the ‘unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient or 
system’ (Reason, 2000). They include any form of a slip, lapse, mistake or procedural 
violations and within the person-centred approach they are where the blame resides.  
 
Latent failures occur as a result of long-standing problems that exist in the system. These 
can include problems in the local workplace (time pressure, understaffing, inadequate 
equipment etc.) or longstanding weaknesses in the defences (unworkable procedures, 
broken physical barriers etc.). Latent conditions can often exist for a sustained period of time 
without causing any harm, but when aligned with active failures can have the potential to 
lead to a patient safety incident. Figure 2.2 presents a visual representation of the Swiss-
Cheese model of patient safety. 
 




Figure 2.2: Swiss-Cheese model of safety. Reproduced from BMJ Quality and Safety, Reason, 
Carthey & de Leval (2001), Volume 10 (Supplement ii),  with permission from BMJ Publishing 
Group Ltd. 
 
Since Donabedian (1966, 1988, 2003) and Reason (2000) introduced their models of quality 
and safety respectively, there has been a move towards producing an ICPS. This included 
introducing standard definitions of concepts related to patient safety (see Runciman, et al., 
2009), as well as producing a conceptual framework (Figure 2.3) (Runciman, et al., 2010; 
Sherman, et al., 2009).  
 
Both Donabedian’s and Reason’s models of quality and safety form the foundations for the 
ICPS conceptual framework rather than sitting in opposition to or being replaced by it 
(Sherman, et al., 2009). Any changes or modifications to these models subsequently impact 
upon the construction of the ICPS conceptual framework. The authors of the ICPS 
conceptual framework recognise that as understanding of the determinants of healthcare 
processes and outcomes develop, the ICPS conceptual framework will develop and needs to 
“remain dynamic in the ever-changing world of healthcare” (Runciman, et al., 2010, p. 4). 
They specifically state that one such way of doing this is using qualitative research methods 
such as ethnography and discourse analysis, which will lead to a greater understanding of 
how the determinants of healthcare processes and outcomes develop.  
 




Figure 2.3: International Classification for Patient Safety conceptual framework. Reproduced 
from Sherman et al. (2009), International Journal for Quality in Healthcare, 21(1), by permission 
of Oxford University Press.  
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2.2.5  Identifying Patient Safety Incidents 
In order to identify the active failures, latent conditions and resident pathogens that 
contribute to safety incidents, it is first necessary to identify when a patient safety incident 
occurs. This can be when all of the holes line up and an adverse event occurs, or in cases of 
near-misses, where a barrier performs its function and stops the patient from being harmed 
(Reason, 2000). 
 
Consequently patient safety reporting is now a feature of all modern healthcare 
organisations, for example in the UK the NRLS collects confidential reports of patient safety 
incidents from healthcare professionals and organisations in the UK, which are then 
monitored. From these reports, trends and causes of incidents are identified, with patient 
safety alerts provided to relevant organisations so that they are able to change the systems 
in which the healthcare professionals operate. Prior to reforms to health and social care in 
the UK, the NRLS was operated by the NPSA, with responsibility for the system now resting 
with a sub-committee of the NHS Commissioning Board (Department of Health, 2010b).  
 
The NRLS was constructed based on the systems approach to safety (Department of 
Health, 2000b), as can be seen through the use of confidential reports which ensure that no 
healthcare professionals or patients are identified, thus reinforcing that it is not a system of 
blame. The first pilot of the NRLS resulted in problems with the data quality received and the 
technical implementation of the reporting system (Williams & Osborn, 2006). As a result, 
Williams and Osborn (2006) report that the NRLS became a bespoke system, which they 
identify as being essential in the development of a reporting system. Other lessons included 
emphasising a safety culture through the development of supporting tools such as root-
cause analysis training, implementing a learning and dissemination strategy alongside the 
reporting system, developing a strategy to promote new safety interventions and considering 
how to encourage compliance from front line healthcare professionals (Williams & Osborn, 
2006).  
 
The implementation of the NRLS has been associated with a change in organisational 
culture, with Hutchinson et al. (2009) finding that the longer acute hospitals were connected 
to the NRLS, the number of incidents that they reported increased, whilst at the same time 
their cultures were more orientated towards patient safety.  
 
However hospital reporting systems have received criticism as they are unable to identify as 
many safety incidents as other methods of incident identification, such as retrospective 
record reviews. Christiaans-Dingelhoff et al. (2011) compared retrospective record reviews 
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with informal and formal patient complaints, patient litigation and healthcare professional 
incident reports and found that only 3.6% of incidents identified by the retrospective record 
review were reported using the other mechanisms. Additionally, the severity ratings of 
medication errors often differ between time points and different professions (Williams & 
Ashcroft, 2009), which may suggest similar reporting differences also occur in other incident 
types.  
 
Although this suggests that the record review is the most comprehensive method of 
identifying safety incidents, it does have drawbacks. The main limitation is that it is 
expensive and time-consuming, requiring specially trained healthcare professionals to 
systematically search through the records of each patient (Woloshynowych, Neale, & 
Vincent, 2003).  
 
2.2.6  Process of Learning from Patient Safety Incidents 
Despite the limitations in the current methods of incident identification, they still act as a 
viable means of organisational learning. As awareness of patient safety issues continues to 
increase on both a national and local level, there are an increasing number of initiatives that 
aim to increase organisational learning around patient safety.  
 
Information collated from the NRLS and analysed by the NPSA is disseminated to NHS 
organisations in the form of patient safety alerts. These aim to increase awareness of 
common incidents that are being reported to the NRLS on a national scale, meaning that 
even if individual organisations are unaware there is a safety issue, they can still implement 
the changes and make their patients safer. Benn, Koutantji, et al. (2009) examined the 
processes for providing feedback to local organisations from incident reporting systems and 
identified the need for it to consist of a multiplicity of methods. These include providing broad 
information dissemination and multiple methods of feedback which will both raise awareness 
of issues most pertinent to frontline staff, further promote a patient safety culture and 
consequently encourage future reporting.  
 
A further method of organisational development is through educational sessions aimed to 
improve skills of various healthcare professionals and managers to fully explore patient 
safety incidents. For example the NPSA ran training sessions on root cause analysis, a 
retrospective method of exploring the origin of a patient safety incident. In particular it is a 
technique that is recognised as being aligned with the systems approach to safety in 
determining the active failures and latent conditions associated with an incident. An 
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evaluation of the programme (Wallace, et al., 2009) established that it enhanced knowledge 
amongst participants, although it was also highlighted that continued education is required in 
order for the participants to achieve a more consistent level of competency amongst 
participants. 
 
In addition to learning from patient safety incident reports, other factors need to be 
considered in relation to how organisations can learn about patient safety. Leape et al. 
(2009) identified five concepts that are essential to improving safety within healthcare 
organisations, which focus on integration of care services across boundaries, patient 
involvement, transparency, the restoration of joy and meaning in work for healthcare 
professionals and a reform to medical education.  
 
It is in relation to the first two of these concepts, the integration of care services across 
boundaries and patient involvement that the present study is situated, where the 
identification and reporting of patient safety incidents by patients themselves can arguably 
help to make organisational care transfers safer.  
 
2.2.7  Initiatives to Improve Safety in the North East of England 
Whilst on a national and international level there are a number of patient safety initiatives, 
such as reducing the number of venous thromboembolism occurrences and the number of 
wrong-site surgeries, there is also a need for local initiatives that aim to address local 
variations that occur in patient safety (Andermann, et al., 2011). 
 
On a local level, the North East SHA released a Patient Safety Strategic Framework (NHS 
North East, 2008) which provided a focus on specific clinical safety themes. These themes 
related closely to the major types of patient safety incidents and include ‘Managing the 
Deteriorating Patient’, ‘Drug Safety Issues’, ‘Healthcare Associated Infections’, ‘Suicide’, 
‘Safe Surgical Procedures’, ‘Care Transfers, Handovers and Discharges (Inter-Disciplinary 
and Inter-Agency Working)’, ‘Falls’, ‘Review of Outlying Mortality Rates for Conditions and 
Procedures to Identify Priorities for Action’ and ‘Safeguarding’.  
 
The framework recognised that these themes originated from a number of sources, such as 
local intelligence from serious untoward incidents (SUIs), local data from the NRLS, safety 
priorities of individual trusts and on a national level, evidence based guidance and feedback 
from clinicians and managers. The themes spanned a number of different organisations 
depending on their relevance, such as acute hospitals, mental health and primary care. For 
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each of the themes responsibility lies with the Patient Safety Action Team (PSAT), who have 
developed a number of internal ‘Objectives, Goals, Initiatives and Measures’ (OGIMs) that 
aim to give direction to the individual themes. 
 
It is within this Patient Safety Strategic Framework that the present research is positioned. 
The North East SHA sponsored this research with a specific focus on patient perceptions 
and reporting of safety under the theme of ‘Care Transfers, Handovers and Discharges 
(Inter-Disciplinary and Inter-Agency Working)’. An overview of this theme is provided in the 
next section, outlining the important patient safety issues that are related to organisational 
care transfers, including the types, identification and current reporting of incidents. 
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2.3  Care Transfers, Handovers and Discharges (Inter-Disciplinary and 
Inter-Agency Working) 
The overall objective of the care transfers theme was to ‘achieve a demonstrable 
improvement in the safety and quality of the patient experience in relation to care transfers’ 
(internal OGIM). Within this objective, there are a number of goals, initiatives and measures. 
Although not all relate to the present study, the ones that do are reported in Table 2.4. 
 
Goals Initiatives Measures 
 
Identify the core mandatory 
information required for 
effective onward patient 
referral to ensure safe and 
effective practice and to 
develop an assurance 
framework to support care 
transfers 
 
Recognition of existing 
good practice 
 





Patient stories about 
good/bad experience in 
relation to information 
supporting their care transfer 
 
Table 2.4: Goals, Initiatives and Measures from the Care Transfers OGIM of relevance to this 
study. 
 
The majority of research projects and governmental policy focus on safety within secondary 
healthcare organisations, such as in ‘An organisation with a memory’ (Department of Health, 
2000b). However healthcare is a series of complex interactions between many different 
organisations. More specifically, complex systems have been defined as “a collection of 
individual agents with freedom to act in ways that are not always totally predictable, and 
whose actions are interconnected so that one agent’s actions changes the context for other 
agents” (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 625). This complexity is further complicated by the 
unclear boundaries that exist in healthcare, such as professional roles and organisational 
responsibilities for patients. Within these complex systems there are many boundaries that 
patients will have to traverse during an episode of healthcare. Cook et al. (2000) identified 
that these transitions are particularly high in risk as the patient has to cross organisational 
and institutional boundaries, including commissioning and funding boundaries, which means 
moving between different professional roles, responsibilities and power. This increases the 
opportunities for active failures to occur. 
 
Organisational care transfers are an area of healthcare where many terms can be used to 
refer to similar processes. For example it is plausible to use the simple definition that every 
time a patient is transferred from one service to another, they are undertaking a care 
transfer. However from this definition it is unclear whether the patient is physically being 
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transferred from one provider to another, from one ward to another or their care is being 
transferred from one team to another but remain in the same physical location. Table 2.5 
provides a definition of the terms that were developed for the purpose of this study in relation 




Organisational Care Transfer / Care Transfer The transfer of a patient from one setting to 
another, where either or both the 
organisations are healthcare providers. This 
includes the Arrival (Admission), Journey 
and Departure (Discharge) stages of the 
transfer. 
Handover The transfer of professional responsibility 
and accountability for some or all aspects of 
care for a patient, or group of patients, to 
another person or professional group on a 
temporary or permanent basis. 
Departure (Discharge) The process by which a patient leaves their 
current location. If this is a healthcare 
provider, the departure is called a discharge. 
Arrival (Admission) The point at which a patient enters a 
location. If this is a healthcare provider, the 
arrival is called an admission. 
Journey The physical movement of a patient from one 
location to another, where at least one of the 
locations is a healthcare setting.  
 
Table 2.5: Definitions relating to care transfers used throughout this study. 
 
2.3.1  Number of Patient Safety Incidents in Organisational Care Transfers 
Care transfers have been highlighted to be high in risk, in particular inpatient-outpatient 
transitions (Arora & Farnan, 2008) and the care of patients post-discharge (Forster, et al., 
2003).  In a recent review of the literature, the incident rate of adverse events in care 
transfers has been estimated to be around 20% (Tsilimingras & Bates, 2008), in comparison 
to the regularly accepted healthcare average of around 10% in other care settings.  
 
Despite these explorations of incident rates, the number of incidents reported around care 
transfers in the North East of England has been far lower. The North East Ambulance 
Service (NEAS) provides healthcare transport to regional counties including 
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham and Teesside, serving a population of 
approximately 2.6 million people (North East Ambulance Service, 2011). Despite responding 
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to more than 900 emergency calls a day and transporting more than 4000 patients a day 
(North East Ambulance Service, 2011), NEAS have a very low reported incidence rate of 
adverse events. The NPSA release bi-yearly figures for the number of safety incidents 
reported to the NRLS by each NHS organisation; for the period of 1st April 2010 to 30th 
September 2010, NEAS only reported 5 incidents over the space of 3 months. These five 
incidents are presented in Table 2.6 alongside the UK average for all Ambulance Trusts over 
the space of six months. 
 
Incident Category NEAS (% unavailable) UK Average for 
Ambulance Trusts 
Access, admission, transfer, 
discharge (including missing patient) 
1 56.8 
Clinical assessment (including 






Disruptive, aggressive behaviour 0 8.3 
Implementation of care and ongoing 
monitoring / review 
0 6.2 
Infrastructure (including staffing, 
facilities, environment) 
0 9.8 
Medical device / equipment 0 20 
Medication 0 7.8 
Patient accident 3 40.3 
Treatment, procedure 0 14.8 
All other categories 1 15.2 
 
Table 2.6: Incident classifications and rates of patient safety incidents reported to the NRLS by 
NEAS and the UK average from 1
st
 April 2010 to 30
th
 September 2010 (NPSA, 2011c). 
 
The NRLS also provides reports on the number of incidents occurring in relation to ‘access, 
admission, transfer and discharge (including missing patient)’ for all NHS Trusts. As a 
percentage of all incidents reported, these only comprise 8% (where data is available), 
suggesting that not all incidents are currently identified in care transfers. The numbers of 
incidents in this category for local NHS Trusts (excluding Ambulance) are presented in Table 
2.7. 
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NHS Trust Number of Incidents (%) 
 
Period of Months 
County Durham PCT 14 (5.3) 6 
Darlington PCT 8 (2.97) 1 
Gateshead PCT 22 (11.76) 6 
Hartlepool PCT 5 (no data available) 1 
Middlesbrough PCT 4 (no data available) 1 
Northumberland Care Trust 26 (10.7) 3 
South Tyneside PCT 15 (6.02) 6 
Stockton-on-Tees Teaching 
PCT 
1 (no data available) 1 
Sunderland Teaching PCT 30 (12.1) 6 
 
Table 2.7: Number of incidents occurring during access, admission, transfer and discharge 
(including missing patients) from 1
st
 April 2010 to 30
th
 September 2010 (NPSA, 2011c). 
 
The data collected by the NPSA was indicative only of the number of incidents reported by 
NHS Trusts, and did not necessarily factor in incidents occurring when patients are 
transferred to social care or private healthcare organisations. Similarly, it is likely that 
incidents occurring when patients are transferred by other means, such as taxis or private 
cars are not reported. Despite this, the number of reported incidents was considerably lower 
than would be expected based on previous research (i.e. Forster, et al., 2004; Forster, et al., 
2003; Tsilimingras & Bates, 2008) and on other ambulance trusts, where the next lowest 
number of reported incidents are 56 over a period of 6 months. This is suggestive of a poor 
patient safety culture within NEAS in comparison to other ambulance trusts where reporting 
of incidents is either not encouraged or not viewed as a priority.  
 
2.3.2  Different Categories of Journeys 
Due to the disjointed and complex nature of healthcare, there are a number of different 
locations patients can be transferred to and from, such as primary and secondary care, 
private residences, nursing homes and social care homes. With the increasing emphasis of 
competition within healthcare in the UK and the move to CCGs that has been proposed with 
the Health and Social Care Bill, which at the time of writing is awaiting its second reading in 
the House of Lords, this is likely to increase the number of healthcare providers as private 
organisations begin to play a bigger role in the provision of healthcare. As the number of 
providers increase, it is possible that the numbers of transfers between them are also likely 
to increase resulting in a greater requirement for safer care during these transfers.  
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Cwinn et al. (2009) identified that there is a gap in the literature that focused on the safety of 
organisational care transfers between nursing homes and acute care and found that 
information gaps occurred in 85.5% of all cases that they studied. This is considerably higher 
than other reports of handovers; however it is perhaps indicative of crossing different types 
of organisational boundaries where information gaps may not be classified as a patient 
safety incident, providers may have different requirements and standards for information or 
due to the use of incompatible systems. Nonetheless, it emphasises the complexity of 
healthcare and the need for a greater exploration of safety incidents within organisational 
care transfers. 
 
2.3.3  Types of Adverse Events in Organisational Care Transfers 
There are a number of different types of patient safety incidents that occur during 
organisational care transfers. However the number of studies exploring these have been 
minimal, and as such there is scope for a wider range of adverse events to be identified, 
including those that may not have been identified within acute or primary care settings. The 
NPSA, when reporting the number of safety incidents in Ambulance Trusts use the same 
classification of incidents as all other healthcare settings such as acute settings (Table 2.6). 
 
The types of incidents reported by to the NRLS differ significantly to those found using other 
methods of incident identification that are frequently used in research, such as retrospective 
record reviews, telephone interviews and prospective observations. The incidents identified 
in the literature often relate to one specific stage of the transfer, such as admission or 
discharge, and in few cases the journey itself. For this reason the incident rates are not 
comparable between those reported to the NRLS and those reported in the literature. 
Naessens et al. (2009) came to a similar conclusion when comparing patient safety 
indicators, provider-reported events and global trigger tool findings, stating that the number 
and types of adverse events reported differed depending on the method of detection. 
 
It is thought that the majority of post-discharge adverse events are due to medication errors 
(Forster, et al., 2004; Forster, et al., 2003), although they are also common during the 
admission process (Tam, et al., 2005). During admission to hospital medication 
reconciliations are often conducted if any changes are needed to the patient’s medication. 
Aronson (2009) identifies four types of medication error that can occur during the prescribing 
stage; knowledge-based errors, action-based errors, memory-based errors and rule-based 
errors. The former three of these are active failures, whereas the latter is a latent failure, as 
defined by the Swiss-Cheese model of safety (Reason, 2000).  
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Any error made during admission is likely to impact upon the patient both during their stay 
and post-discharge unless any mistakes are addressed accurately in the discharge 
summary. Perren et al. (2009) identified that omitted and unjustified medications are a major 
cause of safety incidents during the discharge process, suggesting that when mistakes have 
been made they are not addressed at a later time, resulting in longer-lasting harm.  
 
A lack of adherence with medication further affects the safety of a patient, including 
increased mortality and relapses of disease symptoms (Lehane & McCarthy, 2009). 
Medication safety is particularly pertinent to elderly people being discharged from hospital as 
they are likely to be on numerous medications. Despite this, elderly service users have been 
reported to be dissatisfied with the management of medicines on discharge from hospital 
(Knight, et al., 2011). 
 
Due to the nature of organisational care transfers often revolving around either moving the 
patient or the patient moving themselves, falls are another major source of adverse events, 
particularly in the elderly (Tsilimingras, Brummel-Smith, & Brooks, 2009). There have been a 
considerable number of studies exploring the incident rates of falls in hospitals and 
interventions to reduce them, however there have been far fewer studies exploring this issue 
during organisational care transfers. Forster et al. (2004; 2003) found that post-discharge 
falls account for between 2-4% of adverse events, whilst Davenport et al. (2009) found that 
patients who fall whilst in hospital are at a high risk of falls post-discharge. Within the North 
East of England, reducing the number of falls in the community, which naturally includes 
patients post-discharge, can have both financial and operational benefits for the local 
ambulance service (Newton, et al., 2006).  
 
Linked to falls are adverse events surrounding the use of ambulance stretchers during 
patient transfers which can lead to severe harm to the patient or even death (Wang, et al., 
2009). Comprehensive data on the number of falls that occur during transfers is currently 
unavailable, although the study by Wang et al. (2009) highlight that the issue is of 
importance. 
 
The third most common patient safety incident identified by Forster et al. (2004) are 
healthcare acquired infections. These can take many different forms and occur in all areas of 
healthcare, though the most common are predominantly hospital-based such as 
gastrointestinal, urinary tract and surgical site infections (Smyth, et al., 2008). Because of 
this, it can be suggested that the majority of instances of healthcare acquired infections 
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arising during the care transfer occur during the normal process of care but are then missed 
during handover, whether on admission or discharge, or present themselves post-discharge.  
 
2.3.4  Causes and Impact of Patient Safety Incidents in Organisational Care Transfers 
As with all types of adverse events, both latent conditions and active failures can lead to 
patient safety incidents occurring within organisational care transfers. The difference is that 
when patients are going through a care transfer, there are often more and different types of 
hazards than in other care settings, such as the process of medication reconciliation, the 
transfer of patient information and the physical movement of often fragile patients. There are 
also more gaps present in organisational care transfers (Cook, Render, & Woods, 2000) 
meaning that it is easier for the defences, barriers and safeguards to line up, which 
consequently leads to an increased number of hazards reaching the patient.  
 
There is a limited amount of research exploring the causes of adverse events in 
organisational care transfers, however one cause that is regularly highlighted is the 
inconsistent transfer of patient information during the hand-off and handover processes and 
a lack of communication between healthcare providers and professionals (Arora & Farnan, 
2008; Hains, et al., 2011; Kripalani, et al., 2007; Ye, et al., 2007).  
 
Hains et al. (2011) explored what impacted upon the quality and safety of patients during 
non-emergency transport and generated three key components; communication, efficiency 
and appropriateness. Communication encompasses telephone calls to arrange transfers, 
documentation of patient information and standardised protocols for the transfer of the 
patient. Efficiency focuses on time delays and poor resources, whilst appropriateness 
centres on the necessity of transport, personnel, equipment, method of transport and 
education. Furthermore, Hains et al. (2011) highlighted that patient outcomes in relation to 
quality and safety in care transfers are rarely measured, implying that the outcome of an 
adverse event occurring during the transfer is often unknown. 
 
Where patient outcomes have been explored, it has been suggested that patient safety 
incidents impact upon how patients perceive their continuity of care and the trust that they 
place in the healthcare system. Kripalani et al. (2007) highlighted that poor communication 
between hospital-based and primary care physicians had a negative effect on the continuity 
of patient care. Gulliford et al. (2006) define continuity of care as either a continuous 
relationship with an individual healthcare professional or a seamless service embedded 
within a multi-disciplinary team. The latter applies to organisational care transfers, and 
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engages both patient perspectives, such as satisfaction, and service delivery from the 
provider perspective. 
 
Furthermore, low continuity of care is associated with lower levels of trust in healthcare 
professionals, which can impact upon the quality and outcomes of care (Mainous, et al., 
2001). The role of trust is further explored in relation to how patients perceive their own 
safety by Pandhi et al. (2008) who found that in older patients, those who have continuity of 
care felt safer. With regards to iatrogenic illnesses, Entwistle and Quick (2006) identified that 
patients are able to identify safety incidents without always affecting the trust that they have 
in their healthcare providers; depending on the severity and nature of the incident. Likewise, 
patients participating in their own safety is not likely to weaken the trust that they have in 
their healthcare providers (Schwappach & Wernli, 2010). 
 
2.3.5  Efforts to Improve the Safety of Organisational Care Transfers 
Few efforts have been made to reduce the number of safety incidents occurring during care 
transfers. They predominantly focus on improving the transfer of information and 
communication between healthcare professionals. Boockvar et al. (2010) found that the use 
of electronic health records to improve information transfer proved to be unsuccessful with 
the same number of medication safety incidents occurring as when paper health records 
were used. This is suggestive of there being a need for an alternative method of reducing 
patient safety incidents within healthcare services around the time of an organisational care 
transfer. For example medication reconciliation can be improved through employing 
dedicated staff and reducing the reliance on computerised systems (Boockvar, et al., 2010).  
 
2.3.6  Demographics of Patients Being Transferred 
Within the North East of England most care transfers are conducted by the Patient Transport 
Service (PTS) branch of NEAS (NEAS, 2011), where patients are predominantly older 
people that may be frail (Department of Health, 1998). Consequently the incident rates and 
types of adverse events differ considerably to younger patients (Rowell, et al., 2010), and it 
has also been identified that older patients are more likely to experience an adverse event 
post-discharge than other age groups, a result of discontinuity of care (Tsilimingras, 
Brummel-Smith, & Brooks, 2009).  
 
Inefficient communication between healthcare professionals has been identified to affect the 
safety of older patients during care transfers (Cwinn, et al., 2009), however Hastings et al. 
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(2011) found older people may not understand discharge information due to poor 
communication strategies, potentially impacting upon their safety.  
 
The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (2011) has recently reported on the 
care of ten older people receiving care in the NHS and identified that there is a “gulf between 
the principles and values of the NHS Constitution and the felt reality of being an older person 
in the care of the NHS in England” (p.7). The report also highlights that the care of older 
people focuses predominantly on resolving the clinical condition rather than providing a 
compassionate and considerate service that responds to the social and emotional needs of 
the patient and their families.   
 
2.3.7  Dominance of the Medical Model in Patient Safety 
This same dominance of the medical model which focuses on clinical outcomes can also be 
seen within the field of patient safety. In particular the current definitions of what is classed 
as a patient safety incident, whether in the literature or policy, focus predominantly on the 
clinical definitions of safety, often excluding the way that patients view safety. 
 
In addition, healthcare services rely predominantly upon healthcare professionals to identify 
and report safety incidents, whether through the NRLS or other means such as trigger tools 
and record reviews. As these methods are based upon healthcare professional definitions of 
safety and utilise quantitative methods of analysis to identify safety incidents, they may 
reduce the role of patients being involved in their own safety. Ocloo (2010) suggests that this 
dominance of the medical profession helps to construct patient harm further through 
concealing social processes such as power, especially when positioned within a blame 
culture that conceals incidents.  
 
Health services throughout the world are becoming more aware of the requirement for 
patients to become more involved in their healthcare, which will in turn reduce the dominant 
model currently in place. The next section of this chapter will discuss patient and public 
involvement in healthcare with a focus on how patients can become involved in their own 
safety.  
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2.4  Patient and Public Involvement 
There is an increasing emphasis for patients and the public to contribute to their healthcare, 
including the planning, development and more recently the commissioning of services. There 
are a number of different terminologies that can be used when discussing involvement, such 
as empowerment, engagement and representation. These are representative of 
consumerism and participatory democracy; polar opposites on the continuum of patient and 
public involvement. According to the continuum, consumerism places the patient as a 
consumer in a neo-liberal setting that is deserving of satisfaction through services 
responding to their needs, whilst participatory democracy places the emphasis upon citizen 
rights to shape the services that they receive (Kreindler, 2009). 
 
Current patient and public involvement (PPI) policy displays both neo-liberalist and 
participatory democratic features. Both of these developed through different approaches to 
PPI, with a consumerist approach linked with neo-liberalism adopted by a Conservative 
government wanting to increase efficiency in the early 1990s, and further developed by the 
following Labour government in 1997 to emphasise quality through the inclusion of 
participatory democratic traits in policy (Gibson, Britten, & Lynch, 2012). 
 
One central theme of neo-liberalism; placing a greater emphasis upon market forces and the 
role of the consumer (Heywood, 2012) is evident within reforms to health and social care 
introduced in ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ (Department of Health, 2010a) 
where there is to be increased competition from private providers, and a greater emphasis 
placed upon patient satisfaction and experiences. The impact upon PPI is clear in the 
conversion of LINks to HealthWatch England and local HealthWatch organisations, which 
are to be located in the Care Quality Commission and are proposed to promote choice and 
facilitate in complaints advocacy.  
 
Despite this, the participatory democratic approach to PPI still exists in the form of service 
users being involved in the commissioning of healthcare services via clinical commissioning 
groups, which will be separated from the more apparent consumerist approaches. This 
separation is arguably a result of the two approaches forming on different ends of the 
continuum (Kreindler, 2009), and reduces the impact of democratic approaches upon 
healthcare delivery as it is still unclear how service users will be involved in the 
commissioning of services other than for their experiences to be measured in a consumerist 
fashion, using approaches to involvement synonymous with market research, such as 
satisfaction surveys (Vukmer, 2006).  
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Despite healthcare policy moving towards a more consumerist approach, for the purpose of 
this research PPI is used throughout to represent the participatory democratic nature of the 
research rather than as a consumerist tool. 
 
The different roles that people play and the power issues that accompany these two 
approaches are discussed below in relation to the term PPI. However it is a combination of 
these issues and the policy context of PPI that frames its use throughout this study. In 
addition, involvement is seen as a none-threatening term to healthcare professionals, 
patients and the public (Shaw & Baker, 2004), where definitions of PPI are similar across 
these groups, and include respect, dialogue and shared decision making (Rise, et al., 2011). 
 
2.4.1  Policy Context of Patient and Public Involvement 
The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a) outlined the need to improve the patient 
experience whilst at the same time making healthcare safer. Methods of involving patients 
and the public in healthcare decisions include a variety of mechanisms, such as patient 
choice over their healthcare provider, patient advocates (via the Patient Advice and Liaison 
Service; PALS) and Local Involvement Networks (LINks). More recently the Department of 
Health (2009c) released a guide on patient and public engagement that specified three 
objectives: to provide world-class health and social care that is patient-centred, to use 
patient experience to improve healthcare quality and to engage and empower patients and 
the public. This has been further reinforced by the recent white paper Equity and Excellence: 
Liberating the NHS (Department of Health, 2010a), which despite the changes in healthcare 
commissioning still champions PPI and introduces the concept of ‘nothing about me without 
me’.  
 
The principles behind PPI are to move away from national initiatives and systems that drive 
choices, but instead focus on local initiatives that are guided by patients (Department of 
Health, 2004), which in turn makes local healthcare services more accountable to the people 
that they serve. Although healthcare organisations listening to patients is not a new process, 
with initiatives dating back to Local Voices (NHS Management Executive, 1992) and earlier, 
as reported by Florin & Dixon (2004), it has been deemed that there is room for further 
improvement (Department of Health, 2010a). The NHS Act 2006 also now makes patient 
and public involvement a statutory obligation for healthcare commissioners and providers, 
with patient and public engagement a key component of world class commissioning 
(Department of Health, 2007). With the release of The Health Act 2009, the NHS 
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Constitution (Department of Health, 2010c) came into force, which in relation to involvement 
grants two rights to patients;  
 
• “the right to be involved in discussions and decisions about your healthcare, and to 
be given information to enable you to do this” (p. 10) 
• “the right to be involved, directly or through representatives, in the planning of 
healthcare services, the development and consideration of proposals for changes in 
the way those services are provided, and in decisions to be made affecting the 
operation of those services” (p.11) 
 
Despite such initiatives, government policies have regularly identified that although patients 
are often talked to, they are rarely listened to (Department of Health, 2000a), and there is a 
need to “move from a service that does things to and for patients to one that is patient-led, 
where the service works with patients to support them with their needs” (Department of 
Health, 2005, p. 3, emphasis authors' own). The Picker Institute (2007) found from 26 
national patient surveys that patients are not involved in as many decisions as they wish to 
be. Perhaps a reason for this is that there is currently a limited amount of evidence either 
supporting or opposing PPI (Crawford, et al., 2002; Staniszewska, Herron-Marx, & Mockford, 
2008). 
 
2.4.2  The Evidence for Patient and Public Involvement in Healthcare 
Several factors have contributed to the existence of only a small evidence base, including 
poor quality research, such as difficulties matching outcomes to PPI and the democratic and 
ethical nature of PPI, which is that because patients and the public fund the NHS, they 
deserve to be involved in the management of it (Crawford, et al., 2002; Staniszewska, 
Herron-Marx, & Mockford, 2008). However despite the lack of evidence, there is the potential 
for a number of outcomes relating to PPI in healthcare, including an improvement in 
accountability, service quality and service provision (Andersson, Tritter, & Wilson, 2006; 
Crawford, et al., 2002). In particular, patient reports of healthcare, such as satisfaction, can 
lead to significant changes in hospitals by acting as an incentive for change (Longo, et al., 






















Figure 2.4: Ladder of citizen involvement (Arnstein, 1969). 
 
Arnstein (1969) first proposed the ladder of citizen involvement which provides a hierarchal 
relationship between the different stages; moving from non-participation to certain degrees 
of tokenism and finally degrees of citizen (public) power. According to Arnstein’s model of 
involvement, genuine involvement requires that power is transferred; in this instance from 
policy holders, healthcare professionals and managers to patients and the public. Tritter 
(2009) argues that as well as power affecting the levels of involvement, so does method and 
expectation. It is therefore necessary to create a balanced approach that incorporates each 
of these factors when planning user involvement. Furthermore Arnstein’s model does not 
take into account the outcomes of user involvement, instead working on the assumption that 
with greater levels of power, the greater the outcomes (Tritter & McCallum, 2006). 
 
By incorporating Arnstein’s ladder of involvement into healthcare, it is possible to explore the 
current levels of involvement, and in turn how power has been devolved to patients and the 
public. However within healthcare, power is complicated as patients may not want to be 
involved depending upon their individual characteristics. These can be split into three 
categories; their need for healthcare (type of illness and seriousness), personal 
characteristics (knowledge / expertise and personality) and professional relationships (trust) 
(Thompson, 2007).  
 
For those who do wish to be involved in their healthcare, there are not always mechanisms 
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everyone. For example involving people in commissioning and health research involves a 
relatively small number of patients, and as such decisions need to be made when deciding 
who to involve (Williamson, 2007). 
 
2.4.3  Determining Who to Involve in Healthcare 
As patients are not homogenous, but bring with them a wide range of demographics, 
conditions, knowledge and experience of healthcare, their perspectives naturally differ from 
one-another. Current healthcare policy aimed at increasing PPI is often vague and fails to 
expand upon any of these individual characteristics, which potentially results in certain 
‘types’ of individual often being consulted or others being excluded. Therefore out of those 
that are willing to be involved in their healthcare, a clear approach to identifying which 
patients and members of the public to be involved is required.  
 
Williamson (2007) identifies three types of knowledge and expertise that healthcare 
professionals attain in order to perform their functions; concrete (direct experience), 
theoretical (ideological and ethical) and a mixture of the two (subject specialism). Similar 
types of knowledge and experience exist within patients and the public, albeit not always at 
an individual level. Instead, Williamson (2007) suggests that they are spread throughout 
three different types of people. Individual patients often hold concrete knowledge, focused 
around their direct experiences of healthcare. Patient group members have a subject 
specialism, understanding and able to represent similar patients’ views whilst having a broad 
knowledge of policies and practices. Finally, patient advocates or representatives possess 
the theoretical knowledge and often operate as professional patients, explaining the wider 
patient perspective but sometimes lacking in the concrete or subject specialism that other 
types of patients possess. Since patients, unlike healthcare professionals, do not often hold 
all three types of knowledge, all three types of the patient should be involved in healthcare 
so as to obtain as wide a perspective as possible.  
 
2.4.3.1  Expert Patients 
A further form of PPI in healthcare is expert patients, who are now widely recognised by 
healthcare professionals as being specialists in their own conditions (Donaldson, 2003). 
Anybody can be classed as an expert patient as long as they hold both concrete and 
theoretical knowledge about their care, thus developing a subject specialism. The benefits of 
being acknowledged as an expert patient are an improvement in self-efficacy and the 
encouragement to take an active role in their healthcare (Donaldson, 2003), whilst at the 
same it can change the balance of power in favour of the patient.  
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2.4.3.2  Patient Safety Champions 
In addition to expert patients, the Department of Health (2006) highlighted the need for 
patients and the public to become patient safety champions to help to improve healthcare 
services by shaping them to the requirements of patients. In the UK, the charity Action 
against Medical Accidents (AvMA) partnered with the NPSA to develop a network of patient 
safety champions that were aligned to the SHAs. As such, the champions represent patient 
views from the local area on a national scale and likewise provide feedback from national 
meetings of champions to the PSAT in the NESHA and to patients within their own network, 
such as LINks and the Patient, Carer and Public Engagement network. These champions 
are often classed as expert patients, but are then trained further in wider patient safety 
principles, meaning that they can provide similar input as patient safety experts into policy 
and practice, whilst at the same time still representing the patient perspective.  
 
2.4.4  Patient and Public Involvement in Patient Safety 
As has been identified, there is a clear justification for involving both patients and the public 
in their healthcare, and the network of patient safety champions is a move towards involving 
people in patient safety on a strategic level, as opposed to an individual level. This is evident 
regardless of where PPI is deemed to lie on the consumerism-participatory democracy 
continuum. Although this justification is clear, Vincent and Coulter (2002) highlighted the lack 
of patient involvement in patient safety as being remarkable given that the patient is the 
central component of all healthcare. This is still evident, although there has now been an 
increasing amount of research exploring what role the patient can have in their safety and 
the associated outcomes. It was Vincent and Coulter (2002) who outlined the original 
framework for patient involvement in safety, exploring how patients can become involved 
(Table 2.8). 
 
Helping to reach an accurate diagnosis. 
Deciding appropriate treatment and management strategy. 
Choosing an experienced and safe provider. 
Ensuring treatment is appropriately administered, monitored and adhered 
to. 
Identifying side effects or adverse events and taking action. 
 
Table 2.8: The patient’s role in promoting safety (Vincent & Coulter, 2002). 
 
One possible reason for this lack of PPI in safety is that the majority of safety theories, 
models and cultures come from an engineering context, where there is no room for large 
variances in the product or outcome. Lyons (2007) provided a safety engineering (human 
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factors) perspective to PPI in safety, arguing that patients are able to act as a further barrier 
to preventing safety incidents from occurring, but that emphasis should still be placed on the 
technological systems.  
 
An example of where patients can play a role in their safety is in the reduction of healthcare 
acquired infections. Hand-washing has long been established in reducing nosocomial 
infections (e.g. Barrett-Connor, 1972); however there is often a lack of adherence by 
healthcare professionals which require educational interventions (Harne-Britner, Allen, & 
Fowler, 2011). Studies exploring the role that patients can play have found that patients are 
willing to query if the healthcare professional has washed their hands (Bittle & LaMarche, 
2009), which can result in increased hand-washing compliance (McGuckin, et al., 2001).  
 
Furthermore, the NPSA (2006a) launched the Please Ask campaign which encourages PPI 
in all aspects of healthcare. However there is a particular emphasis on safety, promoting ten 
tips that patients can follow to ensure that they are safe. These include making healthcare 
professionals aware of any allergies, ask questions when uncertain, ensure staff have the 
correct personal information and to ask the healthcare professionals if they have washed 
their hands (NPSA, 2006b), although the latter of these introduces power issues between 
service users and healthcare professionals.  
 
Despite it being important for there to be a reliance on the systems approach to safety, it is 
still argued that patient involvement can be effective in improving safety, as long as the 
burden or reliance of safety does not rest with the patient, but that they are a safety buffer 
created through interactions with safety-orientated healthcare professionals (Davis, et al., 
2007). Leape et al. (2009) report that patient involvement (‘nothing about me without me’) is 
essential to providing safer care by introducing the patient, family members and carers as 
partners in their care. By becoming partners in their healthcare, patients can contribute to 
the construction of a shared understanding of patient safety (Hovey, et al., 2010) rather than 
being passive recipients in a medically dominated domain.  
 
2.4.5  Current Mechanisms for Patients to Report Safety Incidents 
Patient perspectives on the outcome of their care are starting to become increasingly 
considered, particularly within the NHS. Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) are 
now being used in the evaluation of healthcare outcomes to determine the quality of care 
provided from the patients’ perspective. Devlin and Appleby (2010) state that PROMs offer 
enormous potential in areas of the NHS where data on quality is often poor or non-existent. 
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One such area is the reporting of patient safety incidents, especially within organisational 
care transfers where only 5 incidents have been reported in the North East of England 
(NPSA, 2011c).  
 
Vincent and Coulter (2002) identified that patients can play a role in identifying safety 
incidents and subsequently taking action. Currently there are three processes by which 
patients can report safety incidents; informal discussions with staff members, making a 
formal complaint or making a patient safety report to the NPSA and litigation.  
 
2.4.5.1  Informal Feedback 
Patients are often inclined to speak up when they see something that concerns them 
regarding their healthcare. Entwistle et al. (2010) found that this willingness depended upon 
a number of factors, such as their perception of the severity of the incident and confidence 
about their grounds for concern, the perceived workloads and priorities of staff, and the 
impact that speaking up would have upon their healthcare. By speaking up about safety 
concerns, patients can improve their own safety and healthcare professionals can learn 
about being safer through the identification of active failures. However informal discussions 
do not lead to the resolution of latent conditions existing within healthcare organisations as 
root cause analysis cannot be performed where reports do not exist. Additionally, where 
there is a poor patient safety culture, healthcare professionals may perceive a patient 
questioning the safety of their clinical practice as an attempt to blame them and a threat to 
either their reputation or an impending litigation. In this circumstance, the healthcare 
professional is unlikely to learn from the incident. 
 
2.4.5.2  Patient Complaints 
The analysis of patient complaints can lead to organisational learning (Department of Health, 
2009a; Jonsson & Ovretveit, 2008) through the identification of both active and latent 
failures. However patient complaints do not always give a reliable overview of safety as they 
can also relate to other aspects of healthcare quality, such as optimality and efficiency. In 
addition, only around 5% of people who are unhappy with their healthcare go on to make a 
complaint (National Audit Office, 2008), possibly due to patients often justifying why a 
problem had arisen in the first place (Hunt, et al., 2009). Healthcare literature (e.g. 
Sorensen, et al., 2010) and policy (NPSA, 2005) aims to reduce the number of complaints by 
apologising when something has gone wrong, although in an Australian setting this has 
been found to be unsuccessful as it does not meet the needs or expectations of the patient 
and family members (Iedema, et al., 2011). Reducing complaints can have a negative 
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impact upon the organisational learning that can occur from exploring complaints, however it 
can be assumed that in a safety orientated culture that the incident would instead be 
reported elsewhere, meaning that organisational learning can still occur.  
 
If patients are unwilling to make a complaint about their healthcare, they can report a patient 
safety incident to the NRLS in a similar manner to healthcare professionals via an online 
form (NPSA, 2010b). This allows patients to provide data to be used alongside healthcare 
professional reports which can feed into patient safety alerts released by the NPSA. 
However this form of reporting is very scarce, perhaps due to patients being unaware of its 
existence and also that it is limited to online reporting only. 
 
2.4.5.3  Litigation 
The final form of action that a patient can take is through litigation, which is initiated through 
the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA). According to the NHSLA, 6,652 claims were made for 
clinical negligence in 2009/10, whilst 4,074 were made for non-clinical negligence (NHS 
Litigation Authority, 2010). As litigation usually only occurs when severe harm has been 
caused, the Department of Health (2000b) identified that it can be used for organisational 
learning from the most serious of incidents that are generally avoidable. The learning that 
can occur from litigation is often mirrored by patient complaints, as is demonstrated by 
Jonsson and Ovretveit (2008) and Christiaans-Dingelhoff et al. (2011). 
 
2.4.6  Issues Associated with Current Methods of Patient Reporting of Safety 
One of the greatest difficulties associated with how patients can report safety is how closely 
it is linked to patient satisfaction. Burroughs et al. (2005) found a strong link between patient-
reported satisfaction and concerns over safety, whilst Kuzel et al. (2004) identified that by 
classifying emotional distress as a patient harm, the boundary between patient satisfaction 
and patient safety is blurred by the subjective perceptions individuals bring to the situation.  
 
In addition to this blurred boundary, there are also discrepancies between patients when 
asked to be involved in their own safety depending upon the healthcare professional 
involved in their care. McGuckin et al. (2001) found that when evaluating a hand-washing 
campaign, patients were far more likely to ask nurses if they had washed their hands rather 
than physicians. Davis et al. (2007) identified five factors associated with patients becoming 
involved in their safety; patient-related, illness-related, healthcare professional-related, 
healthcare setting-related and task-related. These each relate closely to those identified by 
Thompson’s (2007) dynamic dimensions of involvement but with a focus on patient safety.  
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Within the literature there also tends to be a negative focus on patient safety, with an 
overemphasis on what goes wrong in healthcare and methods that can be used to resolve 
issues. This is especially evident within patient reporting of safety, where King et al. (2010) 
identified that at the time of reviewing the literature (up until April 2008), all studies exploring 
patient reporting of safety focused on asking service users about being unsafe rather than 
safe.  
 
2.4.7  Patient Perceptions of Safety 
A fundamental issue related to patient reporting of safety incidents is that of the varied 
definitions of safety. It is becoming more widely recognised that patients define medical 
errors differently to healthcare professionals (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Burroughs, et al., 
2007; Masso Guijarro, et al., 2010; Mazor, et al., 2010). More specifically, Burroughs et al. 
(2007) found that in the USA service users define medical errors to include falls, 
communication problems and responsiveness in addition to the clinical mistakes currently 
regarded as defining patient safety. This is further supported by Kuzel et al. (2004), who 
include emotional distress as a potential harm to a patient.  
 
In addition to defining safety differently to healthcare professionals, Schwappach (2008) and 
Weissman et al. (2008) have both found that service users identify more than twice as many 
service user safety incidents than those found in clinical records, leaving potential for service 
users to play a role in reporting incidents, which is further supported by Coulter (2006). 
Evans et al. (2006) found that in Australia patient-reporting of incidents and medical records 
show similar levels of safety incidents. However it can be argued that although there are 
similar levels of incidents, they are different incidents being reported.  
 
This is supported by Naessens et al. (2009) who suggest that different methods of incident 
identification can result in different incidents being detected. Evans et al. (2006) and Masso 
Guijarro et al. (2010) both suggest that service user reports of adverse events appear 
credible, giving further foundation for developing a service user mechanism for identifying 
and reporting adverse events. 
  
2.4.8  Active Involvement of Patients in Reporting Safety Incidents 
As has been identified, there are a number of issues regarding the current methods of 
reporting safety incidents. The most apparent of these is that there is still a blame culture 
within many areas of the healthcare service, whether this is within individual teams or across 
Page | 57  
 
organisations (Deilkas & Hofoss, 2010). This has an impact upon the number of incidents 
that are reported by healthcare professionals, which is evident in the number of incidents 
reported to the NRLS by NEAS. Further to this, it has been suggested that the systems 
approach to safety has not adequately reached frontline healthcare professionals (Waring, 
2007).  
 
Although the culture within NEAS has not been measured and reported, it is conceivable that 
from the number of incidents reported that a poor reporting culture and potentially a poor 
safety culture exists. To resolve the issue of poor reporting there are a number of methods 
organisations and regulatory bodies can implement, such as working to change 
organisational cultures and, as health services become more marketised, through the 
introduction of reporting targets to contracts.  
 
An alternative to this is the active involvement of patients in the reporting of incidents, much 
in the same way that healthcare professionals can report incidents. Although healthcare 
organisations have the opportunity to learn from patient complaints, litigation and reports to 
the NRLS, each of these have considerable limitations. Instead, if healthcare organisations 
actively seek patient reports of safety it is possible that there will be greater potential for 
organisational learning, as they can provide a unique and exciting perspective (Pham, et al., 
2010). 
 
Friedman et al. (2008) explored patient identification and reporting of incidents in 
comparison to healthcare professionals and found that patients were likely to identify largely 
preventable adverse events, and those that were identified were often different to those that 
healthcare professionals report. Weissman et al. (2008) came to the same conclusion after 
comparing patient reports of safety with incidents found through medical record reviews. 
 
The method of receiving the patient reports is more ambiguous, with King et al. (2010) 
identifying a lack of literature on methods to solicit patient reports of safety incidents, stating 
that from the evidence available, a mixture between closed- and open-ended questions is 
required which will allow for appropriate causal analysis and cater for patients who may not 
understand medical terminology. 
 
2.5  Chapter Summary 
Awareness of the need for patient safety is increasing throughout healthcare services in the 
UK, with reports stating that approximately 10% of people are harmed by the healthcare that 
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they receive. As a result, patient safety is now a central component of healthcare policy so 
as to provide safe, high quality care for all patients receiving care in the NHS. 
 
This figure doubles in the context of organisational care transfers, where it has been 
estimated that patient safety incidents occur in approximately 20% of cases as a result of 
people falling through gaps in organisational boundaries. This emphasises the reason why 
there is a need for accurate reporting of patient safety incidents when people are having 
their care transferred, so that the healthcare systems in which healthcare professionals 
operate can be made safer through the identification of active failures and latent conditions.  
 
In the North East of England, data on the number of incidents reported suggests that not all 
incidents are reported based on estimations, especially within NEAS where over a 3 month 
period, despite transporting more than 4000 patients a day, only 5 incidents were reported. 
Although this is only indicative of the journey stage of the transfer, excluding the admission 
(arrival) and discharge (departure) stages, it is still reflective of a poor patient safety culture, 
which has the potential to impact upon the safety of patients.  
 
There are a number of approaches that can be taken to resolve this, such as transforming 
the patient safety culture or making reporting mandatory through commissioning. An 
alternative to this is to encourage patients to become involved in their own safety, which 
relates closely to the PPI initiative of working with patients rather than doing things to or for 
them. The evidence of patients’ ability to identify and report safety incidents is increasing, 
however there has been no published research known to the researcher on patient reporting 
of safety within organisational care transfers, where patients are at an increased risk of 
iatrogenic harm.  
 
By encouraging patients to report on their own safety, they can help to fill the holes left by 
current identification and reporting mechanisms, without having to go through complaints 
procedures or litigation. When this is considered in relation to the Swiss-Cheese and ICPS 
models of patient safety, it can be seen that patients can play a role in identifying the active 
failures and latent conditions that lead to safety incidents occurring. Within the ICPS model, 
patients can provide information alongside healthcare professionals that is relevant to the 
central components of learning from patient safety incidents and preventing them from 
happening again; prevention, error recovery and resilience.  
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The detection of incidents is essential to improving the systems that dictate how safe care is, 
and informal discussions with healthcare professionals do not provide a platform for 
organisational learning.  
 
Service users have also been found to define safety differently to healthcare professionals, 
including emotional harm, communication and responsiveness on top of clinical definitions of 
safety. In addition to this, current studies exploring service user reporting of safety tend to 
focus on unsafe opposed to safe care. 
 
2.6  Aims and Objectives 
The aims of the research were to investigate service user perceptions of safety and to 
develop a method of facilitating service users to identify and report self-defined patient safety 
incidents in a care transfer setting, as defined by the Patient Safety Strategic Framework 
(NHS North East, 2008). More specifically, the objectives were to: 
 
• Explore the concepts, explanations and terms used by service users when talking 
about safety in organisational care transfers. 
• Explore what safe care feels like to service users in organisational care transfers. 
• Define patient safety in organisational care transfers from service users’ 
perspectives. 
• Create a reporting mechanism that would facilitate service users to report on their 
self-defined safety when going through an organisational care transfer. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will restate the research aims and objectives and give an overview of the 
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) and Action Research (AR) methodologies that were combined 
within this study. Encapsulated are the philosophical underpinnings of the research, 
particularly in relation to Giddens’ structuration theory and Bhaskar’s critical realism as 
epistemological and ontological frameworks respectively. In particular patient perceptions 
and reporting of safety are contextualised philosophically alongside healthcare professional 
definitions of safety. These are then discussed in relation to how knowledge and structures 
fit within critical realism to create the world(s) that service users inhabit. Finally in relation to 
the philosophical underpinnings, the research participants and organisations are described 
in relation to how they relate to this study. 
 
3.2 Research Aim 
The aims of the research were to investigate service user perceptions of safety and to 
develop a method of facilitating service users to identify and report self-defined patient safety 
incidents in a care transfer setting, as defined by the Patient Safety Strategic Framework 
(NHS North East, 2008). To achieve these aims, the research was structured into two 
interlinked phases with mutually reinforcing methodologies. 
 
3.3 Research Objectives 
To achieve the aims, the study was split into two phases. The particular objectives of each 
phase are outlined below.  
 
Phase 1 
• Explore the concepts, explanations and terms used by service users when talking 
about safety in organisational care transfers, 
• Explore what safe care feels like to service users in organisational care transfers, 




• Create a reporting mechanism that would facilitate service users to report on their 
self-defined safety when going through an organisational care transfer. 
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3.4 Research Philosophy 
For any piece of research it is important to identify the philosophical assumptions of the 
study so as to make the research process and methodological choices more transparent. 
This section provides an overview of the ontological and epistemological frameworks that 
underpin the methodological approaches utilised, followed by their specific application to this 
study.  
 
3.4.1 Ontological Framework 
The ontological assumption of the research that provided a framework for the 
methodological choices was one of critical realism. This philosophical paradigm is based 
heavily upon Roy Bhaskar’s work on transcendental realism, which was later termed critical 
realism. Put simply, critical realism states that “what we are studying determines the 
knowledge we can have of it” (Craib, 1984), which introduces the notion of interpretivism into 
the more traditional realist approaches to science. This is a very simplistic notion of critical 
realism, and the following section explores to a greater depth how these traditionally 
separate paradigms of interpretivism and realism intertwine.   
 
Critical realism follows the ontological assumption of realism in that there is a single reality 
independent of those observing it that is knowable and thus changeable as far as knowledge 
allows. According to realism, this reality is only knowable through objective observations, 
removing any subjectivity that a researcher may bring to the situation. However where 
critical realism differs from realism is that it acknowledges surface phenomena are 
potentially misleading as to their true, underlying character. This is where within critical 
realism the interpretive nature of science emerges, as it argues that this subjectivity brings 
with it different perspectives and viewpoints of the given reality. Bhaskar labels the 
interpretivist nature of science the transitive dimension, whilst the realist nature is termed the 
intransitive. These titles are suggestive of the levels of fluctuation and disparities that can 
occur within each. It is here in this study that patient perceptions of safety are identified as 
potentially different to those of healthcare professionals, where each has a different 
perspective and viewpoint of safety. 
 
According to Benton and Craib (2001), these points make critical realism fallible as the 
“critical realist insistence on the independent reality of the objects of our knowledge, and the 
necessity of work to overcome misleading appearances, implies that current beliefs will 
always be open to correction in the light of further cognitive work” (p.121). This fallibility can 
paradoxically be argued to be a strength of critical realism as a philosophical paradigm 
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because it allows for both interpretivist and realist approaches to research, with each 
bringing their own advantages depending upon the situation. This central position along the 
interpretivism / realism continuum allows for a mixed methods approach to research by 
employing qualitative methods to uncover the surface phenomena that may be hiding the 
underlying truth, and once uncovered using quantitative methods in the identification of clear 
and consistent patterns of practice (McEvoy & Richards, 2006).  
 
When this ontological dualism was applied to this study, it was valuable to first uncover the 
‘underlying truth’ of what safety means to patients when undergoing an organisational care 
transfer, and once uncovered, to use quantitative methods to identify the clear and 
consistent patterns of practice. This forms the basis for a greater understanding of the 
transitive nature of safety within organisational care transfers, which in turn can lead to a 
greater understanding of the intransitive dimensions of safety.  
 
Within healthcare, safety is usually understood in one of two ways; (1) as something that is 
observable and immediately controllable, within a realist framework, or (2) as something that 
is constructed through social interactions, within an interpretivist framework. It is within (1) 
that the majority of literature on safety within healthcare sits, looking at risk management and 
the avoidance of error, representative of the intransitive nature of reality. It is for this reason 
that the majority of patient safety work focuses on measuring the number of incidents and 
reducing them through changes in practices and the environment. However Rochlin (1999) 
proposes that safety is an interactive, dynamic and communicative act, which is necessary 
for the construction and maintenance of safe operations. This means that the reductionist 
approaches to safety associated with the realist framework that do not factor in these 
contributory processes are at risk of oversimplifying problems and are thus vulnerable to 
disruption or distortion (Rochlin, 1999).  
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Figure 3.1: A diagrammatical representation of how reality is interpreted differently by patients 
and healthcare professionals within critical realism. 
 
It is therefore arguable that a critical realist approach, based upon transitive and intransitive 
dimensions of safety can be applicable to this study by combining the constructed nature of 
safety with the observable. This can be seen in Figure 3.1, which demonstrates the transitive 
and intransitive nature of safety. In particular, the understanding of patient perceptions of 
safety are of importance when the patient is seen as being central to their healthcare. 
Without understanding how patients perceive safety, it is possible that any interventions 
aimed at improving safety may be vulnerable to disruption or distortion as highlighted by 
Rochlin (1999). Because the actor, in this case the patient, constructs their own 
interpretation of reality, then if the patient feels unsafe, they must therefore be unsafe.  
 
3.4.2 Epistemology, Structure and Agency 
In addition to the ontological assumptions of the study, it is also important to highlight the 
epistemological framework that underpins the study. As has been suggested within the 
transitive nature of reality, it can be argued that individual actors construct the reality (or the 
structures) in which they operate. This section will give an overview of how structures and 
agents are constructed and operate within a critical realist paradigm, along with how 
knowledge can be constructed.  
 
Bourdieu discusses the differences in phenomenological knowledge and objective 
knowledge, where phenomenological knowledge is created through the construction of and 
reconstruction of subjective and intersubjective meanings and experiences, whilst objective 
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knowledge is created from an outsider’s perspective which presents a view of the research 
object not accessible to itself.  
 
According to Bourdieu, these form part of a hierarchy where phenomenological knowledge 
holds no scientific value, but objective knowledge risks hypostatising itself as reality (Harrits, 
2011). This supplements the critical realist approach where truly objective knowledge can be 
seen as a fallacy and instead represents different interpretations of reality.  
 
This then poses the epistemological question of how knowledge is created within an AI and 
AR methodological approach that is underpinned by critical realism. Instead of knowledge 
being split into the two categories of phenomenological and objective as proposed by 
Bourdieu, knowledge is created within a critical realist paradigm through the amalgamation 
and the concordance between the phenomenological and objective knowledge that each 
participant, co-researcher or researcher brings together through social interactions and 
constructions. These social constructions form the epistemological relativism that underpins 
the transitive nature of science that critical realism claims to combine with the ontological 
realism.  
 
A further epistemological issue that arises from the use of organisational development 
methodologies is how knowledge is constructed within organisations. Within sociology and 
social theory (Callinicos, 2007) there are two opposing models of how society is constructed; 
structure and agency. Structure emphasises a downwards conflation approach to society 
which claims that social activity is determined by the social structures in which it operates. 
Alternatively, agency claims an upwards conflation in which social structures are determined 
by the free actions of those acting within them.  
 
Within critical realism, structure and agency are fluid; changing depending upon the given 
situation, but neither can be explored in isolation of the other (Archer, et al., 1998). As such, 
the transitive dimension of reality represents the role of the agent, whilst the intransitive 
dimension of reality represents the structure in which the agent operates. This notion of 
structure and agency shares similarities with Giddens’ (1979) theory of structuration, 
although there are also important differences between the two theories.  
 
According to Giddens’ theory of structuration, structures exist and perform a role in 
determining the actions of those operating within them. However these structures are not 
permanent and are liable to change depending upon the actions of the agents operating 
within them. Consequently it holds both a downwards and upwards conflation depending 
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upon the situational context. Part of Giddens’ argument is that within this duality of structure, 
agents are able to change their position in a structure through reflexivity, with knowledge 
having the potential to be emancipatory. It is this emancipatory aspect of structuration theory 
that is partly applicable to this study. However unlike structuration theory, where agents alter 
their place in a structure through reflexivity, Bhaskar suggests that ‘activity reproduces or 
transforms them; so they are themselves structures’. This subtle difference emphasises that 
agents are not necessarily aware of their role within structures via the process of reflexivity, 
but can still have an active role in modifying the structures in which they operate. 
 
On an epistemological level this is of importance in relation to collaborative research, where 
knowledge is argued to be created through social interactions between different groups 
rather than through isolated individual judgements (Barnes, 1977). This perpetuates the 
notion that to an extent, structures determine the actions of the individuals operating within 
them. However because individuals within one structure are not homogenous, complicated 
interaction is created that impacts upon the development of the structures through social 
interaction, and even the individual perceptions of such structures that people hold. 
Patomäki and Wight (2000) support this argument by stating that “every social act, event, or 
phenomenon is only possible insofar as the conditions for action exist as well as the agents 
that act; conditions which, we argue, are real and not reducible to the discourses and/or 
experiences of the agents” (p.230). Consequently agents are unable to be entirely separated 
from the structures in which they operate. 
 
This perspective is of importance to this study as the research methodologies, AI and AR, 
rely upon an upwards conflation where the agents operating within the structures of 
healthcare services are able to modify their own behaviour through reflexivity in order to 
transform the services that they either receive (for service users) or provide (for healthcare 
professionals). For service users in particular they may do this whilst being unaware, such 
as through reporting on their own safety. 
 
3.4.3 Transitive and Intransitive Dimensions of Reality through Mixed Methods 
Within health services research the positivist paradigm has been dominant, although there 
has been a recent shift to appreciate the input that interpretivist research can have on 
healthcare. Evans et al. (2003) provided an updated version of the traditional hierarchy of 
research, in which methods are assessed by effectiveness, appropriateness and feasibility, 
rather than just by outcomes. This places greater emphasis upon interpretive studies by 
placing them alongside randomised controlled trials in appropriateness and feasibility. In 
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addition, qualitative research, both individually and in combination with quantitative research, 
has been identified as a useful process for understanding healthcare systems and processes 
of delivery (Cunningham, et al., 2011), which further supports the use of mixed methods 
within this study.  
 
There has also been an increasing amount of support for using mixed methods in healthcare 
(Barbour, 1999; Devers, 2011; Weiner, et al., 2011), though Bryman (2007) highlights that a 
universalistic discourse of mixed methods, where researchers select its use based on past 
experiences and preferences rather than applicability to the research question, should be 
used with caution as the wrong methods could be selected. Instead, a particularistic 
discourse should be utilised where the methods are selected based upon the research 
question. In this study, it is the latter that has been utilised in relation to the chosen 
methodology, where the methodologies have been selected to specifically address patient 
perceptions of safety in OCTs, and to develop and pilot a reporting tool.  
 
Barbour (1999) highlights four uses of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
health research; providing insights into the processes of data construction, helping identify 
relevant variables, providing explanations for unexpected findings and hypothesis 
generation. It is the identification of relevant variables that applies to this study, where 
Barbour (1999) identifies that “where one wants to take a new slant in looking at an 
established research question, there is also justification for looking at additional variables” 
(p.41).  
 
A particular feature of this study was the eventual creation of a quantitative reporting tool 
that is designed to capture the interpretivist perceptions of safety. Although this combination 
of interpretivist and positivist approaches may appear paradoxical, the qualitative 
methodologies utilised in this study explored and uncovered patient interpretations of the 
single reality that is safety within organisational care transfers. These interpretations are not 
classed as individual or multiple ‘truths’, but are instead equally valid perceptions of a single 
reality. Quantitative methods have long been established as being appropriate for measuring 
a single reality, and therefore it is fair to make the assumption that just because 
interpretations differ between healthcare professionals and patients, the methods used to 
measure them should not.  
 
Page | 67  
 
3.5 Methodology 
This section outlines the methodological approaches that are used in conjunction with the 
philosophical assumptions of the study; AI and AR. These are fundamentally similar 
approaches, with the exception that AI explores what works well in organisations and AR 
attempts to address problems and facilitate improvement. An explanation of how they 
combine together is provided to clarify how the intricacies work together to provide a robust 
methodology in this study.  
 
3.5.1 Appreciative Inquiry 
AI is a methodological approach to research which ‘concentrates on exploring ideas that 
people have about what is valuable in what they do and then tries to work out ways in which 
this can be built on’ (Reed, 2007, p. 2). It is based on the early work of David Cooperrider  
(Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987) and comprises a number of principles and assumptions, 
each of which relate back to the philosophical approaches of this study. AI was utilised within 
this study primarily in Phase 1 to explore how patients perceive their safety, although many 
of the principles and assumptions were carried through into Phase 2. 
 
3.5.1.1 Principles and Assumptions 
AI is based upon five principles, which have been widely identified in a number of books that 
explain how AI can be used as a method of organisational development (Cooperrider, 
Whitney, & Stavros, 2005; Hayes, 2010; Reed, 2007). These principles are detailed below. 
 
The constructionist principle relates to the interpretivist philosophical assumptions of AI, 
which state that individual thoughts and perceptions shape the world, rather than objective 
observations. The result of this is that there are many different ‘truths’, and the role of AI is to 
establish the way that these ‘truths’ provide power to individuals and help to shape the world 
and systems that they operate within. Although this does not sit distinctly within the critical 
realist paradigm in that it takes an absolute interpretivist approach, the constructionist 
principle is instead applied by stating that the individual interpretations do not provide 
‘truths’, but instead valid perceptions of reality. 
 
The principle of simultaneity states that the investigation of organisations and their 
subsequent development are not independent processes, but instead occur at the same 
time. Therefore, “an inquiry is an intervention in the way it stimulates reflection and thought 
that lead to different ways of thinking and doing” (Reed, 2007, p. 26, emphasis author's 
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own). This is of importance as it is arguing that organisations require active participation and 
subsequently social interactions in order to develop. 
 
The poetic principle states that people construct their own world by choosing the stories that 
they are most interested in. One of the methods of AI is to encourage people to focus on 
positive experiences, thus shifting their attention and interest away from negative 
experiences. According to Reed (2007), one of the assumptions of this principle is that there 
are multiple realities that are created in the moment. The ontological position of this study 
contradicts this principle in that critical realism, as already stipulated assumes a single reality 
with multiple interpretations. However the ontological assumptions of critical realism still 
result in the same outcomes as the constructionist principle; individual interpretations do not 
provide ‘truths’, but instead valid perceptions of reality, which can be selected based upon 
personal interest.  
 
The anticipatory principle is that the direction of a person’s thought will affect the direction of 
travel. If the person is able to look positively to the future, then that is where they will end up. 
Similarly, if the person looks to the future with a negative outlook, then they will feel that 
trying to change their circumstances is futile. This is also strengthened by the assumption 
that carrying forward parts of the past gives people more confidence to go through a change 
process rather than being in a position of starting from nothing.  
 
The positive principle states that by focusing on positive experiences, people will be more 
engaged and for a longer period of time. This in turn results in people becoming more 
engaged in the organisational development process by capturing their interest and reducing 
potential barriers that may exist when exploring negative experiences.  
 
3.5.1.2 Affirmative Topic Selection 
Within most forms of AI, the topic is usually identified by the research participants as one 
that they want to develop, such as improving medical education for nursing students (Farrell, 
Wallis, & Evans, 2007). This is usually based on what they deem to be valuable, and has 
been termed as the affirmative topic choice. However due to the nature of research funding, 
in contrast to small-scale organisational development process, it can be difficult to explore 
areas of value without any prior research. Instead of relying upon the participants to inform 
this part of the study, the topic was selected based on literature that has identified patient 
safety being an issue to service users, and that in a publicly-funded healthcare service, 
safety should be driven by moral obligations rather than financial. This formed the affirmative 
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topic selection, with the researcher entering into the process post-topic selection, though 
prior to any methodological decisions.  
 
Organisational care transfers were chosen as the field of the research after an introductory 
meeting between the researcher, supervision team and with the then Acting Strategic Head 
of Patient Safety at the NESHA, who identified that it was an area somewhat limited in 
research and one that was high in risk, which has also been identified within the literature 
(e.g. Cwinn, et al., 2009; Davenport, et al., 2009; Forster, et al., 2004; Forster, et al., 2003).  
 
3.5.1.3 Processes of Appreciative Inquiry 
AI as a method of organisational development is usually displayed as a cyclic process. 
There are two different types of AI cycle depending on the researcher, the 4-D cycle 
(Discovery Dream, Design, Deliver) and the 4-I Cycle (Initiate, Inquire, Imagine, Innovate).  
They both consist of the same principles and assumptions and can be used interchangeably 
as their processes are identical in everything but name. Throughout this study, the 4-D cycle 
will be used, which has received the most amount of attention, such as in Cooperrider’s AI 
Handbook (Cooperrider, Whitney, & Stavros, 2005). The 4-D cycle consists of Discovery, 
Dream, Design and Deliver processes (Figure 3.2). 
 
 











"How can it be?"
4. Deliver
"What will be?"
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The first stage of the cycle after the affirmative topic choice is Discover, where one sets out 
to find what gives life to an organisation, or what the best experiences have been in a given 
situation. It is this stage that makes AI a unique form of inquiry, as other similar 
methodologies such as AR begin with finding out what currently does not work. Cooperrider, 
Whitney and Stavros (2005) identify that during the Discovery process, “stakeholders share 
the story of exceptional accomplishments, exploring the “life-giving” factors of the 
organization. Discovery is an inquiry process to begin identifying themes in the stories told 
by those interviewed” (p.86).  
 
The second stage of the cycle is to Dream, or to envisage what could be in the future. Within 
organisational development, it is thought that this stage is the most important for inspiring 
change as people begin to see what can be better within their own setting. The dream stage 
is practical in that the data remains rooted in the history of the organisation, but becomes 
generative as participants move away from this history in their explorations of what might be.  
 
The third stage is Design, which sets about determining how this improved organisation, as 
identified in the dream stage, can be constructed. The act of discussing what might be better 
is not in itself a strong enough catalyst for change, but instead input is required from key 
stakeholders to co-construct what a better future may be. Cooperrider identifies that the 
design stage needs to “fully integrate the “best of past and possibility” and that it be 
consistent with the intended outcome of the inquiry” (p.142). 
 
The fourth stage of the AI cycle is to Deliver, which has also been called the Destiny stage. 
This stage emphasises the need for the Dream to be achieved, and works towards achieving 
the Dream through the development of existing processes that were identified during the 
Discover process.  
 
3.5.1.4 The Use of Appreciative Inquiry in this Study 
AI has been adapted to be used in the study setting of patient perceptions of safety within 
organisational care transfers. Therefore instead of attempting to create appreciative learning 
cultures amongst participants, it instead addressed issues associated with power structures 
that exist within the NHS, where patients have historically been passive recipients of care. 
Although this has recently been changing within healthcare, it is still apparent within patient 
safety. There are some exceptions, such as in hand-washing campaigns (e.g. Pittet, et al., 
2011) and other research interventions (e.g. Byrd & Thompson, 2008) aimed to improve 
patient safety practices of clinicians, however this has not often been present within OCTs. It 
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was therefore useful to explore with the patients their own perceptions of safety within OCTs. 
This was a unique challenge that presented itself, as by removing the healthcare 
professionals from Phase 1, it shifted the emphasis away from organisational development. 
 
By not including healthcare professionals in developing the definition of safety and through 
the use of AI, the service user perspective was given precedence over healthcare 
professionals’ perspectives.  These particularly included where the patient may conceal their 
true feelings so as not to offend their healthcare provider. It is thought that the exploration of 
patient perceptions of safety helped to address the imbalance that exists in definitions of 
safety. 
 
3.5.1.5 Appreciative Interviews 
Although AI has been traditionally seen as a method of organisational development, there 
has been support of its use as a standalone interview method (Michael, 2005; Schultze & 
Avital, 2011). In doing so, the same assumptions and principles of AI methodology remain, 
but focuses specifically on “retrospective and prospective reflection, between past and future 
trajectories, and between personal and collective frames of reference” (Schultze & Avital, 
2011). By focusing participants on the Discovery process, they will tend to drift towards the 
Dream stage naturally (Michael, 2005), which can then be used as a springboard for 
organisational development.  
 
As contact with patients would only consist of a single interview in Phase 1, there was a 
need to develop the interviews in a manner which would still capture the fundamental 
principles and assumptions of AI. By thinking of AI as a research tool rather than a method 
of organisational development, the Discover and Dream stages were incorporated into the 
interview schedule to create appreciative questions such as ‘did you feel safe during any of 
these transfers?’ (Discover) and ‘If you were to go through a care transfer next week, what 
could be done to make you feel safer?’ (Dream).  
 
The positive principle employed by AI states that by focusing on the positives, participants 
will be more engaged. This was reflected within this study whereby keeping to a positive 
framework, the participants were able to talk more openly about their safety than if they had 
been asked questions about being unsafe. They did not have to fear upsetting anyone, and 
were reminded prior to the interview that anything they said would remain confidential unless 
it revealed that somebody was at risk. Furthermore, because experiences of being safe are 
far more common than experiences of being unsafe, the use of AI meant that there was a 
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larger population from which to purposively sample. At the same time participants would not 
necessarily have had hidden agendas, such as to make complaints, although ethical 
procedures were put in place should any complaints or evidence of unsafe care arise as a 
result of the interviews. 
 
In keeping with the poetic principle, it was important for participants to select the 
organisational care transfer that was most memorable for them. Participants were asked to 
think about recent organisational care transfers that they had been through, how recently 
they were and who was involved in them. However it was common for participants not to 
remember the exact details. It was not the aim of the study to audit the OCTs that 
participants had been through. To insist upon participants recalling these details would have 
put undue pressure on the research participants to recall information that was not readily 
available or meaningless to them, and so it was important to provide them with space from 
which to tell the stories that held the most importance to them. If the feelings of safety that 
they exhibited were more important than the specific details of the transfer, then this is the 
interpretation that they hold of reality, which was the subject of the interview.  
 
3.5.2 Action Research 
AR is similar to AI in that it is a methodological approach to research that utilises the process 
of inquiry to facilitate change in organisations on a local level rather than aiming to create 
findings that are generalisable. Although definitions of AR differ depending upon the 
investigator and the topic of investigation (Altrichter, et al., 2002), Stringer (2007) has 
provided a definition that reflects how AR is defined within this study; “a collaborative 
approach to inquiry or investigation that provides people with the means to take systematic 
action to resolve specific problems” (p. 8, emphasis original authors' own). White and 
Verhoef (2005) utilised an AR approach to empower patients in enhancing an integrative 
approach to their care alongside healthcare providers, policy makers and researchers. The 
use of AR has been further identified as a clear option to explore service user and carer 
involvement (Meyer, 2000), although the exact topic of involvement is unspecified. 
 
AR is suggested to be democratic, in that it enables everyone of relevance to be involved, 
equitable as it acknowledges the contributions that individuals can make, liberating, by 
removing any barriers and debilitating conditions which may inhibit development, and 
enhancing, by enabling individuals to express their full potential. These are all structured 
within an interpretivist epistemological basis, where knowledge is constructed through 
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experiential learning (Huang, 2010). Again the interpretivist paradigm fits with the transitive 
dimension of critical realism.  
 
This study utilised Participatory AR, which emphasised the collaborative nature of the 
research. In particular, the participants throughout the study acted as co-researchers in 
different forms depending upon their profession (e.g. healthcare professional or service 
user). This enablement of participants to be co-researchers has been identified as an 
essential component of participatory AR (Stringer, 2007). The exact role that each 
profession holds within the study changed throughout and will be discussed later.  
 
AR takes the form of a cyclic process of organisational development similar to AI. There are 
numerous different names for the different stages within the AR cycle, although they are 
mostly based on the same principles. This study utilised the Plan, Act, Observe and Reflect 
cycles (Kemmis, 2009), which resonate closely with the Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement’s Plan, Do, Study and Act cycles of change management, which have proven 
popular throughout the NHS (Langley, et al., 2009).  
 
Within this study, the Plan stage of AR related to the physical development of the reporting 
tool, whether in the form of workshops or through participant evaluation. The Act stage 
reflected the piloting of the reporting tool by the healthcare professionals, whilst Observe and 
Reflect stages encompassed the ongoing evaluation of the reporting tool by both the 
healthcare professionals and the service users. These were all underpinned by the patient 
perceptions of safety that were identified in Phase 1.  
 
3.5.2.1 Collaborative Working 
Collaborative working amongst patients, healthcare professionals and organisations has 
been receiving increasing attention, in relation to both the patient and public involvement 
agenda and organisational care transfers. The use of AR within this study helps to fulfil this 
agenda by encouraging organisations and professionals to work together across these 
organisational and professional boundaries. Huzzard et al. (2010) in particular highlighted 
that within an AR study, the researcher is able to act as an ‘active constructor’ rather than a 
‘neutral discursive gatekeeper’ in developing a collaborative initiative. This active 
construction was propagated through providing the discourse of patient perceptions of safety 
to healthcare professionals. 
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Furthermore, collaboration has been identified as an essential process for knowledge 
translation (Bellman, Webster, & Jeanes, 2011). By using an AR methodology that 
incorporates collaboration into its fundamental workings, this study naturally bridges the 
knowledge translation gap by involving healthcare professionals working at the micro level 
with the research outcomes, meaning that they are enabled to use current, ongoing research 
findings in their current practice. 
 
3.5.2.2 Power Structures 
Power has been defined as “not simply a relationship between partners, individual or 
collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify othersT [it] exists only when it is put 
into action” (Foucault, 1982, p. 788). This suggests that power is not a solid entity that 
remains in one state, but is instead in a position of constant flux, coming into and going out 
of existence depending upon individual actors and organisations that influence other’s 
actions, either directly or indirectly, and either immediately or in the future. Therefore any 
reflections on power relationships need to take into account the individual contexts of both 
time and place, with an acknowledgement that these are liable to change. Although Foucault 
has received criticism for not acknowledging the shift away from individualism towards 
patient-centeredness in healthcare (Bleakley & Bligh, 2009), his thoughts on power are still 
of relevance, particularly within participatory AR and the field of organisational development 
in general. 
 
Power is a central tenet of participatory AR as it aims to give people more power by reducing 
inequalities. This links into the fundamental argument of this study, whereby patients are 
argued to have less power in their perspectives and consequently reporting of safety 
incidents. Miller (1992) writes about power in an educational collaborative research project 
from an autobiographical perspective. Many of the power issues that exist between 
educators and students also exist between healthcare professionals and patients, especially 
in the context of collaborative research that challenges perspectives. Miller calls for spaces 
to be created, within which people are given the opportunity to have their voice heard. By 
giving people these spaces within this research via the reporting of their safety, patients 
were given a voice they may not have had previously. This in turn can be seen as an 
emancipatory act.  
 
Patient and public involvement resonates strongly with Foucault’s perspective on power, 
suggesting it should be explored through the study of resistance (Foucault, 1982). Foucault 
identifies that power struggles are not always anti-authoritarian, but rather occur as a result 
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of the effects of such power. In particular he identified that the medical profession is often 
not criticised because it exercises uncontrolled power over people’s health. However the 
recent trends and awareness of patient safety issues has resulted in a changing shift in this 
power, and as such there is now a greater emphasis on patient involvement and being open. 
Furthermore, the use of participatory research methods has been suggested to challenge 
systems of power and control that are established through traditional healthcare research 
methods (Baum, MacDougall, & Smith, 2006). 
 
3.5.3 The Use of an Appreciative Framework to Address Power Issues 
Through the use of AI, organisations were reassured that patients would not be asked to 
identify any unsafe practices or feelings of being unsafe, therefore not reproducing any 
complaints mechanisms, but instead be asked what had and would make them feel safer. 
This meant that the organisations were unlikely to perceive the research as being a threat to 
their current routines in contrast to if unsafe care had been explored. The recruitment of 
organisations that already focused on quality improvement work also assisted in providing 
ease of access. 
 
By asking the healthcare professionals to recruit participants on my behalf, they were able to 
select people whom they thought would be the most appropriate to discuss feeling safe. 
Recruiting participants in this manner meant that healthcare professionals were unlikely to 
be able to introduce any bias through the selection of potential participants who had had 
good experiences. Instead the selection of potential participants that would show the 
healthcare professionals in a positive manner will have supported the methodological 
approach to the research of exploring positive experiences of safety. Despite this, healthcare 
professionals identified a number of participants who had had negative experiences of their 
care. This suggests that they were either unaware that these negative experiences had 
occurred as they were outside of their care at the time, that patients had been unable to 
express any concerns of safety (thus supporting the need for a reporting tool) or that they 
were aware and because of having a positive patient safety culture felt that it was 
appropriate for their balanced views to be heard.  
 
3.5.4 Combining Appreciative Inquiry and Action Research 
There are many similarities between AI and AR that are borne out of their philosophical 
assumptions and their goals of organisational development. They both share the same 
assumption that organisational development occurs best through a cyclic process of 
engagement and collaboration, where the participants also act as co-researchers. Within this 
Page | 76  
 
study, these cycles have been partially mapped onto each other to demonstrate the different 
approaches that were taken in each phase (Figure 3.3). This diagram is presented 
throughout the thesis at the start of each stage of the cycle. The Discover and Dream 
processes of AI were utilised heavily in the exploration of how patients perceive safety within 
organisational care transfers during Phase 1. These perceptions were then taken forward as 
a basis for the full AR cycle in Phase 2. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: How the two different methodologies link together. The Appreciative Inquiry 
processes are in brackets. 
 
In addition to the cyclical nature of AI and AR, they both share the same epistemological 
foundations of interpretivism, that knowledge is constructed through action, and this action 
can provide voices to those that have previously been harder to hear. The ontological 
assumptions can also both be placed within the critical realism framework that this study has 
adopted, where interpretations of reality play an important role in how this reality is 
measured. To the extent that they share similar characteristics, AI was developed as an 
alternative form of AR (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987; Reed, 2007) which strengthens the 
argument that they can be combined into a mutually reinforcing process for the purpose of 
this research.  
 
However there are also some differences between the two methodologies that need to be 
addressed. The first of these is that AI focuses on the positives, building on what works well, 
whilst AR is traditionally based upon what does not work or what is poorly understood, and 
tries to resolve or fix it. This issue is addressed by splitting the study into two phases, where 
the positives taken from patient perceptions of safety can be used to underpin the problem 
that is trying to be resolved in the second phase. Additionally, AI does not simply ignore any 
negative experiences or perceptions that arise, but places them within a positive framework 
through the assumption that what people see as a negative, the opposite would be a 
positive. Within this study, it was deemed that in addition to the negative experiences being 
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interpreted within an appreciative framework, the positive experiences could also be 
interpreted within a negative framework.  
 
3.5.5 Identification and Recruitment of Key Stakeholders 
Parand et al. (2010) found that medical engagement in improvement programmes is a 
complex socio-political and motivational issue where different individuals have different 
approaches and perspectives. This can be even more relevant in patient safety research and 
the domain of patient involvement, which are arguably more socio-political than general 
improvement programmes as a result of the blame cultures that often exist within healthcare 
organisations. 
 
Due to the complex nature of the research there were a number of key stakeholders that 
play numerous roles within the research. From a methodological standpoint they are 
identified as stakeholders because they each have a particular interest in the study; patients 
will benefit from being involved to a greater extent in their safety and healthcare 
organisations and professionals have an opportunity to learn to a greater extent from 
patients. Their individual roles as participants will be developed further in relation to the 
phases of the study. 
 
Once OCTs had been identified as the focus of the research, it was identified that it was 
necessary to involve organisations that cross not just NHS boundaries but also 
organisational ones. The rationale for this was that the most complicated care transfers, 
where there is an increased chance of an error occurring (Cook, Render, & Woods, 2000), 
occur across organisational boundaries that involve different types of healthcare provider. 
After discussions with the Care Transfers clinical theme lead, it was decided that nursing 
homes would be appropriate organisations to include in the study as they have a high 
frequency of transfers. In addition, there were already quality improvement projects being 
undertaken within the region to improve safety within these transfers, albeit with a focus on 
improving communication practices such as discharge summaries. Consequently the 
Improvement Foundation (IF) which was running these initiatives assisted in the 
identification of key stakeholders. 
 
The IF acted in the capacity of a bridge-builder, contacting both social and private care 
homes to enquire as to their interest in taking part in the research, and organising a first 
meeting to discuss the research in more detail. This proved to be an invaluable resource in 
the early stages of the research as it meant their contacts and knowledge could be utilised. 
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In particular they were able to identify which care homes within the region were open to 
ongoing quality improvement and had a good patient safety culture; an organisational 
requirement that was established in the planning of the study.  
 
From these meetings, two private nursing homes and two social care homes agreed to take 
part in recruiting participants in Phase 1. Although the service users would most likely be 
transferring into NHS units, it was acknowledged that patients coming from an NHS setting 
would strengthen the recruitment of participants. After meetings with a research and 
development manager within an NHS Trust, it was decided that community care teams 
within the NHS would be an appropriate place from which to recruit participants.  
 
There were two reasons for this, the first being that community care teams have a large 
volume of patients transferring into and out of their services, and the second being that it 
was thought they would be able to target younger people. The second of these was a high 
priority as the social and private nursing homes had already been invited to take part, and 
their patient base is elderly people. The implications and limitations of this purposive 
sampling are discussed within the methods chapter.  
 
3.5.6 Assessing the Quality of Data 
Mays and Pope (2000) identify that there are a number of ways to assess data quality, 
including the triangulation of findings and respondent validation, which are the two main 
methods of quality assessment that will be utilised in this study. 
 
Triangulation, although usually conducted with other sources of data that have been 
collected by the researcher to compare with the same participants, was conducted in relation 
to existing literature to provide support for the findings. This same data also influenced the 
data analysis process, as it is argued that deductive modes of knowledge creation are 
inevitable as it is not possible to remove oneself from that which one has experienced. Other 
methods of triangulation, such as participant observations and healthcare professional 
perspectives were ruled out as it is believed that these would not convey the service user 
interpretations of their safety, but would overly influence the findings from an already 
medically dominated perspective.  
 
Triangulation also occurred through the comparison of patient reports of safety from Phase 2 
and the themes that were generated in Phase 1. When reporting safety, patients had the 
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option to identify other factors that had made them feel safe or unsafe, therefore for patients 
not to identify any other practices suggests that they are supportive of Phase 1 findings. 
 
Likewise, verification of the findings by healthcare professionals to see if they accurately 
determined how safe or unsafe a patient was during the transfer they discussed was ruled 
out because again, it is important to capture how patients perceive their safety. Instead, it 
was felt that respondent (participant) verification would be the most appropriate means of 
verifying the data. This ensures that any interpretations of the interviews by the researcher 
are accurate and convey their interpretations.  
 
In Phase 1, participants were returned to after themes had been identified by the researcher 
from the interview transcripts, meaning they had a chance to add new data or to refute any 
misinterpretations. The use of dyadic interviews has also been suggested to provide 
verification for participant statements and to generate a richer understanding of needs and 
experiences than with a single participant (Kendall, et al., 2009). 
 
3.5.7 The Embedded Researcher 
One major difference between qualitative and quantitative research is that the researcher 
can be embedded within the research during the former, whereas with the latter the 
researcher is supposed to be removed from it by being objective. One of the key concepts of 
organisational development is that the researcher can be in one of two positions; an outsider 
to the organisation, where their knowledge and experiences do not always relate to the 
particular setting that they are looking to develop, or an insider, where they have an intricate 
knowledge of the structures and practices that exist within organisations. Although these 
appear discrete, they are in fact fluid and it is possible for a researcher to move from one to 
another. 
 
(Huzzard, Ahlberg, & Ekman, 2010) state that the action researcher is not a passive 
boundary object within an interorganisational collaboration, but instead acts as an active 
constructor. This means that the researcher is embedded within the research to a greater 
extent than if they were acting as an outsider. Consequently there is a greater requirement 
to be reflexive of the role that the researcher adopts during the intervention, with a particular 
emphasis on the political nature of any such intervention. 
 
Reed (2007) highlights that being an outsider is the most common position for a researcher, 
and reflects the position of the researcher at the outset of this study. There are two major 
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themes that span both the advantages and disadvantages; experience and power. These 
two themes are not independent of one-another, but instead form a complicated reciprocal 
relationship.  
 
There were a number of advantages that presented themselves from being an outsider 
going into the organisations. The first of these was a lack of experience in a clinical or 
safety-orientated setting. This provided a greater degree of independence; there were no 
local interests from being embedded within the organisation such as promotion or internal-
politics, and there was no pre-existing bias or prejudice against organisations, providing a 
greater degree of objectivity, although this is not to be confused with a realist interpretation 
of objectivity. On top of this, a lack of experience meant that any institutionalised healthcare 
cultures, whether positive or negative, did not impact upon this objectivity; views and 
questions could be proposed and asked that an insider may not. 
 
A lack of experience also provided a number of advantages with respect to the power 
relationships that developed over the course of the study. Working across different types of 
organisations such as private nursing homes, social care homes, NHS community care 
teams and NEAS, independence meant that there was no professional prejudice, which may 
have been equally perceived by the organisations and participants within the study. 
Independence also played a major role in the recruitment of organisations to the study, as 
they would not have perceived it to be as much of a threat as an individual that was 
embedded within the patient safety movement or within one individual organisation, thus 
potentially increasing their willingness to cooperate.  
 
The disadvantages can be more easily split into separate experience and power issues. A 
lack of experience working in a professional setting, in particular one related organisational 
care transfers, has meant that at times the processes involved in organisational care 
transfers have been confusing. This is only perpetuated by the complex nature of 
transferring patients between boundaries (Cook, Render, & Woods, 2000). There was also a 
lack of intimate knowledge that healthcare professionals have around the common patient 
safety issues that occur within organisational care transfers in their own particular setting. 
This lack of experience extends beyond that of processes, but also includes networks and 
organisations. For this reason, trust was placed in others to guide the targeting of 
organisations and healthcare professionals.  
 
The disadvantage associated with power relates to how healthcare professionals perceived 
the study and the researcher. Outsiders are often seen with suspicion (Reed, 2007), and 
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working in negative patient safety cultures would have only exacerbated this where people 
will have wanted to cover up or deny, either intentionally or unintentionally, that patient 
safety is a concern for their organisation. For this reason organisations were selected based 
upon either previous experience with quality improvement work (private nursing homes and 
social care homes), or based upon high levels of safety incidents reported (primary care 
trusts), which was deemed to reflect a positive patient safety culture. This was supported by 
the use of AI. 
In two instances, a nursing care home was approached that had not previously been 
involved in quality improvement work, and no contact had been made beforehand by a gate-
keeper. Although they were both open to discussions regarding the research, they later 
dropped out prior to recruiting anybody as they stated they did not have the time, or with the 
second nursing home failed to return any telephone calls or emails after the first meeting. 
This is perhaps a reflection on the difficulties of including organisations that have no history 
of quality improvement work or whose priorities may lie elsewhere, and may also 
demonstrate self-selection bias of the organisations that did participate in the study.  
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the methodological strategy of this study. The final three 
sections of the table; methods, data and analyses, were not explored within this chapter but 







Critical realism and Structuration Theory 
Research approach 
 
Qualitatively-driven mixed methods 
Research design 
 
Appreciative Inquiry and Action Research 
Methods 
 
Interviews, Workshops, Questionnaires 
Data 
 




Thematic analysis (Interviews, 
Workshops) and descriptive statistics 
(Questionnaires) 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of the methodological strategy. 
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In this chapter the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the study were outlined. 
Critical realism was introduced as the philosophical framework, in which there is an 
ontological single reality, or the intransitive dimension of reality, with multiple interpretations. 
These interpretations, existing within the transitive dimension of reality, differ depending 
upon the person observing the reality, thus providing an argument that service users 
perceive reality differently to healthcare professionals and are thus able to identify unique 
components of safe care that are otherwise unknowable by healthcare professionals.  
 
The use of mixed methods allows for the exploration of these two different dimensions of 
reality. Qualitative methods provide an insight into the transitive dimension of reality, and 
quantitative methods are then able to identify specific patterns within the intransitive 
dimension. Both methods allow for the exploration of underlying causal mechanisms.  
 
In addition to the philosophical assumptions, this chapter also introduced the methodological 
approaches to the study, whereby an entanglement of AI and AR provide the overarching 
methodologies. In particular, AI is used as an interview technique to explore how service 
users perceive safety, whilst the two cycles of AR provide the direction of developing, 
piloting and redesigning the reporting mechanism. Finally any power issues that are 
associated with the use of AR are discussed, along with how the researcher’s position as an 
‘outsider’ to the organisations can impact upon the study. The following chapter will detail the 
specific methods utilised within these methodologies.  
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Chapter 4: Methods and Outline of Findings 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methods that were used in the various phases 
and stages of the research cycles. They are broken down into three distinct categories of 
methods; patient perceptions of safety, development of the reporting mechanism and the 
piloting of the reporting mechanism. The patient perceptions of safety section addresses the 
methods used in Phase 1 of the study to develop the patient definition of safety that 
eventually informed the development of the reporting mechanism.  
 
Phase 2 was split into two different methods sections that are representative of how the 
findings are reported. The first of these was the development of the reporting mechanism, 
which constituted the methodological stage of Plan (Design) of the first research cycle. This 
had its own methods section because it was unique to the rest of the research cycles, as 
once the reporting mechanism was developed, it was then modified based upon feedback 
during the cyclic AR stages. The second methods section relating to Phase 2 encompasses 
the piloting of the reporting mechanism, and any subsequent modifications that were made 
to the reporting mechanism.  
 
After the methods for these sections are reported the final reporting mechanism is presented 
alongside an outline of the findings chapters. This is to guide the reader when reading the 
subsequent three findings chapters, which will trace the development of the reporting 
mechanism from defining safety to piloting.  
 
4.2 Methods 
Although the study was split into two phases - defining safety from the patients’ perspectives 
and development of the reporting mechanism - for the purpose of reporting the methods and 
the findings it is more appropriate to report the latter in two separate forms; the development 
and the piloting of the reporting mechanism. The development only constituted one stage of 
the AR cycle (Plan (Design)), but it constituted quite distinct methods to the rest of the 
research cycle.  
 
In the reporting of data, abbreviations are used so as to anonymise participants. Within 
these abbreviations, # represents one digit. P## is used for participants interviewed in Phase 
1 of the study, Pil## for participants interviewed in Phase 2 as part of the evaluation and ### 
for respondents to the reporting mechanism. Healthcare professional abbreviations are 
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provided in Table 4.2. In addition to these abbreviations, the use of ‘[T]’ indicates that data 
has been removed in order to provide clarity to the quote. It was ensured that the meaning of 
the quotes remained the same.  
 
4.2.1 Phase 1: Patient Perceptions of Safety 
4.2.1.1 Recruitment 
The following section on recruitment outlines the process that was undertaken to identify and 
recruit key stakeholders and individual participants. The key stakeholders represent the 
organisations that were recruited to participate in the study, whereas the individual 
participants are those with whom I wanted to explore perceptions of safety. As a result of the 
overarching AR methodology, the key stakeholders (organisations) played an important role 
throughout this phase of the research. As such it was important to purposively recruit the 
organisations that in turn would recruit the individual participants. This section therefore 
comprises not just the recruitment of individual participants in Phase 1 of the study, but also 
the recruitment framework of the entire study as this impacted on individual recruitment.  
 
Sampling Framework 
Within qualitative research, sampling frameworks are often used in the purposive sampling 
of participants so as to ensure a wide variety of individuals are included. Within this study, a 
sampling framework was devised so as to provide a guide for which organisations and 
participants would be targeted. The sampling framework was developed to purposively 
sample a small number of individuals from a range of different organisations within the North 
East of England and encompasses both the organisational traits and the individual traits of 
potential participants.  
 
There have been arguments over the difference between different methods of sampling 
within qualitative research, with some authors differentiating between purposive and 
theoretical sampling (Barbour, 2008; Coyne, 1997). This study takes the perspective 
supported by Barbour (2008) and Coyne (1997) that all sampling in qualitative research can 
be classed as different types of purposive sampling, where the sample is selected 
intentionally based upon the needs of the study. Barbour (2008) defines purposive sampling 
as “selecting interviewees [T] by virtue of characteristics thought by the researcher to be 
likely to have some bearing on their perceptions or experiences” (p. 52), and it is this form 
that is used throughout this study.  
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Organisational Recruitment 
The sampling framework for the organisations that were to be recruited to the study outlined 
a number of requirements. The first of these were that the organisations had to display an 
affinity towards patient safety that represented having a patient safety culture rather than a 
culture of blame. The reason for this was that it was felt any organisation with a blame 
culture may not be open to the scrutiny that research requires when looking at patient safety 
in an attempt to cover up errors for fear of retribution (Department of Health, 2000b; Reason, 
1998). This fear would only have been increased as the study was funded by the North East 
SHA PSAT. Although there are some measures of patient safety cultures (e.g. Colla, et al., 
2005), it would not have been appropriate to carry out patient safety culture surveys on each 
potential organisation due to time constraints. Furthermore, at the point of recruiting 
organisations, the North East SHA did not actively measure patient safety cultures, meaning 
there was no pre-existing data on which to base the decision. It was for this reason that 
organisations only had to demonstrate an affinity towards patient safety.  
 
This was assessed in one of two ways depending on the organisation type. For NHS 
organisations, the numbers of patient safety reports by healthcare professionals over a 12 
month period were compared with other organisations in the region. For social and private 
nursing homes, this information was not available. Instead, culture was assessed through 
their current contributions to quality improvement initiatives that had been operating within 
the region. 
 
NHS Community Care Teams 
NHS community care teams were selected at the point of the NHS Research and 
Development (R&D) application by the R&D manager in order to purposively recruit 
individual participants. Three teams were recruited from two NHS trusts where it was 
believed it would be possible to recruit younger service users. Managers of the respective 
teams were requested to purposively target younger people, however after recruitment had 
begun, conversations with each of the managers led to the conclusion that the number of 
transfers involving younger people into their care was too infrequent, and the timescales of 
the study meant that recruitment needed to occur relatively quickly.  
 
The use of community care teams also provided a unique perspective in that there has been 
a steady move towards more care in the community rather than admitting people to hospital, 
which has been suggested to improve care (Low, Yap, & Brodaty, 2011). Patients have been 
reported to be aware of this trend, and were supportive of it as they deemed it safer and 
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more practical than being transferred into hospital (Kielmann, et al., 2011). The involvement 
of community care teams was of greater significance as they are deemed important to the 
safety of patients by patients.  
 
Social Care Homes and Private Nursing Homes 
Social care homes and private nursing homes were recruited via the Improvement 
Foundation, an organisation that was working closely with the North East SHA to deliver 
quality improvement initiatives. These tended to focus on reducing healthcare acquired 
infections in social care homes and private nursing homes, but they were also running a 
quality improvement project which aimed to improve the transfer of information when 
patients were admitted to or discharged from these services. As a result of their quality 
improvement work, they had a detailed database of social care homes and private nursing 
homes within the North East of England that were willing to be involved in various 
improvement initiatives. From this list, seven homes from across the region (Durham, 
Middlesbrough, Newcastle and Sunderland) were identified and initial contact meetings with 
the researcher were organised by the Improvement Foundation.  
 
After the initial meetings, three care homes decided not to participate, citing time and 
resources as the main reason, with one stating that the majority of their residents had 
dementia, and thus would be ineligible for the study. Consequently, two social care homes 
and two private nursing homes agreed to be involved in both phases of the study. The next 
section on individual participant recruitment details the demographics and characteristics of 
the individual participants recruited into this study. 
 
Individual Participant Recruitment 
The sampling framework for individual participants stipulated that they had to be aged 18 or 
over, able to give informed consent, and to have undertaken an organisational care transfer 
within the last 6 months, or alternatively had extensive experience of organisational care 
transfers in the last five years. Extensive experience was classified as having gone through 
more than two organisational care transfers in the last five years at the point of recruitment. 
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Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
 
• Aged >17 • Aged <18 
• Able to give informed consent • Unable to give informed consent 
• Undertaken an organisational care 
transfer in the last 6 months, or; 
• No experience of organisational care 
transfers 
• Extensive experience of 
organisational care transfers (>2 in 
the last five years) 
 
 
Table 4.1: Inclusion and exclusion criterion for participants in Phase 1. 
 
A sampling grid was devised to ensure that equal numbers of participants were sampled 
where possible based on age, gender and experience of care transfers. However given the 
larger recruitment strategy for both individuals and organisations, this proved difficult to 
complete. In particular, the organisations that were involved in the recruitment resulted in a 
population that consisted of largely older people that had more females than males. As such 
the emphasis of the study shifted towards older service users going through an 
organisational care transfer, and the weighting of females to males is slightly more 
representative of the general trend in the ageing population. 
 
Fourteen participants were recruited aged between 56 and 88 (mean age of 76.2), of which 
ten were female and four were male. It was originally envisaged that twenty participants 
would be recruited, although this was reduced to fourteen as it was felt that data saturation 
had occurred with regular themes emerging from subsequent interviews. During the 
recruitment of all participants, they were invited to include a family member, carer or 
advocate. The rationale for this was that patients are often accompanied by someone when 
they are being transferred, and that person may be able to provide a different viewpoint on 
safety than the participant, or to give prompts. Three participants, P03, P04 and P08, had a 
carer or family member present to form a dyadic interview.  
 
The participants were recruited from three community care teams spanning two NHS trusts 
(n=7), two City Council Resource Centres (n=3) and two private nursing and residential care 
homes (n=3). A further participant, who was not under the care of any of these 
organisations, was also recruited opportunistically. She was a family member of a current 
participant (P03), and she discussed her own experiences of going through care transfers as 
a patient. She was fully informed about the purpose of the study and was given an 
information pack and a consent form to sign. The respective managers and/or team leaders 
from the organisations were given the inclusion and exclusion criteria (see Table 4.1) and 
Page | 88  
 
were asked to select potential participants. This responsibility was to ensure that people 
included in the study were able to provide informed consent as the researcher did not have 
the relevant qualifications to assess this.  
 
4.2.1.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews, based on the AI methodology, were developed in order to 
explore what had made patients feel safe during organisational care transfers in the past and 
what would make them feel safe in the future. These were based on the Discover and 
Dream processes of AI, and the use of semi-structured interviews gave participants the 
necessary freedom to discuss topics that are of the most importance to them as required by 
the poetic principle (Reed, 2007). 
 
An interview schedule was created to provide prompts for both the researcher and the 
participant as it has been identified that important information may be missed “not because it 
is not relevant[T] but simply because it has momentarily slipped his/her mind” (Barbour, 
2008, p. 119). This included contextual questions aimed at exploring the participant’s 
experiences of organisational care transfers, questions aimed at finding out what had made 
them feel safe, and questions aimed at finding out what would make them feel safe in the 
future. For a full version of the final interview schedule please see Appendix 13. 
 
In the interviews where a family member, carer or advocate was present, they were given an 
information pack and they signed a consent form as they were actively contributing to the 
interview. Despite having a reply slip in the information sheets for the participants to 
complete if they wanted to be contacted, the majority of the participants gave verbal 
permission for their respective care team to organise the interviews with the researcher on 
their behalf.  
 
The participants were given a choice as to where they would like the interview to take place. 
Eleven participants chose to hold the interview in the same location that their care was being 
provided, whereas two interviews with participants from city council resource centres chose 
to have the interviews at home due to convenience as they had recently been discharged. 
For those interviews conducted where members of their care team were nearby, there was 
no apparent effect on the interview or the answers given to questions. The use of 
appreciative questions helped to mitigate any effect that the interview location may have 
had, as participants would not have been hesitant discussing positive aspects of their care.  
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In one instance, the participant (P02) requested that the interview wasn’t voice recorded, 
stating that she didn’t like voice recorders. Instead, detailed notes were made, and once the 
interview was complete the researcher verified that what had been written was an accurate 
account of the interview. The notes were then typed up post-interview. A further participant 
(P03) requested for the interview to be stopped part of the way through (see page 109). This 
may have also been the result of the slightly repetitive nature of the questions. As a result of 
this, I made it clear to future participants at the start of the interview that some questions 
may appear to be repetitive, and a pre-emptive apology was given.  
 
As the interviews were conducted, the question order was modified in order to tackle a small 
number of issues which are detailed below. It was decided before data collection began that 
piloting the interview schedule would be an ongoing process. Pope, Ziebland and Mays 
(2000) identified that data analysis begins during data collection, with collected data 
informing future questions that may be asked. Although this was not a formal process within 
the study, it is an inevitable part of qualitative data collection as the researcher is working in 
the field (Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000). The first modification consisted of changing the 
question order after the first interview as it was thought that the original order provided a 
discussion with the participant which was incoherent. An example of this ambiguity within the 
original interview schedule is that the participant was asked ‘how do you feel about the 
process of being transferred?’ before being asked ‘can you tell me about a time when you’ve 
felt safe going through a care transfer?’ This had the potential to cause confusion as the 
participant was being asked about their feelings of the process prior to being asked what the 
process actually entailed.  
 
The second set of modifications was made after the fifth interview to accommodate having a 
family member present during the following interview and to try and capture their 
perspectives. Changes were also made to the question order as participants were asked 
about their experiences of going through a safe transfer before discussing what the term 
safety meant to them.  
 
The third set of changes was made after the eighth interview. This consisted of adding a 
particular question regarding if the participant had any experiences of feeling unsafe. 
Although this appears to oppose the principles of AI, it is necessary to pay attention to 
negatives in order to dream about how the world could be better. Changes were again made 
to the question order to create a more logical order, and the question ‘are you aware of any 
means for you to tell someone about how the process has been for you?’ was moved to the 
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end of the Dream section as the greatest emphasis from the question is ‘Is this something 
that you think should exist?’, rather than if it already does exist.   
 
4.2.1.3 Data Analysis 
The interview recordings were transcribed immediately after data collection, although due to 
some interviews occurring shortly after one-another, this was not always possible. Instead, 
analysis was completed as soon as possible afterwards. NVivo 8 was used as a tool to 
systematically code and analyse the data, which has been suggested to improve the rigour 
of the data analysis process (Welsh, 2002). 
 
Although the interview was split into the Discover and Dream processes of AI, thematic 
analysis was utilised to highlight key themes that spanned the two processes. The purpose 
of this was to provide a full account of the concepts, explanations and terms used by service 
users when discussing safety regardless of whether they were discussing what currently 
works well or envisaging what would work well in the future.  
 
Thematic analysis was chosen as the method of data analysis as it has been identified as 
being “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). In doing so it is a flexible method of data analysis that spans 
different epistemological frameworks (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The result of this is that data is 
not analysed in an epistemological vacuum, but rather the researcher’s own epistemological 
assumptions are embedded within the data analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) identify that thematic analysis can be a joint process of 
inductive and deductive analysis. Within this study the deductive influences of the researcher 
are evident in addition to the inductive development of the themes, which are discussed in 
section 4.6.3.  
 
During the interviews, participants sometimes spoke of negative instances of, or unsafe 
care. Although coding these appears to go against the principles of AI of focusing on the 
positives, Cooperrider, Whitney and Stavros (2005) have stated that “Everything people find 
wrong with an organization represents an absence of something they hold in their minds as 
an ideal image... One could argue that there is no such thing as negative data, for every 
utterance is conditioned by affirmative images” (p.95-96). As such the ‘negative data’ that 
was collected was interpreted using an appreciative lens, working on the assumption that 
what participants deemed to be unsafe care, the opposite was safe.  
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Initial codes were developed inductively by moving participants’ statements into multiple 
codes that summarised what it was they were saying when talking about safety. Once these 
were all compiled, they were then grouped together into overarching themes. It is recognised 
that researchers do not operate in an epistemological vacuum (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and 
so it would be naïve to claim that the final themes were developed through a pure inductive 
process. They still hold many components that resonate with healthcare definitions of safety 
that exist within the literature, although these have been developed in consideration of how 
the patient has perceived them. During the process of compiling the final themes, a degree 
of deductive processing occurred, which has also been termed theory-driven coding and is 
recognised to be the most common process of coding qualitative data (Boyatzis, 1998; 
Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
Although theory-driven codes have been highlighted to be vulnerable to projection from the 
researcher based upon their cultural bias (Boyatzis, 1998), it can be argued that this has 
been constrained within the development of the codes in my study. For example I have 
previously argued that on an epistemological basis, healthcare professionals inherently have 
a different perspective of safety than service users based upon their working cultures, 
experience of safety and principal experience of healthcare as a practitioner rather than a 
service user. As I do not hold these perspectives, I am not constrained by them and will have 
been able to identify more closely the different perceptions that service users hold.  
 
It is for this reason that the process of data analysis is an interpretive act of the researcher, 
and one which requires reflection in order to identify potential influences, and verification of 
the emergent themes so as to ensure accuracy as to their original meaning. Data verification 
is addressed in the following section, whilst reflection is addressed in section 4.6.3.  
 
4.2.1.4 Data Verification 
Participant verification, sometimes referred to as respondent validation (Mays & Pope, 
2000), is a process of assessing the quality of data in qualitative research. It is based on the 
premise that when a researcher analyses qualitative data, they may introduce their own 
deductive reasoning into what should be an inductive process, which may ultimately 
influence the emerging themes (Mays & Pope, 2000). Therefore participant verification 
serves to reduce this from happening by asking the participants to confirm or refute the data 
by establishing a level of correspondence between the researcher’s interpretation and the 
participant’s perspective (Mays & Pope, 2000). This can be done at different stages of data 
collection, for example by asking participants to verify transcripts pre-analysis or to review 
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themes post-analysis. However Barbour (2001) warns that asking too much of participants 
may place excessive demands on their time and may also be distressing. It was for this 
reason that participants were only approached with a summary of the themes. 
 
The researcher contacted each of the participants to discuss the themes that had arisen as a 
result of the data analysis. Out of the fourteen participants, six were revisited after data 
analysis had been completed. Each of the six verified that the themes that had been 
captured were accurate, and felt that they did not have anything else to add. From the other 
eight participants, two preferred that the findings were posted out to them and six were not 
contactable via telephone. The findings were posted to their last known address with a letter 
explaining that if anything was incorrect or missing then they should contact the researcher. 
No contact has been made since the letters were sent. 
 
4.2.2 Phase 2: Development of the Reporting Mechanism 
4.2.2.1 Process of Developing the Reporting Mechanism 
Workshops were the primary method of developing the reporting mechanism. They brought 
together a wide variety of stakeholders, including service users, expert patients and various 
healthcare professionals from the different organisations involved in Phase 1. This afforded 
the opportunity for the different stakeholders to present their unique experiences and 
perspectives. It was decided that the two workshops, each lasting three hours would provide 
enough time to develop a first draft of the reporting mechanism, which would then be further 
developed and adapted based upon feedback from patients and healthcare professionals 
involved in the distribution.  
 
Bringing these different stakeholders together provided a unique collaboration between 
various healthcare professionals spread across various sectors and service users. 
Interdisciplinary collaborations have been defined as “an effective interpersonal process that 
facilitates the achievement of goals that cannot be reached when individual professionals act 
on their own” (Bronstein, 2003, p. 299) and have been identified as being important to tackle 
complex issues (Ovretveit, et al., 2002). There are many different variations of 
collaborations, depending upon the number and types of organisations involved, processes 
that exist in these organisations and the resources that are available to both the organisation 
and the quality improvement project. With regards to the latter, there were a limited number 
of resources available for conducting this study, meaning that financial support for 
participants was unavailable other than travel expenses for service users.  
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The role of collaborations spanning organisational and professional boundaries within AR 
have been labelled as social constructions, where the researcher is an active rather than a 
passive mediator across these boundaries (Huzzard, Ahlberg, & Ekman, 2010). The role of 
the researcher within this study was very much as an active mediator, bringing different 
professions and organisations together to achieve the goal of developing the reporting 
mechanism.  
 
The following section details the methods that were implemented in the two workshops. 
Where appropriate, these are combined across the two workshops, with any differences 
highlighted along with the rationale behind those differences.  
 
4.2.2.2 Recruitment 
In keeping with the overall sampling framework of the study, participants were sampled 
purposively for the two workshops. An overview of the participants of both workshops who 
contributed to the development of the reporting mechanism is provided in Table 4.2. Service 
users that participated in Phase 1 of the study were invited to attend both workshops so as 
to create continuity between the two phases of the study. It was thought that they would be 
able to provide their own unique perspective that had previously contributed to the definition 
of safety reported in Chapter 5. Despite the invitation, no service users volunteered to 
participate. Instead, the links between the two phases of the study were artificially 
established via a presentation introducing the participants to them. This was done in the two 
workshops as there were new participants who had not been exposed to the findings 
previously in both.  
 
In addition to service users from Phase 1, expert patients were also invited to participate. 
They were identified as being expert patients due to their active involvement in the PCPE 
network, which had also acted as a steering group for the study. In total, four expert patients 
were invited to participate in the workshops, with three in attendance. The fourth dropped out 
after confusion over the time of the workshop. It was originally decided that having an equal 
number of service users (either from Phase 1 or expert patients) to healthcare professionals 
would provide a balanced perspective from the two groups. However as no service users 
from Phase 1 volunteered, there was insufficient time to recruit others before Workshop 1. 
This was addressed in Workshop 2 through the inclusion of service users from the 
Northumbria University Service User Network, which consists of service users who are 
involved in the education of healthcare professionals at Northumbria University.  
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Healthcare professionals from organisations involved in the recruitment of participants in 
Phase 1 were also invited to participate in the workshops. This consisted of three NHS 
community care team nurses, two social care home managers and two private nursing home 
managers. The invitation including piloting of the reporting mechanism, meaning that it would 
be tailored to their systems, providing an established link between the reporting mechanism 
and how the data could be used to improve their services.  
 
In addition to these healthcare professionals, the Ambulance Service Trust was invited to 
send two participants. Although they were not to be involved in the piloting of the reporting 
mechanism, it was hoped that they would provide a unique perspective into the journey 
stage of the organisational care transfer that other healthcare professionals may not 
possess. In Workshop 1, two paramedics attended, whilst in Workshop 2 two safeguarding 
adults leads attended. The healthcare professionals were chosen by the Ambulance Service 
as being the most appropriate people.  
 
The two private nursing homes were unable to send a representative to attend Workshop 1. 
One dropped out of the study, citing a lack of available time and resources to develop or pilot 
the reporting mechanism. The other representative, the manager of the care home, attended 
Workshop 2. A representative from the SHA (YK) who was involved in organising the 
Patient, Carer and Public Engagement network also attended both workshops, providing a 
supporting role via the facilitation of groups and also having an active input into the 
discussions.  
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1 and 2 1 1 SHAR 
 
Table 4.2: Group constitutions and abbreviations of roles of participants involved in the 
development of the reporting mechanism.  
 
4.2.2.3 Structure of the Workshops 
Workshop 1 
Participants were split into two groups depending on their professional role and organisation 
that they were recruited from. Group 1 consisted of an expert patient, a paramedic from 
NEAS, a social care home manager and a nurse from an NHS community care team. Group 
2 consisted of two expert patients, a paramedic, a social care home manager and a nurse 
from an NHS community care team. These are summarised in Table 4.2. This required a 
degree of flexibility from participants to work in groups without a hierarchy of professions, 
identified as a key component of collaborative working (Bronstein, 2003).   
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The workshop began by providing participants with an agenda for the session (Appendix 14) 
and providing feedback to participants on the results of Phase 1 of the study. This was done 
through a presentation at the beginning of the workshop highlighting the different themes 
that patients had defined as being important to safety, whilst including quotes to provide 
clarity and evidence as to where the definitions had come from. At the same time all 
participants were provided with a hand-out containing a summary of the findings, helping to 
ensure that the mechanism was based upon these findings. 
 
Participants were able to relate to and discuss the findings from Phase 1 throughout the 
session in relation to the development of the reporting tool. Upon recollection of a poor 
experience of healthcare by an expert patient, a healthcare professional stated: 
− “It’s just recognition isn’t it? What you’re describing here is as well, I think it’s the 
apology, it’s not being listened to and it’s not knowing who to speak to. They’ve gone 
against everything that Jason’s found is good practice” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
− ‘[CCTN] - Patients might think that something is unsafe when it’s not but they can be 
reassured to reduce / stop this worry’ [JS observation notes, Group 1] 
 
Observation notes by PD also refer to a discussion held around the findings from Phase 1. 
These portray a different perspective of the findings from Phase 1, where only one small 
segment relates to apology, and none relate to blame. It is possible that this reflects the 
participant’s perspective of a patient reporting mechanism for patient safety where it is seen 
as a mechanism to attribute blame to healthcare professionals. 
− ‘[CCTN] Should the questions relate to the themes in Phase 1? Human error, 
apology, blame’ [PD observation notes, Group 2, emphasis is PD’s own] 
 
Two questions were developed to focus the development of the reporting mechanism, which 
were introduced in the form of two break-off sessions. The first of these questions was ‘What 
will the mechanism look like?’ which provided participants with the opportunity to develop 
ideas for what a reporting mechanism would resemble. Two sub-questions were provided to 
guide participants in their thinking; ‘What format will the mechanism take?’ and ‘What 
questions will the mechanism ask?’. The second of the questions was ‘How will it fit with 
current systems?’ which was designed to tackle the issue of how the reporting mechanism 
could be implemented into their respective organisations. The questions in Workshop 1 are 
shown in Table 4.3, along with cues given to participants.  
 





Main Question Sub-Questions Cues 
1 What will the 
mechanism look like? 
What format will the 
mechanism take? 
Healthcare 
professionals; how do 
you want service users 
to report back to you? 
   Service users; how do 
you want to report back 
to healthcare 
professionals? 
  What questions will the 
mechanism ask? 
Healthcare 
professionals; what do 
you want service users 
to tell you? 
   Service users; what do 
you want to tell 
healthcare 
professionals? 
2 How will the 




Table 4.3: Workshop 1 questions and cues given to participants. 
 
Following each of the break-off sessions, groups provided feedback to the other group on 
what had been discussed and written on the flow-chart paper. This allowed both groups to 
come together and discuss each other’s interpretations of the answers. In the instance of the 
first question, this provided an opportunity for the groups to come to a shared understanding 
of what the mechanism would look like, before considering how it would fit with existing 
mechanisms and procedures. 
 
Workshop 2 
In order to ensure continuity from the previous stages of the research (Phase 1 and 
Workshop 1), many of the participants who had previously contributed to the study were 
invited to attend Workshop 2 (see Table 4.4).  This meant that seven participants were able 
to bring forward their knowledge from Workshop 1, in particular the key principles that were 
identified as being important in the reporting mechanism. Five of the participants had had no 
exposure to the study previously, and were introduced via the introductory presentation. All 
participants were provided with an agenda for the session (Appendix 15). 
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Slides  Rationale for Slides 
 
Purpose of Today Provide participants with a clear objective for 
Workshop 2 
Background and Phase 1 
Findings 
Create a link between Phase 1 and Phase 2 so that 
participants knew what the reporting mechanism 
needed to be based upon 
Aims of Reporting Mechanism Provide clarity to participants what the reporting 
mechanism is and is not trying to capture 
Workshop 1 Findings Principles of the reporting mechanism provided for 
participants not in attendance at Workshop 1 
Thinking Differently Methods Participants were introduced to the Thinking 
Differently methods so that they understood what 
was expected of them 
Ground Rules It has been identified that the use of ground rules are 
essential when using Thinking Differently methods 
(Maher, et al., 2007) 
 
Table 4.4: Overview of introduction presentation to participants at Workshop 2. 
 
As part of the introductory presentation, participants were introduced to Thinking Differently 
methods (Maher, et al., 2007), which are a set of tools aimed to increase the creativity of 
participants. Although Thinking Differently is often referred to as a methodology, within this 
study it was used as a toolkit within the overarching AR methodology. The fundamental 
basis of these tools is that individuals hold schemas, or mental structures of the world, and 
thoughts are channelled through those. The schemas are separated from one another, 
meaning that it can be difficult to think outside of these mental structures, or to think 
differently. This in turn inhibits the ability for potentially novel ways of doing something to be 
introduced into or alongside existing systems. For example, participants in Workshop 1 were 
unable to move away from the thought process that if patients are to report something, it 
must be their satisfaction; indicative that they had been unable to move outside of their 
patient reporting schema.   
 
To encourage participants to think outside of their traditional schemas, Workshop 2 was split 
into two break-off sessions; divergent and convergent thinking (see Figure 4.1). To facilitate 
this, participants were given four thinking differently tools; ‘fresh eyes, ‘reframing by word 
play’, ‘pause, notice, observe’ and ‘random word, picture or object’, which were implemented 
into the divergent thinking session.  
 
‘Fresh eyes’ asked participants to think how the problem looked from a different perspective. 
On a basic level this could have been from a patient’s or healthcare professional’s 
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perspective (depending upon the participant’s own role), or they could have envisaged the 
issue from a unique perspective, i.e. that of a fast food restaurant or tabloid. A list of different 
perspectives was provided to participants  (for the full list see Maher, et al., 2007). ‘Pause, 
notice, observe’ performs a similar function, encouraging participants to discuss what other 
organisations, outside of healthcare, have done to resolve a similar problem.  
 
‘Reframing by word play’ is based upon mental benchmarking, where participants were 
asked to describe a current, similar process and to reduce it down to its most simple terms. 
This helps to reduce jargon that may be attached to current schemas, and participants are 
then able to recognise schemas that are similar in constitution. ‘Random word, picture or 
object’ encouraged participants to think of something that is usually unrelated to the existing 
schema and to produce ideas based upon it. In order to aid this, participants were provided 
with a list of random words (see Maher, et al., 2007), and were asked to choose one at 
random to discuss.  
 
These four tools were selected as they were deemed to be the most appropriate of the 
Thinking Differently tools to use within a workshop with tight time constraints. In addition to 
the tools, participants were also provided with ‘ground rules’ on what was acceptable and 
what was not. These included that participants were not allowed to criticise an idea, a large 
quantity of ideas was more important than quality, participants should encourage wild ideas, 
they should build on the ideas of others, there should only be one conversation at a time and 




Figure 4.1: Structure of Workshop 2 in terms of divergent and convergent thinking. 
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Group constitution took a nuanced approach, with participants able to sit where they felt 
most comfortable. There were no issues raised with the group constitution of Workshop 1, 
and as participants were not expected to share their experiences, it was not necessary for 
them to be split between their professional roles; instead they were being asked to create 
something new, rather than to examine processes already in existence in their respective 
organisations.  
 
Following each of the break-off sessions, participants were asked to feedback what they had 
discussed to the rest of the group. After break-off session 1 this gave the opportunity for 
groups to digest ideas from the other group, as opposed to creating an open discussion. A 
wider discussion involving both groups was held following break-off session 2. The facilitator 
for Group 1 (JS) and Group 2 (AJ) provided a summary of the discussion points to the wider 
workshop by using the flipchart paper. 
 
4.2.2.4 Data Collection 
The same methods of data collection were incorporated into the two workshops, and so are 
reported together below. Five data collection methods were implemented in the workshops 
to capture the discussions and ideas that participants held on the development of the 
reporting mechanism; voice-recordings, flipchart paper, observations, post-it notes and blank 
paper.  
 
Flipchart and blank paper were provided so that participants could write down their thoughts 
and design ideas for the reporting mechanism. By using flipchart paper, participants were 
encouraged to share and discuss their ideas with the group, meaning that the final design 
was a sum of the individual ideas of participants. The flipchart paper was used at the end of 
each break-off session for participants to share their ideas with the other group. Post-it notes 
were also provided to participants so that they could write down any ideas that they either 
felt uncomfortable discussing in the group, or felt that they had gone unheard by other 
participants.  
 
Voice recordings were of the individual groups during the break-off sessions, which took the 
form of activity-based focus groups. In the same manner as Workshop 1, these voice 
recordings were aimed to capture the conversations that participants were having in their 
own group and to understand the decision-making processes that contributed to the design 
of the reporting mechanisms, as well as capturing the ideas that participants presented 
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during the divergent thinking session. Due to a technical issue, the voice recorder in Group 2 
did not capture the convergent thinking break-off session.  
 
Observations of each group were also carried out where possible so as to triangulate the 
data collected and to be able to reflect upon the process of developing the reporting 
mechanism. These were conducted by the researcher (Group 1) and the researcher’s 
supervisor (AJ; Group 2). The observation notes were limited in their detail as both 
observers were facilitators of a group each. AJ has had previous experience of facilitating 
groups and has worked previously with the service users in Group 2. It was for this reason 
that she was asked to facilitate Group 2 as the service users were likely to be more 
forthcoming with a familiar person.  
 
4.2.2.5 Data Analysis 
Workshop 1 
As the data was emergent it was not possible to plan the data analysis a priori. Instead it 
was analysed based upon the different themes and concepts that had arisen during the 
workshop. This centred on the flipchart paper markings that summarised the discussions 
that the groups held, along with the sticky dots that were applied to them. From this, the 
observations and the voice recording were used to analyse the discussions that underpinned 
the flipchart paper, also exploring the underlying group dynamics that may have impacted 
upon the outcome of the workshop, such as professional boundaries between the various 
healthcare professionals and service users.  
 
Workshop 2 
Data analysis was conducted concurrently through the process of convergent thinking. In 
particular this consisted of drawing upon the ideas that the two groups formulated during the 
divergent thinking session, and working as individual groups to assess the shared ideas and 
bring them into a tangible reporting mechanism that could then be piloted. This was further 
expanded following the convergent thinking session where the two groups again came 
together to share the reporting mechanisms, and a brief discussion was held over which 
parts of each were the strongest. This is an unorthodox but applicable method of data 
analysis that is embedded within the AR methodology, whereby the participants are involved 
as co-researchers in the data collection and analysis (Baum, MacDougall, & Smith, 2006). 
Additional data that was collected, such as voice recordings and flipchart paper, was used 
post-workshop to ensure that the reporting mechanism had accurately captured what the 
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participants had discussed during the workshop. Any discussions not directed around the 
development of the reporting mechanism are not reported.  
 
4.2.3 Phase 2: Piloting of the Reporting Mechanism 
4.2.3.1 Organisations 
A feature of AR is that participants are also engaged as co-researchers (Baum, MacDougall, 
& Smith, 2006). Within this study, the healthcare professionals who were engaged in the 
development of the reporting mechanism were also invited to pilot it within their own 
organisations (n=6), moving back to being co-researchers as they were in Phase 1, instead 
of participants as they were in the workshops. The reporting mechanism was piloted in NHS 
community care teams (n=3), social care homes (n=2) and a private nursing home (n=1). 
One nurse from each of the community care teams was given the responsibility for 
distributing the reporting mechanism, which was not necessarily the same person who had 
attended the workshops. The same social care home and private nursing home managers 
who attended the workshops were responsible for piloting the reporting mechanism in their 
organisations.  
 
By having this continuity over the different phases of stages of the study, it has meant that 
the findings from Phase 1 have not had to have been transferred to settings from which they 
were not developed. This has helped to ensure that they are still relevant for the populations 
for which the reporting mechanism had been developed.  
 
4.2.3.2 Sampling Strategy 
For each round of piloting, 20 reporting mechanisms were given to each of the individual 
teams or organisations involved in both Phase 1 and the development of the reporting 
mechanism. A total of 120 were distributed to organisations in each cycle of piloting, with 
piloting lasting up to 14 weeks depending on the speed at which they were able to be given 
to service users. The first cycle of piloting began on 1st November 2010 and ended 21st 
January 2011 (12 weeks), and the second cycle began on 21st February and ended 27th May 
2011 (14 weeks). The second cycle of piloting was extended in order to give organisations 
more time to distribute the reporting mechanisms. 
 
In addition to the piloting of the reporting mechanism, service users were invited to 
participate in an interview as part of the ongoing evaluation. They were sampled 
opportunistically based upon those who had completed the reporting mechanism and had 
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stipulated that they would be willing to be interviewed. Two service users volunteered to be 
interviewed in Cycle 1 of the piloting, with one being accompanied by their carer. There were 
no volunteers in Cycle 2 of piloting.   
 
4.2.3.3 Participants 
The health care professionals distributing the reporting mechanism were asked to distribute 
it to any service users entering or exiting their service, regardless of their destination or point 
of origin. The health care professionals were given the freedom to sample any service users 
they wished. The only instructions that they were given were that the person they were 
giving the reporting mechanism to had to be able to give informed consent. The private 
nursing home specifically targeted service users based upon their willingness to complete 
the reporting mechanism, whereas the other organisations distributed the reporting 
mechanism regardless of willingness. A detailed description of the participants is provided in 
6.3.1 and 6.4.1 in relation to Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 of the piloting, respectively.  
 
4.2.3.4 Data Collection 
The reporting mechanism was piloted in order to determine the feasibility of introducing a 
mechanism that allows service users to report their own safety when going through an 
organisational care transfer. This includes how willing service users are to complete the 
reporting mechanism, and the types of reports that they provide. In order to achieve this, four 
types of data were collected in relation to the piloting of the reporting mechanism; the service 
user reports, an evaluation form for the reporting mechanism, a semi-structured interview 
with a service user and carer exploring their experiences of completing the reporting 
mechanism and information on who the reporting mechanism was distributed to, compiled by 
the health care professionals.  
 
The reporting mechanism and evaluation form were distributed together in a pre-paid, 
addressed envelope that was being returned to the researcher at the university. The use of 
pre-paid envelopes has been found to increase the number of responses to questionnaires 
(McColl, et al., 2001), and was included so that service users did not incur any expenses in 
completing the reporting mechanism. All documents contained a unique participant number 
so that they could be collated and compared in relation to the organisation they were 
distributed from and individual details of each service user. Mechanisms 61 to 80 were lost 
and subsequently replaced with mechanisms 122 to 141.  
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The service user reports focused specifically on how safe, rated ‘safe’, ‘neither’ or ‘unsafe’ 
service users had felt during their organisational care transfer. This was split into three 
sections; ‘your departure’, ‘your journey’ and ‘your arrival’. Service users were asked to 
provide this rating in relation to ‘communication from staff’, ‘staff listening to you’, ‘departure 
running to schedule’, ‘falling or potential falls’, ‘medication problems or concerns’ and 
‘hygiene’. These were included based upon the findings from Phase 1 of the study (Chapter 
5). In addition, service users were asked to provide information on where they had departed 
from, their mode of transport and where they arrived to.  
 
There have been no studies exploring patient reporting of safety when going through 
organisational care transfers. This means that there is currently no baseline on expected 
response rates and willingness to complete a reporting mechanism. However it is possible to 
extrapolate findings from other patient feedback mechanisms in other settings. The first 
indicator of a successful reporting mechanism is how willing or able service users are to 
complete it (Fitzpatrick, et al., 2006; Fitzpatrick, et al., 1998). Another term for this is 
saliency, which is defined as how relevant, important or interested the participant is in 
completing a questionnaire (McColl, et al., 2001). For questionnaires, the average response 
rate is 55.6% (Baruch, 1999), although it has been reported to be as high as 67% for postal 
questionnaires (Sitzia & Wood, 1998), which the authors recognise is unusually high in 
comparison to elsewhere in the literature. McColl et al. (2001) identified that non-
respondents to surveys are more likely to be elderly people, which has the potential to 
impact upon the response rates of this mechanism.  
 
Service users were encouraged to complete the evaluation form even if they did not want to 
complete the reporting mechanism, for example to give a reason for why they did not 
complete it. During Cycle 1 of piloting, service users were asked to provide feedback on 
seven items (items 1-7, Table 4.5) on a three-point scale of ‘agree’, ‘neither agree or 
disagree’ or ‘disagree’. During Cycle 2 of piloting, a further three items were added to the 
evaluation form (items 8-10) and item 6 was removed. The additional items were added 
based on informal feedback from healthcare professionals piloting the reporting mechanism.  
  





1 I understood the purpose of the Patient Safety Survey 
2 I understood what was meant by ‘your journey’ 
3 I understood each of the questions 
4 The questions were appropriate 
5 There was nothing missing from the Patient Safety Survey 
6 I had no concerns about completing the Patient Safety 
Survey 
7 I feel the Patient Safety Survey allows me to provide useful 
feedback about the healthcare I have received 
8 I experienced difficulties completing the patient safety survey 
9 I felt that the colour scheme was useful 
10 The size of the text was appropriate 
 
Table 4.5: Individual items contained in the evaluation forms. 
 
In addition to the questions, participants were also encouraged to write comments and to 
expand upon their answers to ensure that nothing was missed. There was also an option for 
the service users to participate in an interview so that they could provide more detailed 
feedback. An explanation of the inclusion of each item is provided in the Reflection stages of 
the AR cycles (Chapter 7). 
 
The healthcare professionals distributing the reporting mechanism were asked to compile 
information on who they were distributing the reporting mechanism to. This included their 
age, gender, ethnicity, if they were a service user, carer or advocate, if they were arriving 
into or departing out of the service, their medical conditions, if they were receptive to the 
mechanism and if any questions were asked. During Cycle 2 of piloting, they were also 
asked if there were any issues during the transfer that the service user was unaware of, 
such as missing documentation, medications or poor communication. Despite having the 
form to complete, healthcare professionals often did not complete it when distributing the 
reporting mechanism. This occurred either due to not having the time, or because the 
responsibility for distributing the mechanism was shared amongst the healthcare team and 
they forgot to compile the information. This means that there is often data missing, and any 
findings and their subsequent implications need to take this missing data into consideration.  
 
4.2.3.5 Data Analysis 
The data was analysed in relation to the different stages of the AR cycle; Design (Discover), 
Delivery (Action), Observation and Reflection. As the first Design (Discover) stage of the 
research cycle constituted the development of the reporting mechanism (Chapter 6), the first 
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cycle of piloting began with the Delivery (Action) stage, where the reporting mechanism was 
distributed to service users.  
 
The Delivery (Action) stages encompass the data from the distribution of the reporting 
mechanism. This covers the number of reporting mechanisms that were distributed by the 
different organisations and care teams and the number of respondents. A descriptive 
account of the service users at the point of distribution and response is also provided, 
showing the average ages, male to female ratios and points of distribution (either on arrival 
or departure). A comparison is made between the characteristics of respondents to the 
target population that it was distributed to. Given the small nature of the sample size, it was 
not possible to run inferential statistics between the target population and respondents. This 
data is utilised to contribute towards the measure of saliency amongst service users for the 
reporting mechanism.  
 
Data regarding the Observation stage is captured in terms of the patient reports of safety; 
observing what it is that respondents are reporting about their safety and the types of 
organisational care transfers that they are reporting. Again this is used to determine saliency 
amongst service users, but also to compare with the number of healthcare professional 
reports of safety within organisational care transfers, which have identified an incidence rate 
of around 20% (Tsilimingras & Bates, 2008). 
 
Finally the Reflection stage of the AR cycle was used to explore evaluation data. This was to 
determine any changes that needed to be incorporated into the reporting mechanism to 
improve it and to address any issues that service users may have had completing it. Any 
limitations of the data collection and analysis of these findings are presented in the 
Discussion (Chapter 8). 
 
4.2.4 Ethical Considerations 
When conducting qualitative research with service users it is important to consider the 
ethical implications of the research, especially in relation to research governance (Barbour, 
2008). Outlined below are the ethical considerations that were identified during the planning 
of the study and the procedures implemented to protect the participants.  
 
4.2.4.1 Informed Consent 
The researcher ensured that fully informed consent was obtained from everyone taking part 
in the study, whether they were the service user or acting in the capacity of a carer, family 
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member or advocate, healthcare professional or a representative of the SHA. This involved 
providing the participants with an invitation letter, information sheet and consent form prior to 
participation, and giving them time to consider them and ask any questions. In the cases 
where participants were unable to read the consent form for themselves, the researcher read 
it out to them, and they were asked if they would like more time to consider whether they 
wanted to take part.  
 
Richards and Schwartz (2002) identified that within qualitative health research, gaining 
informed consent is often a process rather than a one-off event. Although data collection in 
Phase 1 often only consisted of a one-off interview, participants were reminded immediately 
after the interview of their participant rights, and were encouraged to contact the researcher 
at any time if they had any questions or concerns. For the six participants involved in the 
participant verification, they were reminded of their rights as participants and were asked if 
they had any questions or concerns prior to and after the validation. A similar process was 
initiated for Phase 2, where participants were reminded of the voluntary nature of the study 
and that there was no obligation to attend either or both workshops. Similarly healthcare 
professionals were made aware that even when they were involved in the workshops, there 
was no obligation to participate in the piloting of the reporting mechanism.  
 
There were two situations, both relating to the two private nursing homes in Phase 1 where 
the healthcare professional had identified a potential participant who had verbally agreed to 
participate in the study. In the first instance when the potential participant was approached 
by the researcher to gain informed consent, it quickly became apparent that the individual 
was not able to understand the purpose of the study or even the consent process itself. 
Rather than continuing with the consent process, I explained that I would leave the forms 
with him to complete at a later date should he wish to.  
 
In the second instance, the individual appeared to have capacity to give informed consent. 
However during the interview it quickly became apparent that she could not follow the 
questions, and instead of talking about healthcare, her focus was on stories and experiences 
from when she was growing up. I decided that it would not have been appropriate to stop the 
interview as she may have been offended, and instead did not include any of her data in the 
study. The healthcare professional that recruited her was informed of this upon leaving the 
interview location.  
 
In such scenarios, especially within nursing homes where the residents are likely to have 
cognitive or speech impairments, it was necessary to be reflexive as to the purposes of them 
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volunteering to participate (Wilson, 2011). In the former case, it was perhaps that the 
individual was unaware of what he was agreeing to when approached by the healthcare 
professional, and assumed that because he was being asked, he had to participate. In the 
latter case, it was apparent that although she was able to give informed consent, her own 
agenda was that of wanting company and someone to talk to, an issue that has been 
recognised when working within care homes where residents may be in need of company or 
someone new to talk to (Wilson, 2011). 
 
During the piloting of the reporting mechanism, an opt-in procedure for gaining consent was 
utilised. Service users were provided information on the purpose of the reporting 
mechanism, but rather than asking them to sign a consent form, they were told by the 
healthcare professionals that completing the reporting mechanism was voluntary. Therefore 
any respondents were opting-in to the study. An opt-out system, based upon presumed 
consent, was rejected as it was deemed unethical (Den Hartogh, 2011). 
 
4.2.4.2 Data Protection, Confidentiality and Anonymity 
It is of ethical importance for all participants to remain anonymous, which has been identified 
as being particularly difficult within qualitative research which often contains many clues as 
to a participant’s identity (Richards & Schwartz, 2002). All data collected on participants was 
handled confidentially, and any identifying information about them or other people or 
organisations that they mentioned was anonymised. This was done by using participant 
numbers instead of names. An overview of how these are presented within the data is on 
page 95. Any names and locations mentioned during the interviews were removed from data 
at the point of transcription. The qualitative data collected was not analysed comparatively 
across the different organisations because the small number of participants recruited from 
each would have made them identifiable to the organisations they were recruited from.  
 
All personal information collected about participants was stored in a secure, password-
protected database to which only the researcher had access. In line with university policy 
this information will be destroyed immediately upon completion of the research. All non-
personal information, such as voice recordings and transcripts were also stored securely and 
will be destroyed 6 years after completion, again in line with university policy. This included 
the patient reports of safety and evaluations, of which the physical copies were stored in a 
locked cabinet inside the university.  
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4.2.4.3 Breaking Confidentiality 
Although confidentiality is of great importance to research participants, there are some 
circumstances in which this has to be intentionally broken. This is often dictated by legal and 
regulatory frameworks, where the participant is deemed to be at risk of harm (Wiles, et al., 
2008). Despite the assurances given to interviewees regarding confidentiality, they were also 
informed that if they told the researcher something that put themselves or somebody else at 
risk of harm, then confidentiality would have to be broken. It was made clear to them that 
should this happen, they would be informed of what would happen and the person that was 
informed would be in a position to help. The reporting mechanism was specifically designed 
to be anonymous, so only when the participant requested feedback would confidentiality 
have been able to be broken. During the course of the study there were no instances that 
the researcher needed to break confidentiality. 
 
4.2.4.4 Distressing Stories 
A further consideration that needed to be made was the potential for distressing stories to be 
told. Researchers are required to assess the potential impact that a qualitative interview may 
have upon the participants (Orb, Eisenhauer, & Wynaden, 2000), and to consider the 
benefits and harm that it may have upon the participant. It was determined that this study 
had the potential to impact upon both the participant (in the form of recalling a distressing or 
painful experience) and researcher (listening to a story that reflected personal experiences 
or resonates with experiences of family members or friends). A plan was put into place that 
meant interviewees were aware that they could stop the interview either for a break or 
completely, and that they wouldn’t be left alone until they requested otherwise. They were 
also given contact details of the researcher’s supervisors who were experienced clinicians 
that would be able to counsel them via the telephone, an option also available to the 
researcher. 
 
4.2.4.5 Right to Withdraw 
Participants involved in interviews or workshops were informed of their right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without giving any reason. One participant (P03) exercised his right to 
withdraw, asking for the interview to be stopped half-way through, stating: 
−  “I think there’s a lot of time wasted on these interviews... you come round and ask 
me certain questions. I don’t know. I can’t grasp it” [P03] 
 
It was later explained as I was leaving and out of earshot by his wife, who was present 
during the entire interview that he sometimes gets angry when he loses concentration. 
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Although the participant requested to withdraw from the study, he was still happy for the data 
collected up until that point to be used. 
 
4.2.4.6 Researcher Safety 
As the researcher was going into people’s homes alone a lone worker policy was 
implemented where the researcher was required to ‘check-in’ with someone; a supervisor, 
family member or friend. This required the researcher informing them of the interview 
location, the interview start time and anticipated interview end time. Any deviation from these 
would result in the trusted person contacting the researcher to ensure that they are safe.  
 
4.2.4.7 Ethical Approval 
The study received full ethical approval by the school Research Ethics Committee and by an 
NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC). In addition to ethical approval the study also 
received R&D approval from the relevant Trusts, and in the case of the social care homes, 
from the city council R&D department. The NHS REC was notified of all minor amendments 
to the study, including the addition of new sites. There were no major amendments to the 
study.  
 
4.3 Outline of the Findings Chapters 
The following three findings chapters (Chapter 5: Patient Perceptions of Safety, Chapter 6: 
Development of the Patient Reporting Mechanism and Chapter 6: Piloting of the Reporting 
Mechanism) are presented in a manner which tells the story of how the reporting mechanism 
was developed. Chapter 5 outlines how safety was defined by service users who had gone 
through an organisational care transfer, followed by a discussion of how the findings were of 
relevance to the reporting mechanism. This encompassed the AI methodology, where the 
Discover and Dream stages were used to inform the development of the reporting 
mechanism.  
 
Chapter 6 details how the reporting mechanism was developed through the process of the 
two workshops detailed previously. These two workshops constituted the start of the AR 
cycles at the point of planning the reporting mechanism (Design stage of AI). The final 
findings chapter, Chapter 7, provides a detailed account of the rest of the two stages of the 
AR cycles, which took the form of two rounds of piloting the reporting mechanism. A full 
summary of the findings chapters, the methods used to collect the data and the methodology 
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Chapter 5: Patient Perceptions of Safety 
5.1  Chapter Overview 
This chapter will provide an overview of Phase 1, where patient perceptions of safety were 
explored using an AI research methodology. Contained within this chapter are the findings 
and a discussion of how the findings informed the latter stages of the research. In addition a 
reflective account of the data collection process is included, which provides an overview of 
the issues that were encountered throughout this phase of the study and how they were 
addressed. This chapter does not give a full discussion of the findings, but instead aims to 
provide clarity of the research process leading into the second phase of the study, which 
requires a small discussion of the findings. The full discussion is located in chapter 8 where 
the findings of the entire study are explained as a whole.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Where the service user perceptions of safety fit into the methodological cycles. 
 
5.2 Findings 
A number of key themes were identified in relation to what safety means to service users 
and what made them feel safe when undergoing organisational care transfers. The particular 
themes that were developed are communication, responsiveness and traditional safety 
issues. Below is a general overview of these concepts, with a particular focus on the terms 
and explanations that were used when participants discussed safety. In addition to these 
themes, trust was also regularly discussed by the service users. Trust was separated from 
the other three themes as they all refer to actions or events impacting upon safety, whereas 
trust appeared to impact upon perceptions of safety. 
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5.2.1 Communication 
There are many components to effective communication between healthcare professionals 
and service users that lead to feeling safe, such as being informed, having a means with 
which to contact healthcare professionals and apologising when something goes wrong. 
Interpersonal skills of staff also played a role in how safe service users felt. 
 
5.2.1.1 Being Informed 
One participant explained that she always tries to find out as much information as possible 
before she is transferred. 
− “I try to find out as much as I could about where I was supposed to be going before I 
say I would go” [P04]  
 
Another participant discussed her experiences of being admitted to hospital. 
− “On that admissions ward they’re so busy they don’t have the time to come say to 
you every hour, every couple of hours that, ‘it shouldn’t be too much longer’, or, ‘it’s 
going to be a while’. Really just to keep you informed.” [P13] 
 
P15 discussed an incident that spans the two themes of communication and 
responsiveness; informing service users and responding to individual needs. 
− “[The doctor] looked in my eye, and said ‘well you’ll have to go to the eye infirmary’ 
[...] And I had to come home on my scooter. I had to get a taxi. Aha. And when I got 
there, you’ll never guess. They were shut. They closed at half past four. [...] And that 
was a bad experience. Didn’t feel very safe then.” [P15] 
 
5.2.1.2 Knowing that Support is in Place 
When service users are discharged home, it is often the case that they will require additional 
support in order to help them cope. This can be seen by the use of the term ‘nothing to fear’ 
by participant 5. 
− “Safe when I’ve been transferred? Well if the organisations are in place, I haven’t got 
anything to fear” [P05] 
  
Later in the interview the same participant explains one of the systems in place for her care 
team after she has been discharged from hospital. 
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− “they can key in [a] code and get the key out to open the door and come in just in 
case of emergencies if I didn’t answer or anything like that... Just an extra protection 
sort of isn’t it?” [P05] 
 
5.2.1.3 Having a Means to Contact a Healthcare Professional 
Service users also discussed the importance of having a means with which to contact 
healthcare professionals once they are discharged.  
− “when I say I feel safe, I feel safe with them there so I can call them at any time, the 
rapid response team. You know, it gives you that feeling of somebody’s there for you” 
[P15] 
 
This also applies on a more immediate level that covers the use of personal alarms as a 
means to request help. 
− “They’ve tied the... wall thing on here for me [personal alarm / call button]. Just 
having that beside you makes me feel a lot safer.” [P11] 
 
5.2.1.4 Apologising 
One participant when discussing an incident where the healthcare professionals hadn’t 
informed her that she was being discharged explained that either an apology or an attempt 
to view the situation from her standpoint would have stopped her from being annoyed. 
− “I was furious. I was annoyed. [...] nobody said well we’re very sorry. I mean not that I 
wanted them to go down on bended knee and beg pardon, but they never looked at it 
from my point of view.” [P04] 
 
5.2.1.5 Interpersonal Skills 
There are many interpersonal skills that healthcare professionals have that make service 
users feel safe. These were identified by the participants as having the ability to put you at 
ease, being civil  
− “you do feel safe when you’re leaving your home if you’re with these people. It’s not 
as if they’re a stranger to you, they actually put you at your ease so [they] make you 
feel safe.” [P08] 
− “Well they were very civil, and when you’re old people are not always civil.” [P07] 
 
Research notes taken from the interview with P02 further demonstrate the role that good 
interpersonal skills can have on how safe people feel 
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− ‘They talk to you, ask questions, ask how the pain is. It’s very nice to ask if you’re 
alright. This definitely helped to make you feel safe.’ [P02 interview notes] 
 
5.2.2 Responsiveness 
Another key theme that was identified when discovering what made service users feel safe 
and envisaging what would make them feel safe in the future centres around the 
responsiveness of the healthcare professionals, particularly in providing patient-centred 
care. As with communication, responsiveness is also a multi-faceted theme, with an 
emphasis on responding to individual needs, having short waiting times both on admission to 
hospital and when waiting for their healthcare professionals.  
 
5.2.2.1 Responding to Individual Needs 
Service users discussed how healthcare professionals could make them feel safer by 
responding to their individual needs.  
− “I felt that they felt ‘there’s nothing wrong with her’ [...] they didn’t even open the back 
door. [...] And bearing in mind I hadn’t a breath in me. And they’re saying ‘go on you 
can do it, go on you can do it’. Like you know, and I did, but when I got in he had to 
put an oxygen mask on me” [P15] 
− “I think you’d need to look at your patient first and decide whether they needed semi-
personal attention, not total attention, put somebody with an eye on them” [P04] 
 
5.2.2.2 Short Waiting Times 
A further feature of providing responsive care that made service users feel safe included the 
length of the waiting times both after they had been transferred to hospital and discharged 
into the care of community care teams. Participant 13 is envisaging what would make her 
feel safer in future care transfers. 
− “Could be to ensure that you were seen by someone straight away, you weren’t just 
left on one of those trolley things for hours which you can be. And being seen by, by 
the doctors quicker then a lot of the times you do, [...] I don’t want to be left on one of 
those trolleys, and I don’t want to have to wait hours to see a doctor.” [P13] 
− “They’ll come to here if I need them. [...] I mean they’re not very long coming either, 
they’ll give you a time, ‘we’ll be there in thirty minutes’ or something. [P15] 
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5.2.3 Traditional Safety Issues 
Participants described traditional safety issues whilst talking about safety, which for the most 
part consisted of falls, while there were also mentions of healthcare acquired infections 
(HCAIs), drug incidents, missed diagnosis and inadequate care.  
 
5.2.3.1 Falls 
The major issue that was discussed was being safe from falls when being transferred. 
− “Being secure[...] know that if they try to lift you or anything that you’re safe and they 
won’t let you fall” [P01] 
− “They help me down backwards, as I say down the step. One at either side they 
make sure I’m not going to fall. Oh no they’re very careful like that. I was safe.” [P04] 
− “If I need help, if I fall[...] they get help to you” [P06] 
− “there’s no fear of them tipping you up or anything like that. Safety wise, you know. 
Even in the ambulance, when you get in the ambulance everything’s[...] perfect” 
[P08] 
 
5.2.3.2 Healthcare Acquired Infections 
Participants also mentioned HCAIs, with two of the participants having acquired MRSA 
previously. 
− “I just don’t like hospitals because I think all the bugs that’s going around that you 
can pick up, I’d rather be at home because I could pick up any of the nasty things 
there [at hospital]” [P06] 
− “when I was there they kindly donated me the MRSA bug, and I had to stay in 
hospital for quite a while” [P07] 
 
5.2.3.3 Drug Incidents 
One participant in particular explained feeling unsafe once he had been transferred home 
due to his drug management method. 
− “I don’t feel safe in the house now because I’ve been taking epileptic fits[...] I can’t 
remember what tablets I’ve got to take or when I’ve got to take them. And if I’ve took 
them, have I took them?” [P11] 
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5.2.3.4 Missed Diagnosis 
Another safety issue that was discussed by a family friend of a service user was that of a 
missed diagnosis. 
− “you had your x-ray and they said everything was fine[...] the nurse or somebody 
helped [daughter] to put her in the car, and she was yelping with the pain[...] they 
took her back to A and E only to find when she’d had that fall three weeks previous, 
she’d broke her hip” [P04] 
 
5.2.3.5 Inadequate Care 
The final traditional safety issue was being discharged without an appropriate care package 
in place. 
− “I don’t think it should happen to anyone that is incapable of looking after themselves, 
to be sent home on their own to an empty house without any care support in.” [P06] 
 
5.2.4 Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of Safety 
In addition to the key themes that were identified, a number of related themes kept arising 
that could not be placed within the same categories. The most prominent of these was the 
issue of trust, which had an impact upon how safe patients felt. However where it differs 
from the other themes is that trust is not informed by individual acts but is created in a 
holistic manner encompassing all aspects of healthcare. A further theme that presented itself 
was that of power, which is of importance within an organisational development study.  
 
5.2.4.1 Trust 
Trust is a concept that frequently arose during the interviews when speaking with 
participants about what made them feel safe. Generally participants spoke about feeling safe 
because they trusted their respective healthcare professionals; however participants were 
also prepared to justify staff actions when things had gone wrong, instead placing blame on 
organisational restrictions. 
 
Trust of Healthcare Professionals 
− “you’ve got men and women doing their job and they’re there to look after you, and 
their training comes in [clicks fingers]. Safety first.” [P08] 
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− “I think that when you’re poorly you’re at your lowest ebb. And the reassurance in 
knowing that you have trained people with you, yes that does make you feel safe.” 
[P10] 
 
Trust from Within 
− “Being safe as I say, it’s just something that I assume. I mean, I presume I’m in 
capable hands, I presume they’re capable people that will get me from A to B in a 
comfortable manner” [P09] 
 
Making Excuses for Healthcare Providers and Professionals 
− “I seemed to be in this cubicle for an awful long time [T] But they were busy, they 
had emergencies and everything.” [P03] 
− “I’ve seen it be half past eleven at night before you’ve got a bed in hospital, but that’s 
due to bed shortages and one thing and another. Everybody has to put up with that.” 
[P06] 
− “I think they do as much as they can with the resources that they have. I don’t think 
they could do any more really.” [P13] 
 
5.2.4.2 Attitudes to Safety 
When participants were asked if they often thought about their own safety when going 
through an organisational care transfer, the majority stated that it was not something that 
they often thought about. The main reasons for these were that they either trusted the 
healthcare professionals to look after them, or because they were too ill to think about 
safety.  
− “[Safety] never enters my mind. I just put myself in their hands. I know that they’ll get 
me there safely. I don’t know why, I just trust people.” [P02] 
− “No, [safety] never has [entered my mind]. Probably because I feel safe, I don’t feel 
at all unsafe” [P10] 
− “I’m always unhappy if I have to go into hospital, and when you go in you’re just not 
well enough to think about [safety]” [P11] 
 
There were occasions when participants stated that they would think about safety. In the first 
example, it is dependent upon how ill he is. In the second example, safety is a concern due 
to the complicated nature of her treatment and the potential impact it could have if something 
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was to go wrong. She is discussing if safety crosses her mind when being discharged from 
hospital.  
− “[T] if you’re being transferred and you are aware of everything that’s going on, then 
you may think about safety. But not when you’re poorly you don’t bother thinking 
about it. When you’re poorly that’s it. You’re being poorly.” [P09] 
− “[T] safety becomes an issue if for example before I had the oxygen in, if I had 
difficulty breathing, well obviously I used the nebulizer and everythingT so safety 
does cross your mind because if you haven’t got those things available to you, then 
things just get progressively worse." [P13] 
 
5.2.4.3 Attitudes to the Reporting of Safety 
Participants reported mixed feelings towards the reporting of safety in response to the 
question ‘do you think there should be a means for you to feedback being safe or unsafe?’ 
There were a number of reasons for this mixed attitude, with those in favour of reporting 
seeing it as a learning experience for healthcare professionals, and to make them aware of 
any concerns. This tended to be focused around providing immediate, verbal feedback to the 
healthcare professionals.  
− “if you’re nervous, if you feel unsafe I think you should be able to tell them” [P04] 
− “if you’re being transferred you are then in the hands of somebody else. So there 
should be someone there in reasonably near contact, that you could either go to, 
speak to or something like that, if you felt either safe or unsafe” [P09] 
− “Oh yes, I would certainly [feedback]T I mean the thing is I suppose it would help the 
paramedics if you were to tell someone that they were very good, that you felt 
completely safe.” [P10] 
− “Yeah if there was a formal way [I would give feedback], if there was some form or 
something to fill in or something like that.” [P15] 
 
Those that were against the reporting of their safety tended to state that they had never had 
a reason to report something, and so could not see the value in doing so.  
− “It never bothered me [reporting safety], I just felt that of course you’ll be safe, that’s 
what they’re there for” [P01] 
− “No I’ve not had any reason to [feedback]. I’ve never had any reason to, you know. 
I’ve always felt safe.” [P08] 
− “Well if I felt unsafe I would probably complain, but as I say I’ve never faced that” 
[P10] 
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5.2.5 Summary of the Findings 
In summary of the findings, there are a number of clear concepts that began to emerge 
when participants were discussing their safety in organisational care transfers. These have 
been merged into three key themes that demonstrate how the participants define and 
perceive safety when going through an organisational care transfer. In addition to these 
three key themes, there are also other issues that were of importance to the study, although 
they were not part of the original aims of this stage of the research. These include the role 
that trust plays in relation to how patients perceive and define safety, and participant 
attitudes towards safety and the reporting of safety. Table 5.1 presents a brief overview of 
these themes and sub-themes. Where possible the major themes are displayed down their 
second sub-theme.  
 
Major Themes Sub-theme 1 Sub-theme 2 
• Communication • Apologising  
   
 • Being informed • Able to understand 
instructions 
• Kept updated 




• Know support is in 
place 
 • Being friendly and 
Reassuring 
• Civil and respectful 
• Having somebody to 
talk to 
 • Listening • Having a choice 
 • Having a means to 
contact health care 
professionals 
• Contact details 
• Personal alarm 
• Responsiveness • Easy process • Support in place 
before transfer 
 • Individual needs • Co-operative 
 • Listening • Having a choice 
 • Short waiting times • Kept updated 
• Delayed response 
• Traditional safety 
issues 
• Adequate care • Beds being made 
• Delayed response 
• Given food 
• Support in place 
before transfer 
 • Falls  
 • Healthcare Acquired 
Infections (HCAIs) 
 
 • Medication  
 • Missed diagnosis  
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 • Painful procedures  
 • Physical safety • Able to breathe 
• Careful driving 
• Crowded waiting 
rooms 
• Personal security 
• Trust • From within • Religion 




• Lack of resources 
 • Trust in health care 
professionals 
• In somebody else’s 
hands 
• Training 
• Attitudes to Safety • Don’t think about 
safety 
• Trust people 
• Don’t feel well 
enough 
 • Think about safety • Depending on illness 
• Depending on 
available equipment 
• Attitudes to the 
Reporting of Safety 
• (Discover) Had no 
reason to report 
safety 
 
 • (Dream) Reporting 
can be useful 
• Make health care 
professionals aware 
of concerns 
• Provide helpful 
feedback 
   
 
Table 5.1: Key themes of how participants perceive safety within organisational care transfers. 
 
5.2.6 Reflections on the Data Collection Process and Analysis 
Participants often struggled to understand the questions regarding the care transfer; they 
found it difficult to conceptualise which area of their care that I wanted to ask them about. 
This occurred from the outset of data collection, as notes from my research diary explain in 
relation to P01: 
−  ‘She appeared to struggle to grasp the concept of the care transfer. She appeared to 
want to keep returning to the idea of a care transfer being a local process, i.e. moving 
from her bed to the wheelchair.’ [JS Research Diary] 
 
As this was a common trend amongst the interviews, attempts were made to try and 
establish as early as was possible what was meant by an organisational care transfer. As 
part of the interview briefing with the participant where the purpose of the study was 
explained, and they were also informed what was meant by an organisational care transfer. 
At the start of data collection this explanation indicated that an organisational care transfer is 
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when people were moving from one organisation to another. However this still caused some 
confusion with participants and on reflection did not detail the boundaries of the 
organisational care transfer, such as giving a specific start and end point. It was therefore 
decided that the boundaries would consist of any aspects of their care related to discharge 
or departing (such as planning the transfer), the journey itself and any aspects of their care 
related to admission or arrival (such as finding a bed). The latter of these appeared more 
complicated, and when asked by participants it was described as ‘up until the point at which 
they are settled’.  
 
Despite this greater clarity, some participants had a tendency to move away from talking 
about organisational care transfers to talking about their care in general. This can be 
interpreted as part of the person’s narrative of their healthcare where it will include different 
modes and situations, and the separating of the organisational care transfer from the rest of 
the episode of care may seem artificial. The researcher selected the parts of this narrative 
that are of relevance to the study, i.e. those that focus on organisational care transfers. The 
aspects of care not related to organisational care transfers were left out of the analysis 
process unless deemed important to the transfer process in some form. 
 
5.2.6.1 Dyadic Interviews 
The uses of dyadic interviews have been argued to have both a positive and negative 
influence upon the interview process (Kendall, et al., 2009). Within this study the impact of 
using dyadic interviews was generally positive, where the family member or friend played a 
role in aiding memory recall or articulating in a clearer manner what was trying to be said. 
For example P04 was often reminded of particular situations or details that she would not 
have otherwise remembered, such as who was present during the transfer and when it was. 
− Int “So did your daughter manage to get up for the Wednesday?” 
P04 “No she didn’t, no. She didn’t get up in time did she?” 
Carer “She did” 
P04 “Oh she did, yes” 
Carer “She did on the Wednesday. She couldn’t on the Tuesday because she was 
in London” 
P04 “They decided they would move it to the Wednesday” 
Carer “Half past four on the Wednesday I think” 
P04 “That’s right, because she couldn’t leave [work], and that was more 
important.” 
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P08’s wife helped him to articulate his feelings, often referring to P08’s experiences as joint 
experiences through the use of the word ‘we’. 
− P08 “My wife’s explained to you what I’ve tried to put into words” 
Wife “I don’t know, I still can’t do it properly, but if that’s the way it comes across, 
that’s the only way that [P08], I mean me would be able to explain that” 
P08 “I’ve never had any bother” 
Wife “Never felt insecure” 
P08 “Insecure or anything off the paramedics. They’ve always been gentlemen” 
[T] 
Wife “If that helps, but that’s the only way we could put it that way. It’s the only way 
we could feel to put it in that category.” 
 
Although it could be argued that these do not make up the individual’s own interpretation, in 
both circumstances the family friend or member was present during the transfer, and their 
input into the interview was supported by the research participant. It did not appear that they 
were influencing or changing the participant’s own perspectives, but instead supporting and 
expanding upon them. Kendall et al. (2009) highlight that multiperspective data can 
sometimes show differing concerns amongst participants, but there were no instances of 
competing ideas or perspectives during the dyadic interviews in this study.  
 
5.3 Discussion of the Findings 
The following section aims to give an overview of the research findings from Phase 1 of this 
study, with a particular emphasis on how this impacted upon the research process of Phase 
2. In order to do this, it is first necessary to explore how these findings relate to the 
philosophical assumptions of both phases of the study, and the implications that these 
findings have for Phase 2. A wider discussion of these findings is presented in Chapter 8. 
 
5.3.1 Relation to the Philosophical Framework  
The findings from this phase introduce the role of interpretivism into patient safety which is 
usually investigated through a realist medical framework. By linking back in with the critical 
realist framework of this study, the findings represent the individual interpretations of patient 
safety that the patients interviewed held. As has been highlighted, these differ slightly to 
those of healthcare professionals, although there is still some overlap in the form of 
‘traditional safety risks’. When interpreting the single reality, these differences and 
similarities are to be expected as there will usually be an overlap between different groups of 
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individuals. However with regards to this study the differences in interpretations are of 
greater importance, as those that are the same will already be included in current reporting 
mechanisms aimed at those that are able to identify them, such as healthcare professionals 
reporting falls, medication errors and healthcare acquired infections.  
 
Therefore these different interpretations of reality emphasise the need for a patient reporting 
mechanism for safety. As patients interpret reality differently to healthcare professionals, 
they are thus perceiving a different part (or depth) of that reality. There is a need for the 
mechanism to be capable of capturing this intransitive nature of reality, otherwise safety is 
not explored, challenged and addressed in every possible way, but only in a manner of 
relevance to (or via interpretations from) healthcare professionals. Additionally, through the 
process of retroduction, the findings have been used to identify the potentially underlying 
mechanisms that are able to produce the safety in the form of the safety buffers in the 
Swiss-Cheese model of safety. Theories and models of safety are discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
5.3.2 Implications for Phase 2 
The original plan for the study was that findings from Phase 1 would inform the development 
of the reporting mechanism. It was therefore essential that these findings were conveyed 
throughout the entire research process, so that the reporting mechanism would capture 
these perceptions and not focus specifically on traditional definitions of safety. For this 
reason, the findings from Phase 1 were reported to all healthcare professionals involved in 
the recruitment of participants, with the intention that they would then be involved in the 
development of the reporting tool, and that they understood that it would be developed 
based upon these findings.  
 
It was therefore essential that the reporting mechanism to be developed and piloted in 
Phase 2 captured communication and responsiveness in addition to the traditional safety 
issues identified by participants. On a philosophical level, basing the reporting mechanism 
on these perceptions allows for the identification of the clear and consistent patterns of 
practice that were identified as being important in relation to the underlying causal 
mechanisms of safety (McEvoy & Richards, 2006). On a theoretical level, the perceptions 
have identified new safety buffers that can lead to increased safety, however there needs to 
be a mechanism to be able to identify when these buffers have failed.  
 
A further impact of these findings upon the development and piloting of the reporting tool is 
the finding that there were mixed feelings towards safety and towards the reporting of safety, 
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which has also been identified previously (e.g. Davis, et al., 2007). It is therefore important 
for there to be an evaluation of the reporting tool so as to capture its perceived usefulness 
from participants. Furthermore as the definitions of safety are developed based on fourteen 
participants’ perception of safety, there needs to be an opportunity for future participants to 
refine the definitions if they see something else as being important to their safety when going 
through organisational care transfers. Both the evaluation and further refinement will be 
detailed in greater depth in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter offer a different insight into safety than the medical 
definition which dominates the literature. There was some crossover between participants’ 
perceptions of safety and the medical definition such as medication errors, HCAIs, but some 
large differences also exist. In particular, participants identified that different components of 
communication and responsiveness are important to their safety.  
 
The following two chapters will explain the processes involved in the development of the 
reporting mechanism and how it was piloted and further refined. Each chapter will be 
presented individually, although there is inevitably some crossover between the two chapters 
and this, in particular in relation to the recruitment of the organisations.  
 
This chapter has only given a brief discussion of the findings so that it is clear to the reader 
how they informed the development and piloting of the reporting tool. They are discussed in 
greater detail in the discussion chapter (Chapter 8), as well as an explanation of how they 
link into the wider literature on reporting of safety and other theoretical concepts.  
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Chapter 6: Development of a Patient Reporting Mechanism 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter details the processes by which the patient reporting tool was developed through 
two collaborative workshops, which formed the Design (Plan) stage of the first AR cycle. It 
begins with a reminder of the original aims for the reporting mechanism, and is then 
structured in terms of the methods, data analysis, findings and reflections of each workshop. 
This covers how the reporting mechanism was developed and the rationale for the inclusion 
of its individual components and the principles that underpin it. Although the involvement of 
the organisations began during the recruitment of participants in Phase 1, the collaboration 




Figure 6.1: Where the development of the reporting mechanism fits into the methodological 
cycles (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
6.2 Aims of the Reporting Mechanism 
The aim of Phase 2 was to develop a method of facilitating service users to identify and 
report self-defined safety incidents in an organisational care transfer setting. To achieve this, 
the aim was split into two objectives; develop a method of facilitating service users to identify 
self-defined safety and to create a mechanism for service users to report self-defined safety. 
The patient perceptions of safety identified in Phase 1 of the study; communication, 
responsiveness and traditional safety risks were embedded within these objectives. The AI 
methodology was reflected in the focus on safe care in addition to unsafe care.  
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6.2.1 Findings 
6.2.1.1 Summary of the Findings 
When exploring what the reporting mechanism should look like, participants were asked to 
focus on the format that it should take and what questions it should ask. During these 
discussions, key principles that underpin the reporting mechanism were also introduced. 
Potential designs that were identified for the reporting mechanism included service user 
meetings, generic open-ended questionnaires, one-to-one interviews, verbal reports, Patient 
Advice and Liaison service (using service user complaints) and leaflets. Out of these, 
participants felt that a questionnaire and / or a leaflet were the most appropriate method of 
capturing patient reports of safety. Key principles highlighted by participants were that the 
reporting mechanism needed to be patient-centred, short and concise with clear signposting, 
optionally anonymous and have a focus on both safe and unsafe care.  
 
Participants also explored practical issues of implementing the reporting mechanism in that it 
needed to comply with current processes that are already in existence within each of the 
services. It was identified that there are already numerous feedback mechanisms for when 
care is already in place, but there are no mechanisms for the admission and discharge 
processes within the organisations represented in this study. Discussions around the 
distribution of the mechanism focused on an individualistic approach in that it should be 
given to service users after each episode of healthcare. However there were uncertainties 
around if this should be via continuous distribution or batch distribution, depending upon 
available financial and time resources. It was felt that either local or national legislation 
would be necessary as a driver to implement the reporting mechanism on a wider scale, with 
funding issues focusing on any potential advertising of the reporting mechanism and a 
sustained roll-out. The final issue of implementing the reporting mechanism discussed by 
participants was who the responsibility for monitoring and acting upon the reports rested 
with. The workshop did not provide solutions to these issues, which would need to be 
addressed if a patient reporting mechanism was introduced into practice. 
 
6.2.1.2 What will the Mechanism Look Like? 
This question was split into two parts that were addressed at the same time by the 
participants; ‘What format will the mechanism take?’ and ‘What questions will it ask?’. The 
following analysis is structured in terms of the two sub-questions and cues given to 
participants in Workshop 1 (Table 4.3). A further section is included on the principles that 
participants felt were needed to underpin the reporting mechanism. 
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What Format will the Mechanism Take? 
A number of suggestions were proposed by the participants as to what format the 
mechanism would take. These captured a wide variety of methods that patients could report 
safety back to their healthcare professionals. Below are the proposed formats of a reporting 
mechanism provided by Group 2 via flipchart paper, though there is no relevance to the 
order in which they are reported. Group 1 held a different discussion to Group 2, instead 
focusing on the principles of the reporting mechanism and what healthcare professionals 
and service users would want in a reporting mechanism. During this discourse, methods of 
reporting were also discussed and are combined with those provided by Group 2. There 
were no unique methods proposed by Group 1 that were not also identified by Group 2. 
 
• Service user meetings in different locations 
Flipchart paper notes and the observation of Group 2 suggested that service user meetings 
could either take a similar format to, or be linked in with current Local Involvement Networks 
(LINks), where service users would have the opportunity to discuss any safety issues 
amongst each other and with healthcare professionals.  
 
• Surveys 
Both generic questionnaires and leaflets were suggested by participants as appropriate 
means of collecting service user reports of safety via surveys. Within these, different 
methods of conducting them were suggested, which included via postal services and one-to-
one guidance.  
 
One of the key requirements of using a survey was that it would need to be generic so that it 
could be applied to any service, which was particularly important as service users could be 
being transferred to and from many different organisations.  
− “it’s easiest and most generalisable thing isn’t it? Especially for covering the range of 
services. [T] There needs to be somebody who can come back to all these different 
points in the process. [T] It’s got to be very general I think is what I’m trying to say.” 
[SCHM, Group 1] 
− “I know what you’re trying to say, you’re trying to say something generic for the whole 
of any service, on a transfer of care. But I think that’s because transfers of care are 
that different to talking from somebody being transferred from a home to a hospital, a 
hospital to a home, for an appointment, for going for an x-ray” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Coming in on their own steamT” [SCHM, Group 1] 
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• Verbal reports 
The EP in Group 1 described that from his own personal experience he would have liked to 
have provided verbal feedback, either face-to-face or via the telephone 
− “In regards to that situation that you were saying, [T] from this mechanism would you 
say that it was better to speak to somebody verbally or was it better to be done face-
to-face or over the telephone, orT? [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “I would have quite happily done it face-to-face, or telephone would have sufficed” 
[EP, Group 1] 
− “I’m going to put verbally there then [on the flip chart paper]” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Aha” [EP, Group 1] 
 
This method also received support from a healthcare professional later in the break-off 
session. 
− “Patients are always encouraged, sort of if they do feel in any sort of way then they 
can contact us as first contact, and if they don’t feel that they’re getting any further 
forward then by all means contacts PALs. I would far rather try and sort ofT if a 
patient was saying to me that they didn’t feel that something was safe, I would far 
rather try to sit down with the patient and try to sort of get to the bottom of what they 
felt. Because if it was just a case of misunderstanding then I could work with the 
patient to give them reassurance for that. But if there was a case that something was 
unsafe then ordinarilyT our sort of reporting mechanismT it would take shape that 
way.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
• PALs (complaints) 
The Patient Advice and Liaison service (PALs) was suggested by an expert patient in Group 
2: 
− ‘If you have a reps group, how do you reach everyone – PALs – report an incident, 
want a response’ [PD observations, Group 2] 
 
In response to the suggestion of using PALs data, the other expert patient in the group 
questioned ‘how do you know what’s happening outside the box?’, subsequently suggesting 
service user to service user interviews. These were not recorded on the flipchart paper, and 
there is no further reference to them in the observation notes.  
 
Group 1 also discussed the use of PALs, in particular focusing on the limitations of utilising 
pre-existing data. PALs aims to stop people from making a complaint by resolving any 
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issues, subsequently making any complaints data unrepresentative, and potentially resulting 
in only 5% of patients that are unhappy with their care going on to make a complaint 
(National Audit Office, 2008). Furthermore the EP in Group 1 recalled a time when he 
wanted to make a report about a transfer of a relative, and opted not to contact PALs: 
− “But [PALs] is almost like putting in a complaint. I didn’t really want to put in a 
complaint, I just wanted to say is there a better way forward?” [EP, Group 1] 
 
At the end of the workshop when participants were deciding which aspects were of greatest 
importance or relevance, six stars were placed on ‘generic questionnaire’ and five stars were 
placed on ‘leaflets’. No stars were placed on any of the other formats, signifying that the 
participants wanted the mechanism to take the form of a questionnaire and / or leaflet.  
 
Principles that Underpin the Reporting Mechanism 
Participants made recommendations and references to the principles on which the 
mechanism should be based. These included that it should be patient-centred, short, 
concise with clear signposting, optionally anonymous and being objective with a focus on 
both positive and negative care.  
 
• Patient-centred 
The SCHM in Group 1 referred to their processes being patient-centred, although there was 
no such process in place for admissions and discharge, which the reporting mechanism 
would be able to address. 
− “Our whole assessment and care planning process is person-centred. So there’s lots 
of opportunities there for the person to have their say about the service we’re 
providing. Perhaps what we haven’t got is just before they get to us, and just after we 
discharge them.” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
• Short and concise with clear signposting 
There was also an agreement that the reporting mechanism needed to be both short and 
open-ended so that service users could report what was of most importance to them, 
although the open-ended nature of the questions were not recorded on the flipchart paper. 
− “From a professional wanting to know what a patient would want, you’d want 
something that’s short but open-endedT” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Yes” [EP, Group 1] 
− “T so it allows the patient toT discuss one aspect that you felt safe. That’s a 
massive topic but if you had sort of four or five questions like, were you happy with 
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that element of care?, did you find that was safe?, and that sort of thing” [CCTN, 
Group 1] 
− “Yeah, and, if not, why not?” [EP, Group 1] 
 
Participants felt that a short and concise reporting mechanism would increase the number of 
service users that completed it. This conversation also highlights what is meant by the term 
objective; that the mechanism needed to be equally weighted between safe and unsafe 
care.  
− “So to capture that [transfers of care are different], would we say that they would 
want the questionnaire to be sort of short and concise to encourage people to 
actually do it?” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Got to be fairly concise. The longer it is I think the less chance there is of getting 
involved with it, and especially if you’re asking for positive as well as negative 
feedback or just general commentary” [SCHM, Group 1] 
− “That’s a very important point. It shouldn’t all be whinging. You need to capture the 
positives as well” [EP, Group 1] 
− “So objective, yeah?” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Yeah” [EP, Group 1] 
 
• Unbiased 
The use of the term unbiased was used by both health care professionals and Expert 
Patients to emphasise the necessity to be appreciative, which also corresponds with being 
objective. Both groups were aware that any reporting mechanism needed to place an 
emphasis upon both the positive and negative experiences of safety. 
− “You don’t get much feedback unless it’s a complaint” [SCHM, Group 1] 
− “But I think, I think a lot of people do get feedback. I just think there’s an emphasis on 
the negative. There’s a lot of people, like I’m sure you’ve probably had a patient, 
where they feedback that you do a grand job. That never gets captured.” [CCTN, 
Group 1] 
 
• Anonymous (optional) 
Participants felt that the reporting mechanism should have an option to be anonymous as 
some service users would want to avoid going through a formal complaints procedure. 
However there were concerns over the traceability of an incident. 
− “The only problem is with it being anonymous isT. tracing it back because it’s 
actually more effective when you can look. [T] So you can improve practice 
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generally, but for that specific case you might want to look at it in more detail.” 
[SCHM, Group 1] 
 
What Questions will the Mechanism Ask? 
The two groups took different approaches to tackling this question. Group 2 discussed the 
actual questions that the mechanism should ask service users, which included; 
• How satisfied were you with the length of time taken for: 
o Ambulance 
o GP appointment 
o Hospital appointment 
o Treatment 
o Waiting time 
o Follow-up 
o Test results, etc. 
• Did you feel your needs / requests were listened to / met / respected 
• How satisfactory was the care you received? E.g. basic needs: food and drink / 
medical care 
• Were you given contact numbers of services in the community? 
 
However these questions do not deal with the issues of safety, either from a medical or 
service user perspective, suggesting participants struggled to differentiate between service 
user reporting of safety and service user reporting of satisfaction. This ties in closely with the 
findings of Kuzel et al. (2004), who found that by including emotional distress as a safety 
incident, the boundaries between patient safety and patient dissatisfaction were blurred. This 
has been further supported by Burroughs et al. (2005) who found that patient reporting of 
medical concerns was significantly correlated with patient satisfaction. Group 1 did not tackle 
the direct questions that would be asked, instead focusing on the principles behind the 
questions. 
 
6.2.1.3 How will the Mechanism Fit with Current Systems? 
A number of points of discussion arose during the second break-off session which focused 
on how the potential mechanism would fit with current mechanisms. These have been split 
into six themes; Current Systems, Distribution, Drivers, Financial Considerations, 
Timescales and Outcomes. Participants appeared unclear about the purpose being to 
develop a mechanism to allow service users to report safety incidents, and not satisfaction. 
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Because it has been highlighted in the literature (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Kuzel, et al., 2004) 
and was evident in Workshop 1 that it is difficult to distinguish between service user 
reporting of safety and satisfaction, it is assumed that the principles behind any reporting 
mechanism should be similar. The six themes also incorporate data from the first break-off 
session when participants diverged from the question and discussed issues pertinent to the 
implementation of the reporting mechanism. 
 
Current Systems 
Participants were unsure about what systems were available locally and nationally that the 
mechanism could link into. This was especially the case for the EP in Group 1 who 
acknowledged that service users are often unaware of the systems in operation. 
− “I know some of the current system, butT for the service user that could be the 
problem, you don’t maybe know the system. I mean, I know part of the system” [EP, 
Group 1] 
 
A further question was raised about how well the current systems (such as PALs, complaints 
and patient satisfaction surveys) work, and if they don’t work, then it was unclear what 
purpose fitting the mechanism into it would serve. It is possible that this was a result of the 
participants focusing on developing a patient satisfaction survey, and not a patient safety 
reporting mechanism. However these questions are still valid and were addressed when 
developing the mechanism, although this was done within the context of patient safety 
reporting mechanisms and not patient satisfaction surveys. The final comment regarding the 
current systems was that the mechanism should complement existing services.  
 
− “From our perspective we’ve already got lots of things in place where service users 
can give feedback, not just complaints. So one of the first considerations for us is to 
not duplicate what is already there.” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
− “Our whole assessment and care planning process is person-centred. So there’s lots 
of opportunities there for the person to have their say about the service we’re 
providing. Perhaps what we haven’t got is just before they get to us, and just after we 
discharge them.” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
− We’ve all got process in place that if there’s something we’re concerned about we 
can bring it up. But looking what feedback we get from patients, I know certainly on 
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an ambulance point of view, we get no feedback. The only feedback we get is either 
a complaint coming in or a letter of thanks. [ASP, Group 1] 
 
An additional concern raised was how the reporting mechanism would be regarded by 
governing bodies that had their own systems in place to monitor adverse events. 
− “if there’s suddenly another pathway comes in for people to put in negative feedback, 
how are they going toT I don’t know how that would be seen not just by our 
governing bodies but other governing bodies that are already in place” [ASP, Group 
1] 
 
When discussing how the reporting mechanism would fit with current systems, participants 
returned to the notion that a generic reporting mechanism could be applied regardless of the 
point of care in which service users were to receive it. 
− “a very generic form which is available at all points of care; it’s available in the care 
homes, in the ambulance, in the hospital, in the doctors’ surgery. The same thing is 
available right the way through, so wherever you are, whatever point in the care 
pathway you’re at, whoever you’re talking to, you’ve got the same pathway to give 
feedback” [ASP, Group 1] 
 
Distribution 
Distribution of the mechanism focused on when service users would be given the 
mechanism and the timescales involved. Firstly, it was suggested by Group 1 that service 
users are given the mechanism post-consultation. This was further developed with the 
suggestion on the flipchart paper that ‘each mechanism captured after each [...] 
consultation’. Three stickers were applied denoting the importance to the participants.  
 
Concerns were raised regarding the number of times service users were to be asked to 
complete feedback forms during or shortly after organisational care transfers.  
− “what we get is people who’ve been in hospital perhaps, then they’ve come into us, 
then they’ve maybe gone back into hospital and then come back into us again. So 
what they’ll have done within that, they’ll have gone through lots of assessments and 
answered loads of questions, and be assessed to death[T] so you get a lot of 
service users who are sick of being asked questions” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
Secondly, two different timescales were suggested for distributing the mechanism. This 
included continuous distribution, whereby potential respondents would be given the 
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mechanism on a continuous basis where certain criteria were met, although these criteria 
were not established during the workshop. The other option was to conduct a batch 
distribution of the mechanism. Each has their own merits; continuous distribution would allow 
for a more responsive service that captures instances of safe and unsafe care in real-time, 
whereas batch distribution would be more time- and cost-effective. Both distribution 
techniques will have to be considered in further depth before a decision is made. 
 
Multiple methods of feedback were supported as a means of capturing as many experiences 
as possible. One particular outcome that can be inferred from this is that any reporting 
mechanism should enable as many people as possible to complete it by taking into 
consideration any barriers that may affect them; in this scenario a questionnaire can be used 
to overcome the barrier of being unwilling to speak in front of a group of service users about 
any issues that are of a concern.  
− “In our service if we’re trying to encourage as much feedback as possible what we try 
and do is we try and have a range of routes that people can go down. So you might 
have people who are unhappy about speaking up in a group, but we have a service 
user meeting every week so you know that that person may not want to speak up in a 
group, that’s fine. That person has then got the option of filling out a questionnaireT 
or other people have got access to a comments and complaints box. So is it about 
having a range of options when you’re signposting ways of reporting? So you can do 
that, that or that.” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
Drivers 
Two key drivers were discussed regarding the implementation of a reporting mechanism; will 
it be driven by legislation and/or will it be incorporated into operational policy, and the role of 
partnership working. The issue of legislation and/or operational policy is difficult to address 
due to the changing nature of healthcare services at present as a result of the recently 
published white paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Department of Health, 
2010a). It is assumed that during the initial piloting of the mechanism, the driver will be the 
participants’ desire to improve patient safety within their organisation.  
 
Partnership working was also mentioned as a necessity when working across boundaries. 
This has already been identified in the literature in terms of interprofessional collaborations 
(Berg-Weger & Schneider, 1998; Bronstein, 2003) and the positive impact that they can 
have on services (Ponte, et al., 2010); however it reaffirms this need to work closely with 
different organisations when service users are undergoing an organisational care transfer 
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and suggests that the participants involved in this study are keen to improve their services in 
this area.  
 
Financial Considerations 
Relatively few financial considerations were mentioned. Of those that were, marketing of the 
mechanism received the greatest attention. This focused on how service users would find 
out about the mechanism, with a suggestion that advertising and awareness campaigns 
should be initiated to increase awareness. Although this was proposed by the EPs in Group 
2, there was little support from the healthcare professionals 
− ‘[EP 1] Whatever method the service user needs to be aware of this’ 
− ‘[EP 1 and 2] Mass marketing and advertising for LINks; didn’t yield any response’ 
[PD observation notes, Group 2] 
 
− ‘[EP 1] got to be marketed to the service user. They won’t ask for it for fear of 
discrimination’ [PD observation notes, Group 2] 
 
Due to the nature of the study and the funding streams, it was not possible to market the 
mechanism unless the organisations took this on themselves. During the piloting stages, the 
relevant participants from the workshop will make their service users aware of the 
mechanism.  
 
The other financial consideration was where the funds would come from to deliver the 
mechanism over a sustained period of time. Again this would need to be developed further 
within each of the participants’ own organisations, and is closely linked with the distribution 
techniques. It may therefore be viable for organisations with greater financial constraints to 
use batch distribution methods. 
 
Measuring Outcomes 
This theme focuses on how the outcomes of the mechanism were to be measured. It arose 
after discussions focused on what would happen once a service user had completed the 
mechanism.  
 
Group 2 also focused on the perceived outcomes of the reporting mechanism, though with a 
particular focus on the impact that it may have upon practice. In particular it is highlighted 
that there needs to be an incentive to improve safety. 
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− [ASP] this is an exercise in seeing where the problems lie – but what is done and 
what is the impact? [PD observation notes, Group 2] 
− [ASP] nothing will happen unless there’s an incentive to drive up performance [PD 
observation notes, Group 2] 
 
Suggestions were put forward that healthcare professionals should monitor the outcomes 
and feedback to the service users the results of the report.  
− “I think you also need to let service users know what will happen to the information 
because that’s the next stageT” [SCHM, Group 1] 
− “There’s nothing worse than putting in a report and it disappears.” [EP, Group 1] 
 
It wasn’t discussed what feedback should be provided to service users, though this should 
be identified through current literature.  A study exploring service user involvement in the 
planning and delivery of mental health services found that service users were dissatisfied 
when feedback was not provided following consultation with them (Crawford, et al., 2003). 
 
In addition to these outcomes, it was felt that giving service users the opportunity to report 
on their concerns and worries about their safety helps to break down barriers between the 
healthcare professional and the service user. This was partially supported by a healthcare 
professional in the group, with the added caveat that for this to occur patients needed time to 
digest information and to develop their thoughts and feelings. 
− “If you ask a patient if they have any concerns or worries that’s a hugeT it breaks 
down barriers” [EP, Group 1] 
− “I semi agree with that for the simple reason that I’ve witnessed patients being 
offered all this information and it’s not until the doctor gets up and leaves and they go 
‘ohh’, and it’s that time afterwards whereT so they probably do want to ask the 
questions but I think it’s allowingT giving them the information and giving them time 
to think about it and to develop their thoughts and feelings” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
6.2.2 Reflections of Workshop 1 
The development of the reporting mechanism was an iterative process which began with 
Workshop 1, and continued over the course of Workshop 2 and the two cycles of piloting. 
Workshop 1 provided the opportunity to explore a potential reporting mechanism whilst 
providing the foundations for the further development in Workshop 2. This section provides a 
reflective account of Workshop 1 and explains how the data was used to inform the 
development of Workshop 2. A summary of these reflections is provided in Table 6.1.  
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6.2.2.1 Patient Satisfaction 
One reflection that was evident to both the researcher and an observer (PD) was that 
participants appeared to struggle to grasp the concept of developing a mechanism for 
service users to report safety incidents. Instead they appeared to be intent on developing a 
patient satisfaction mechanism. This was first evident when participants were discussing the 
current systems that already exist. Although they identified some systems that are available 
to report safety, such as complaints mechanisms, they also discussed patient satisfaction 
and experience questionnaires that are already given to service users during their episode of 
healthcare.  
− ‘I had to prompt when group got bogged down with designing a patient satisfaction 
questionnaire’ [PD observation notes, Group 2] 
 
When discussing what the mechanism may look like, participants used language that was 
synonymous with that of patient satisfaction. For example, when Group 1 discussed the use 
of an open-ended questionnaire as a possible reporting mechanism they often used the 
word ‘like’. 
− “if there’s one fairly generic open-ended sheet with how do you rate this, how would 
you feel safe, blah blah blah. That would give you the option as a user at any stage 
to say right, I’ll have one of them. I like that and didn’t like that.” [ASP, Group 1] 
 
This reflects other research that identified there is a very fine line between patients reporting 
safety incidents and patient satisfaction (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Jha, et al., 2010; Kuzel, et 
al., 2004), which in this study is seen in both EPs and health care professionals. Although 
this may be somewhat understandable in health care professionals, by definition EPs can 
operate in a similar paradigm. It is possible that this was the cause of the lack of the 
development of a tangible reporting mechanism on which to build in Workshop 2. Given that 
participants were informed that the mechanism needed to include issues relevant to service 
users identified in Phase 1 of this study, it is understandable why participants hadn’t stated 
what questions the mechanism should ask as the instructions at the outset could have been 
more direct.  
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6.2.2.2 Individual Agendas 
When working in a collaborative environment it was necessary to reflect upon and take into 
account the personal and individual agendas participants brought with them, in order to 
address how these agendas could be constrained during Workshop 2.  
 
During Workshop 1 it was evident that some of the EPs wanted to tell their stories even 
when they were not always relevant to the task in hand. This agenda was clear early in 
group 1, where the expert patient stated: 
− “[I] have a story to tell which fits quite neatly into some of the things that Jason 
outlined [in the introduction]” [EP, Group 1] 
 
When the EP asked if he could recount his experiences of going through a care transfer, I 
tried to address this as there were tight time constraints on the workshop. Although this 
supports the findings from Phase 1 and could have provided a useful link between Phase 1 
and Phase 2, it detracted from the focus on the development of the reporting mechanism.  
− “Would it be useful if I gave you the real life scenario which involves the ambulance 
service, care home and hospital. Because I’ve got some unanswered question, and 
it’s real. Do you want to start at thatT” [EP, Group 1] 
− “The thing that I’m concerned about is the time we’ve got and the amount of stuff we 
need to get through [T]” [JS, Facilitator] 
 
However this did not work and the EP insisted on telling his story so that he could try to 
obtain answers to these ‘unanswered questions’. This posed a problem, as it had the 
potential to cause the healthcare professionals in the group to become defensive, as the use 
of the term ‘unanswered question’ could be seen to be confrontational. Furthermore, the 
telling of these stories impacted upon the time available to discuss the issues that were of 
most pertinence to the development of the reporting mechanism. Williamson (2007) 
identifies that EPs are able to speak for patients’ interests in the same manner that health 
care professionals speak for their own interests, which is evidently what was happening 
within this workshop through the telling of their own stories.  
 
Health care professionals may also have brought with them their own agendas. The greatest 
threat to the study and to the collaborative nature of the AR methodology was that the health 
care professionals were not receptive to the idea of patients reporting on their safety, which 
would suggest that their attendance was in defence to any mechanisms and to guide it away 
from the patient reporting of safety. Although this could be perceived to be a reason for the 
Page | 140  
 
focus on patient reporting of satisfaction rather than safety, the discussions between 
participants suggested that they wanted to receive truthful feedback from participants. 
− “You want them to be honest really” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
− “You do want people to comment about your service don’t you? You don’t want 
people not to give feedback about, you know, what you’re doing because you need to 
know that it’sT okay, and safe.” [SCHM, Group 1] 
 
There was one technical issue encountered during Workshop 1, where the voice recorder 
did not start. This meant that the intricate discussions that were going on in Group 2 were 
not captured.  
 
Reflections Impact on Workshop 2 
Participants focused on the reporting of 
patient satisfaction instead of the reporting of 
patient safety, despite being briefed before 
and during Workshop 1 
Repeat the emphasis of what we are trying 
to do, but clarify what it is that we do not 
want participants to do.  
Lack of the development of a tangible 
reporting tool 
Different methods will be utilised that will 
focus participants on the development of the 
reporting mechanism based upon the 
principles highlighted in Workshop 1. 
Personal and professional agendas may 
have a negative effect upon the group 
discussions  
More direction given to participants as to 
what is wanted will help to guide the 
discussions. Moving away from the principles 
of a reporting mechanism to the physical 
development will help provide this direction. 
Familiarity with fellow participants will also 
help to reduce this.  
 
Table 6.1: Reflections on Workshop 1 and the impact upon Workshop 2. 
 
6.3 Workshop 2 
Workshop 2 is presented in terms of the recruitment of participants to the workshop, 
including how they were chosen and the group constitution within the workshop. The 
methods of data collection within the workshop are explained, followed by the ethical 
considerations and how the workshop was structured. Finally the data analysis, findings and 
a reflection of the findings are presented.  
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6.3.1 Findings 
The findings are presented in relation to the outcome of the workshop; the mechanism for 
patients to report their safety. Although the processes of divergent thinking opened up many 
different ideas for the reporting mechanism, only those that contributed to the final idea are 
included. The data to support these are presented in terms of the decision to use a leaflet as 
the reporting mechanism, and then the twelve individual sections that construct the final 
reporting mechanism. Other concepts that were not important to the development of the 
reporting mechanism are provided as a summary. The findings are not reported in 
chronological order based upon the point at which they were discussed, but instead tell the 
story of how the final design of the reporting mechanism was developed.  
 
6.3.1.1 Choice of the Reporting Mechanism 
During the divergent thinking session a number of ideas were generated, which are listed in 
Table 6.2 along with the group they originated from and a brief explanation.  
 
Idea Group Brief Explanation 
Noticeboard 1 Provided in GP waiting rooms for patients to write 
comments about their recent experiences. Provides 
anonymity. 
Postcard 1 Given to service users during every part of the journey to 
complete, capturing the wide range of organisational care 
transfers. 
Post-boxes 1 An alternative to the noticeboard which provides privacy 
for service users and confidentiality for healthcare 
professionals. 
Thermometer Scale 1 Service users are able to place stickers on a large 
thermometer relating to how safe or unsafe they felt. 
Proposed as it would be quick and easy for service users 




2 CHIRP is a tool used in aviation. Suggested as an idea 
as it is confidential and had no blame attributed to the 
reports. 
RSPB Bird Watch 2 A method of collecting a lot of data in a systematic way 
over a short period of time 
Gordon Ramsey 2 Communication in restaurants by waiters can reduce the 
impact that long waiting times have 
Supermarket Tokens 2 System similar to supermarket charity donation tokens. 
Given to service users on discharge for them to place in 
a ’safe’ or ‘unsafe’ box 
Reverse Transfer 2 Increase safety by reducing the number of organisational 
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care transfers through increased care in the community 
Internet 
Questionnaire 
2 An automatic email sent to everyone that had gone 
through an organisational care transfer 
Hospital Wait 2 Provide information, either in person or via electronic 
screens regarding length of wait and delays 
Discharge Lounge 2 Place for service users to go prior to a discharge to free 
up a bed. Somebody could be there to coordinate 
transfers, provide information and receive feedback 
 
Table 6.2: Divergent thinking ideas for a patient reporting mechanism. 
 
Group 1 decided that the postcard was the best system to take forward and develop due to 
its simplicity and applicability to a wide variety of settings. Group 2 chose to develop a 
leaflet-based reporting mechanism, split into three sections directed towards the discharge, 
journey and admission of the service user. Ideas from both groups were included in the 
reporting mechanism. The following section explains how each of these came together to 
form the mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Outside of the patient reporting mechanism v1. See Table 6.3 for where each 
section is reported in the chapter. 
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Figure 6.3: Inside of the patient reporting mechanism v1. See Table 6.3 for where each section 
is reported in the chapter. 
 
Number Brief Overview  Location of 
Findings (Page 
Number) 
1 Explanation of what is meant by safety 144 
2 Explanation of what is meant by a transfer 144 
3 Efficient signposting 144 
4 Details for service users to provide further 
information 
145 
5 Option for service users to receive feedback 
(voluntary) 
145 
6 Individual demographics for research purposes 146 
7 Title of the reporting mechanism 146 
8 Logo of the reporting mechanism 146 
9 Information for service users 147 
10 Details of the service user’s organisational care 
transfer 
148 
11 Reports on how safe or unsafe the service user felt 149 
12 Overall rating for the service user’s safety 151 
 
Table 6.3: Overview of each segment of the reporting mechanism and location of the findings. 
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Number 1: Explanation of what is meant by safety 
A service user in Group 1 felt that there was a need to identify what a safe journey is for 
service users. 
− “I think that’s what you need on that card on the other side, is identifying what is a 
safe journey” [EP, Group 1] 
 
An explanation of what is meant by safety within the context of this study was inserted into 
the reporting mechanism. 
 
Number 2: Explanation of what is meant by transfer 
It was felt that service users may consider a transfer to be just the process of moving from 
one location to another, excluding the preparation that is involved. An explanation of what 
was meant by a transfer was put into the reporting mechanism to resolve this. 
− “I think we need something about the preparation for their journey as well, because 
otherwise people will just think[T] from their transfer. So we need a little bit of a lead 
in” [SCHM 2, Group 1] 
− “What about on the front if we explain exactly what we mean by a journey?” [JS, 
Facilitator Group 1] 
− “Yeah” [SCHM 2, Group 1] 
 
Although there were concerns about the use of the term journey, such as being interpreted 
as referring to traffic conditions, it was felt that by defining it on the reporting mechanism this 
would be resolved. 
− “I don’t think you need journey. I think people think journey as, you know like you 
said, was the trafficT” [EP 1, Group 1] 
− “I know, but we’re defining it on the front.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− [T] 
− “I think it’s very meaningful, it’s been meaningful from biblical times. You know, 
people’s journeys. [T] I think it’s very meaningful to most generations, a journey, and 
it doesn’t just mean transport.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
Number 3: Efficient signposting 
Signposting was one of the main outcomes of Workshop 1, indicating to service users that 
by completing the reporting mechanism they were not making a formal complaint. This was 
again raised in Workshop 2 as being essential in the reporting mechanism. 
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− “We also need them to understand that it isn’t the complaints route though as well 
don’t we. We need to be very clear about that.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
Related to patient complaints are the outcomes of reporting safety. There were concerns 
that service users do not comprehend the benefits of reporting, with the worry of blame 
playing a role in this. Participants in Group 2 were keen for the mechanism to not be a 
method of blame. This is evident in the reporting mechanism where there is an emphasis on 
improving services. 
− “I think people don’t understand the need to report things, or that there would be any 
benefit to reporting it.” [ASSA 1, Group 2] 
− [T] 
− “I think there’s also the fear that if you report it, you’ll get the blame” [SU1, Group 2] 
 
Number 4: Details for service users to provide further information 
When pulling the mechanism together, there was only a limited amount of space available. 
Given that it was important to capture safety during the departure, journey and arrival, there 
was no available space for service users to expand upon their answers. It was therefore 
decided that providing them with an option to do this on a separate piece of paper would be 
a suitable alternative.  
 
Number 5: Option for service users to receive feedback 
When participants were discussing the signposting for service users to understand that the 
reporting mechanism is not a method of complaining, one expert patient stated that the 
mechanism can be used to provide feedback if people have felt unsafe. 
− “If it wants to be followed through, the complaints as such could be picked up, and 
this is the action we took” [EP 2, Group 1] 
 
Within Group 2, having anonymous data was seen to be inadequate as they would not be 
able to respond to and act upon the individual comments. 
− “We couldn’t deal with or manage any issue that are anonymous because we 
couldn’t address it with the individual, we wouldn’t be able to [tell] if it’s just the one 
person or if it’s a service-wide problem” [ASSA 2, Group 2] 
 
Although the complaints were acknowledged by the CCTN to be outside of the remit of the 
tool, the same principle can be applied to any reporting mechanism where feedback should 
be provided to patients if they want it to be, a process which is supported by the ‘Being 
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Open’ policy (NPSA, 2005) and can mitigate the impact of something going wrong by 
improving patient-provider relationships (O'Connor, et al., 2010). 
 
Feedback was supported again later in the workshop as an incentive for patients to report 
their safety. 
− “I think also we can promise them that we’ll feedback how we have, you know, if 
we’re looking to change” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− [T] 
− “Otherwise it would be pretty meaningless for them as well, it wouldn’t really give 
them any incentive to, actually write anything down as such” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
Number 6: Individual demographics for research purposes 
For the purpose of developing the reporting mechanism it was necessary to capture some 
basic demographic information from service users in order to determine which population 
groups were completing and returning the reporting mechanism. Although this was not 
raised as a point of inclusion in the workshop, it was felt by the research team that it was 
necessary in order to determine the demographics of the respondent. 
 
Number 7: Title of the reporting mechanism 
The title of the reporting mechanism was chosen based upon two key components of the 
study; the title of the study (SURE) and the focus on safety.  
− “Our folded A4 piece of paper is headed safe and sure, and safe because we want 
that safety message rather than satisfaction message, and sure being service users 
reporting experience. So your rainbow can certainly go on the bottom of that.” [AJ, 
Facilitator Group 2] 
 
 
Number 8: Logo of the reporting mechanism 
The logo was suggested by the PCHM based upon the smiley faces that were incorporated 
into the reporting mechanism, which received support from other participants within the 
group. This also helped to fulfil the principle that the reporting mechanism needed to be 
appealing to service users, which was identified in Workshop 1.  
− “I did this earlier; if you had a happy and a smiley face, and connected by a 
rainbow?” [PCHM, Group 1] 
− “Aww. Yeah that’s nice” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− [T] 
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− “When people choose postcards, they choose something that they like. It’s fun, and 
bright.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
Number 9: Information for service users  
The reporting mechanism is addressed to either the service user or their carer for 
circumstances when the service user would be unable to complete it themselves.  
− “What about where they can’t fill it in for obvious reasons? [T]” [EP2, group 1] 
− “That’s where your carer comes in” [EP1, Group 1] 
− [T] 
− “Yeah could have dear patient or carer on the front” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
It was felt that due to the number of different forms of receiving patient feedback that 
currently exist, there needed to be clarity that they are being asked to feedback on their 
safety, and not any other aspect of their care.  
− “I think the clarity of what we’re asking for is vital because we’re looking at such a 
range of services in different kind of settings; in community care, in the hospitals in 
the care homes, all over really. And I think the danger is that there’s already a lot of 
stuff out there, so people become confused about what’s being asked from them. 
‘Cause people will automatically think that’s a comment in general terms about 
whatever service has been provided. I think that’s really vital that it’s clear what we’re 
asking for” [SCHM 2, group 1] 
 
− “On that postcard we’ll have to explain to them what the purpose of it is” [CCTN, 
Group 1] 
 
− “Is that capturing their experience, whether they had a good, bad, happy, sad 
experience. Is that what itT or is it more in terms of patient safety, whether... [SHAR, 
Group 1] 
− “It’s got to be around safety” [JS, Facilitator Group 1] 
− “It’s got to be around safety” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “Yeah, so that’s what we need to encapsulate[T] so we have to have that emphasis 
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Number 10: Details of the service user’s organisational care transfer  
Departure, Journey and Arrival 
The organisational care transfer was divided into three separate stages; the departure, the 
journey and the arrival. It was thought that having more specific information on the different 
stages of the organisational care transfer would allow the reports to be utilised better to 
improve services. The healthcare professional would be able to explore at which points of 
the transfer the service user had felt safe or unsafe and address those individually.  
− “we thought that most journeys, and I like your idea of defining a journey and what 
service user safety is, have a beginning, and a middle and an end. So, we would like 
to start with this panel, which isT we’ve got a day and a dateT place of departure, 
so where did you depart from?” [AJ, Facilitator Group 2] 
 
− “at which point did we see a smiley face, and at which point was it a negative one, 
and why. And then, and justT if there’s an improvement that’s needed somewhere, 
is the waiting time too longT” [PCHM, Group 1] 
 
These three stages were originally labelled ‘discharge’, ‘transfer’ and ‘admission’. This was 
changed prior to the piloting based upon feedback from the CCTN from Group 1 post-
workshop as it was felt that they did not accurately capture each of the different types of care 
transfer. For example people leaving from or going home would not be classed as being 
discharged from home or admitted to home. ‘Transfer’ was changed as it was thought it may 
confuse service users as the whole process, including departure and arrival is inclusive of 
the term ‘transfer’. During Workshop 2, the use of the term transfer was also thought to be 
ambiguous and open to misinterpretation by service users.  
 
− “I’m never happy with transfer because peopleT some people, particularly the public, 
would automatically think you’re talking about wheels, as opposed to the journey” 
[CCTN, Group 1] 
  
Collecting Transfer Information 
The date and location of the transfer were left open so that service users could complete 
these themselves. It was important to capture the departure and arrival points along with the 
mode of transport so that the reporting mechanism could be generic and used across many 
different services. This was deemed a necessary feature of a patient reporting mechanism 
for organisational care transfers during Workshop 1, and would provide enough information 
for the relevant services to be able to learn from the service user reports. However concerns 
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were raised in Workshop 2 as to the appropriateness of having a generic reporting 
mechanism, and that there may need to be a range of reporting mechanisms. 
− “This is a very difficult task because there’s so many different areas, so many 
different departments. To get one tool that would work for everyone is almostT I 
would imagine quite [difficult]” [ASSA 1, Group 2] 
 
− “We really were then hooked on the fact that we probably needed a range of tools, 
that one-size-fits-all didn’t work, that there were generational mechanisms that would 
work better with younger people than older people.” [AJ, Facilitator Group 2] 
 
Number 11: Reports on how safe or unsafe the service user felt  
Question Selection 
Questions were designed to direct the service user into focusing specifically on safety issues 
that had arisen during Phase 1 of the study.  
− “And then we had the box in the middle with a series of questions based on Jason’s 
initial themes” [AJ, Facilitator Group 2] 
 
It was felt that patients would have to be given this direction, rather than open-ended 
questions such as ‘What made you feel safe during your journey?’, so that they did not focus 
on issues irrelevant to their healthcare. 
− “Did you think that your journey between such and such and such and such was 
safe? Because that’s how describe the journey anyway. Which therefore would 
hopefully mean somethingT” [CCTN, Group 1] 
− “I think the danger with that feedback, they’re thinking what the traffic was like” 
[SCHM 2, Group 1] 
 
Standardised Reporting 
Group 1 suggested a way of standardising the reporting mechanism across organisations, 
which would alleviate the concerns held in Group 2 that a reporting mechanism could not be 
standardised. By using the patient perceptions of safety identified in Phase 1 as the basis for 
the reporting mechanism, it is going some way to making it a standardised system. Only if 
perceptions changed based upon the type of care transfer would there need to be a non-
standardised reporting mechanism.  
− “So the issues that you were bringing up, about communication and trust, so if we 
kind of capture that and standardise that somehow on the back, about the 
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information you were given. Because that’s all that builds in to the safety aspects of 
that journey through yourT through the particular care issue.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
Smiley Faces 
When discussing the possible use of postcards, it was suggested that they were a good idea 
as they could be distributed at any point throughout the organisational care transfer. They 
were also supported for their simplicity, and the use of smiley faces was something that built 
upon the notion of simplicity and continued throughout the session. They were also 
incorporated into the logo of the reporting mechanism. 
− “You could have little postcards everywhere, every part of the journey” [SCHM 2, 
Group 1] 
− [T] 
− “One side with a smiley face and one side with aT [unhappy face]. And then straight 
away you can see” [PCHM, Group 1] 
− “Something simple. I think the most simple ideas are the most effective” [SHAR, 
Group 1] 
 
The traffic light system was suggested by the facilitator in Group 2 when discussing the use 
of stickers for service users to report their safety, although it was suggested that for 
complicated issues the traffic light system would not be comprehensive enough.  
− “we could have traffic lights; red, orange and green. And so that bit in the ward was 
really green, but actually the ambulance car, the person wasn’t very friendly and 
didn’t help me and so that is red.” [AJ, Facilitator Group 2] 
− [T] 
− “as you were saying where you should have a red, a green, amber, and identifying 
how happy you were, but the detail this lady’s describing would need to be 
addressed quite intricately” [ASSA 2, Group 2] 
 
− “If we don’t have enough detail in this reporting tool, then acting on it and feeding 
back is lost to the system.” [AJ, Facilitator Group 2] 
 
Despite these points being raised, it was never stipulated the amount of detail that was 
necessary in order to learn from patient reports, and so it was decided that as a starting 
point the traffic light system of smiley faces would suffice. This could be later modified based 
upon feedback during the piloting stages. 
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Positive and Negative Experiences 
Although the capturing of positive and negative experiences of safety was part of the original 
objective for the reporting mechanism based upon the AI methodology, this received support 
from participants. 
− “you’ve got to look at both sides. And that’s how we worked in industry; we looked 
atT you just didn’t concentrate on the bad, you concentrated on the good as well. 
Because peopleT it’s a good morale booster and it’s also a good working practice to 
get them to go on that pathway” [EP 1, Group 1] 
− “It would be good feedback for people that were doing it well” [NUSU 3, Group 2] 
 
Number 12: Overall rating for the service user’s safety 
An overall rating for the service user’s safety was introduced so as to capture how the 
individual components of safety, captured in ‘Number 11’, fit into their overall perspective of 
safety. For example exploring how each individual component of safety impacts upon on 
their overall feeling.  
 
6.3.2 Reflections of Workshop 2 
6.3.2.1 Emphasis on Group 1 Data 
It may appear that the reporting mechanism was designed primarily on the data collected on 
Group 1. However this was not the case, and the emphasis placed upon Group 1 recordings 
is an artefact of the voice recorder not capturing the discussions in Group 2 during the 
convergent thinking session. Group 2 had an equal input into the design of the reporting 
mechanism during the final ‘sharing of ideas’ section of the workshop. This is best evidenced 
in the use of a system that was not a postcard, which was the suggested reporting 
mechanism of Group 1.  
 
6.3.2.2 Thinking Differently 
One participant queried the use of the Thinking Differently methods, interpreting the use of 
them as an implication that their current modus operandi is wrong.  
− “Why do we have to think so differently? What is it that we’ve done so terribly wrong 
that makes us feel like we have to think differently?” [CCTN, Group 1] 
 
The same participant questioned the extent to which people are able to think differently. 
− “I’d like to leap out of the box, but how far can you leap out of the box to create this 
mechanism? I don’t know.” [CCTN, Group 1] 
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Despite these initial reservations, the CCTN and all other participants were actively involved 
in the discussions arising from the Thinking Differently methods. This also provided an 
interesting reflection point as participants can only hold a finite amount of knowledge, and so 
therefore moving from one schema to another is still operating within their own knowledge 
constructs. This limits the extent to which participants can think outside of the box. However 
the use of collaborative groups of participants with different backgrounds allows them to 
increase their knowledge by taking into account others’ perspectives, supporting the 
rationale for using collaborative workshops as the means of developing the reporting 
mechanism. 
 
6.3.2.3 Patient Advocates 
Participants spoke about the ability for advocates to report the patient’s perspective on 
safety. For example for those that are physically unable to complete the reporting 
mechanism, it was thought that advocates via special training would be able to complete it 
with the patient’s input.  
− “when you’re talking about the people whoT wouldn’t be able to communicate [their 
safety], you know, how are we going to capture that? [PCHM, Group 1] 
− “You can do it with a little bit of staff training. If you have an escort going with them 
from the care home, you can do a little bit of training about this is how we’re going to 
capture the information with these emotion cards in that case if somebody has 
communication difficulties, and then you can do that journey with them.” [SCHM 1, 
Group 1] 
 
The overall responsibility for this lies with the individual organisations during the piloting of 
the reporting mechanism. It was identified that this approach does not always work, with 
some patients travelling without an advocate. 
− “If it was an acute admission and then, from our setting then they would have an 
escort. Whereas if it was from a transfer from hospital back they wouldn’t, so you 
would lose that.” [PCHM, Group 1] 
 
6.3.2.4 Learning from the Service User Reports 
It was identified that the service user reports of their safety could be useful in the changing of 
the systems that had made them feel unsafe.  
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− “I think it would be great if people could be fed back their information as well [T] and 
then it makes you want to improve it” [NUSU 3, Group 2] 
 
However there were concerns that this would not apply to every part of the transfer as the 
responsibility for other systems lies with other organisations. 
− “we want instant feedback to change our systems” [SCHM 1, Group 1] 
− “And so we can change the system within our environment but we can’t change the 
system anywhere else” [PCHM, Group 1] 
− “Absolutely, yeah” [SCHM 1, Group 1] 
 
− “that person[T] needs to be assured. Basically something’s going to happen, there is 
going to be a change[T]” [PCHM, Group 1] 
− “But locally, we can change itT I mean that’s the thing, it’s probably not very good for 
research purposes, but what we’d be looking to do, if we could capture someone’s 
experience like that we could change it very quickly” [SCHM 1, Group 1] 
 
−  “What’s going to happen to that information, by whom and by when?” [EP 2, Group 
1] 
− “And where it goes to” [PCHM, Group 1] 
 
A solution to this that was proposed was using the feedback from patients to approach the 
relevant organisation, although this would require further work before being an applicable 
solution. 
− “You mightT relating to ambulance services, with the information you’ve got you 
could turn around to the [organisation name removed] ambulance station, ‘look, 
patients are getting good treatment while using the service, but accessing the 
service, they’re not’” [EP 1, Group 1] 
 
6.3.2.5 Individual Agendas 
In comparison to Workshop 1 participants appeared to bring with them fewer individual 
agendas, or if they were present, they were hidden by the structure of the workshop. All 
participants appeared to have an input into both the divergent and convergent thinking 
break-off sessions. It is possible that this is an outcome of the recruitment strategy in that 
many of the participants had already participated in Workshop 1, and therefore had already 
had the opportunity to express their personal stories or felt that their organisations were not 
threatened by the process of developing the reporting mechanism.  
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6.4 Chapter Summary 
The two workshops discussed in this chapter formed the Plan (Design) stage of the first 
cycle of developing and piloting a reporting mechanism that would allow service users to 
identify and to report their safety when going through an organisational care transfer. This 
built upon the findings from Phase 1 (Chapter 5), where service users defined what safety 
meant to them within an organisational care transfer context. Subsequently, the mechanism 
allowed service users to report this self-definition of safety rather than one based upon 
healthcare professional perspectives 
 
Participants in Workshop 1 identified a number of different possible mechanisms for service 
users to report on their safety. Out of those identified, participants felt that a questionnaire 
and / or a leaflet were the most appropriate method of capturing these patient reports of 
safety. Key principles that were fundamental to the reporting mechanism were also 
identified, including that it needed to be patient-centred, short and concise with clear 
signposting and optionally anonymous. A further key principle was that it needed to focus on 
safe as well as unsafe care to provide a balanced viewpoint and to avoid any confusion with 
complaints mechanisms. This relates closely to the AI methodology that forms part of the AR 
cycle, where a focus on positives is thought to drive future improvement (Reed, 2007).  
 
Discussions were also held around how the reporting mechanism would fit with current 
systems. It was identified that within the organisations involved in this study or known to 
participants outside of their organisations, there was no mechanism in existence for service 
users to report their safety on both admission and discharge from services. Concerns were 
raised regarding the roll-out of the reporting mechanism, such as what would drive 
organisations to implement and learn from the patient reports, as well as who responsibility 
would lie with to monitor and act upon the reports. These implications are considered in 
further detail in the Discussion chapter.  
 
In addition to the direct findings from Workshop 1, reflections by the researcher and 
observers also provided a valuable insight into the data collection process. Firstly was that 
during the workshop there had been no attempt to develop a reporting mechanism. Secondly 
was that participants focused on the reporting of patient satisfaction as opposed to patient 
safety. It is thought that these were the result of a lack of direction given to participants 
regarding what was expected of them and what was not expected of a reporting mechanism. 
Each of these was addressed in Workshop 2.  
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Following Workshop 2, the participants had developed a tangible reporting mechanism 
through the process of divergent and convergent thinking congruent with Thinking Differently 
methodology. It was based upon the key principles that had been identified in Workshop 1 
and the service user definitions of safety identified in Phase 1. Again concerns were raised 
about how organisations would learn from the service user reports, which is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 8. 
 
The following chapter will explain how the reporting mechanism was piloted and further 
refined through the rest of the two AR cycles explained in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 7: Piloting of the Reporting Mechanism 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
The previous two chapters have detailed how the service user definitions of safety were 
developed (Chapter 5), and how the reporting mechanism was developed (Chapter 6), 
linking in the service user definitions of safety. The latter of these chapters formed the Plan 
(Design) stage of the first AR (AI) cycle. This chapter provides the findings from the 
remaining first cycle; Action (Deliver), Observe and Reflect, and the full second cycle.  
 
More specifically, the Action (Deliver) stages of the cycles explore how the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to organisations and subsequently to service users. The 
Observe stages explore the service user reports of safety, reporting on how many reports of 
safe and unsafe care are provided by service users in the different domains of safety that 
were identified in Phase 1 and included in the reporting mechanism. The Reflect stage of the 
cycle represents the feedback provided by service users, either in the form of the evaluation 
form or interviews. This feedback informed the redevelopment of the reporting mechanism at 
the end of the first cycle, and was used in the formation of the recommendations for future 
piloting and roll-out of the reporting mechanism at the end of Cycle 2.  
 
7.2 Cycle 1 
7.2.1 Delivery (Action) of the Mechanism 
 
Figure 7.1: Where the (Deliver) Action stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles 
(Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
Out of the 120 reporting mechanisms distributed to the six organisations, 91 were distributed 
to service users. The three NHS community care teams distributed all 60 of their reporting 
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mechanisms, the two social care homes distributed 25 and the private nursing home 
distributed six. A full summary of distribution and response rates is provided in Table 7.1.  
 
Organisation Number Distributed Response Rate 
NHS Community Care Team 
1 
20 / 20 (100%) 5 / 20 (25%) 
NHS Community Care Team 
2 
20 / 20 (100%) 4 / 20 (20%) 
NHS Community Care Team 
3 
20 / 20 (100%) 10 / 20 (50%) 
Social Care Home 1 12 / 20 (60%) 8 / 12 (67%) 
Social Care Home 2 13 / 20 (65%) 8 / 13 (62%) 
Private Nursing Home 6 / 20 (30%) 6 / 6 (100%) 
Total 91 / 120 (76%) 41 / 91 (45%) 
 
Table 7.1: Distribution rate from organisations to service users and response rates (Phase 2 
Cycle 1). 
 
The Private Nursing Home reported a lower distribution rate due to a limited number of 
organisational care transfers into and out of the organisation as well as specifically targeting 
service users who had stated they would be willing to participate.  
 
From the 91 reporting mechanism distributed, 56 were given to patients and two were given 
to family members or carers, both of which by Social Care Home 1. Data for the other 33 
reporting mechanisms was unavailable. Where data was available the average age of 
service users was 79 years, 23 service users were male and 40 were female. All were White 
British. Although data was collected on medical conditions, this was not extensive enough to 
be used in an exploration of the findings. Twenty seven were given to service users on 
arrival to the service, whilst 16 were given on departure. These are broken down by 
















Male Female Arrival Departure 
NHS Community Care Team 
1 
79 12 8 3* 0* 
NHS Community Care Team 
2 
0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 
NHS Community Care Team 
3 
78 3 17 10 10 
Social Care Home 1 79* 5* 5* 7* 0* 
Social Care Home 2 81 3 10 7 6 
Private Nursing Home 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 
Total 79 23 40 27 16 
*Denotes that some or all data is missing 
N.B. Average age is rounded to 1 decimal place. Where the value is 0, it was not included in the Total 
calculation 
 
Table 7.2: Description of who the reporting mechanism was distributed to by organisation 
(Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
In total 41 (45%) people responded to the reporting mechanism. Where data was available 
the average age of service users that responded was 79 years, 11 service users were male 
and 17 were female. Fifteen respondents were given the reporting mechanism on arrival into 
the service, whilst seven were given on departure. These are broken down by organisation 
in Table 7.3. 
 
Organisation Respondents 




Male Female Arrival Departure 
NHS Community Care 
Team 1 
5 77 3 2 0* 0* 
NHS Community Care 
Team 2 
4 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 
NHS Community Care 
Team 3 
10 78 2 8 4 6 
Social Care Home 1 8 75* 3* 2* 4* 0* 
Social Care Home 2 8 81 3 5 7 1 
Private Nursing Home 6 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 
Total 41 78 11 17 15 7 
*Denotes that some or all data is missing 
N.B. Average age is rounded to 1 decimal place. Where the value is 0, it was not included in the Total 
calculation 
Table 7.3: Description of who responded to the reporting mechanism by organisation (Phase 2 
Cycle 1). 
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Where data is available, the ratios of respondents have been developed as a form of 
comparison between the respondents and the overall sampled population that the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to. The ratio of females to males that responded to the reporting 
mechanism (1.55) remained similar to the ratio that it was distributed to (1.74). However 
there was a large difference between the ratio of arrival to departure that responded (2.14) 
compared with the ratio that it was distributed to (1.69). The average age of both the 
sampled population and respondents remained similar, only changing from 79 to 78.  
 
This suggests that gender and age of participants had no influence on responding to the 
reporting mechanism. The increase in response to the reporting mechanism when given to 
service users on arrival to the service can be attributed to one of two factors, both of which 
are related to the service users’ ongoing care. The first of these is that service users would 
have been able to receive more assistance in completing the reporting mechanism; whether 
in relation to answering the questions or by being able to give the reporting mechanism 
directly back to their healthcare professional rather than having to post it themselves. The 
second of these is that participants may have felt obligated to complete the reporting 





Figure 7.2: Where the Observation stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles (Phase 
2 Cycle 1). 
 
When completing the reporting mechanism, service users were asked the location of their 
departure and arrival points (Hospital, Home, Nursing or Residential Home, Community Care 
or Other) as well as their mode of transport (Ambulance, Private Car, Taxi, Patient Transport 
or Other). A summary of each of these is provided in Table 7.4.  
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Departure 






17 13 4 2 1* 4 
 
Journey 
Ambulance Private Car Taxi Patient 
Transport 
Other Unstated 
22*** 6 5*** 3 1** 4 
 
Arrival 






10 7 8 5 4**** 6 
*Participant did not expand 
**Walking 
***One participant selected both Ambulance and Taxi. 
****Social Care Home 
 
Table 7.4: Self-reported locations and journey types by respondents (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
Service users reported their safety across a number of domains, each of which was based 
on the findings from Phase 1. The following section details how safe the respondents felt 
during their departure (Table 7.5), journey (Table 7.6) and arrival (Table 7.7). Where the 
totals do not equate to 41, there was missing data. In total, there were 40 reports of 
respondents feeling unsafe. Out the 41 organisational care transfers that were reported on 
by service users, 13 (31.7%) discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one 
domain. As AI informed the development of the reporting mechanism and was used to 
underpin the study, it was important to measure both safe and unsafe care. Therefore equal 
weighting has been provided to the reports of feeling safe as those of feeling unsafe. Where 
service users have reported feeling unsafe, it has been classed as a patient safety incident. 
However reports of feeling unsafe by the same service user across more than one domain of 
safety do not constitute more than one incident. There is an emphasis placed upon unsafe 
rather than safe care here so as to create a comparison with current literature on service 















Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
27 8 1 30 6 1 17 12 6 17 12 2 
 
Medication Hygiene Other Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
14 10 5 24 9 1 1 2 1 18 1 1 
 
Table 7.5: Service user reports of safety during their departure (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
During their departure from services, respondents reported feeling safe a total of 130 times 
across the seven domains and unsafe a total of 17 times, with some respondents reporting 
feeling unsafe across more than one domain. The majority of reports recorded service users 
feeling either safe or neutral. Nine discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least 
one domain during their departure, giving an incident rate of 21.95% for the point of 
departure. Although only one respondent reported feeling unsafe overall, this was a result of 
those service users reporting feeling unsafe not answering the question. Out of the nine, one 
reported feeling unsafe, one reported neutral or not applicable and six left the question 
blank. Only one service user who had reported feeling unsafe in one or more domains then 
proceeded to report feeling safe overall. 
 
The respondent that had rated ‘other’ as unsafe expanded on their answer, stating that ‘I did 
not know why I was delayed leaving hospital’ [029, Reporting Mechanism]. This does not 
represent a potentially new domain of safety as it would perhaps have been more 
appropriate in the ‘communication from staff’. The other service users that reported ‘other’ 





















Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
24 9 0 27 6 0 22 7 4 19 12 1 
 
Medication Hygiene Other Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
17 12 1 21 12 0 0 1 1 18 3 0 
 
Table 7.6: Service user reports of safety during their journey (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
During the journey stage of the transfer there were 130 reports of feeling safe across the 
seven domains, whilst they felt unsafe a total of seven times across the seven domains, with 
some respondents reporting feeling unsafe across more than one. The majority of 
respondents felt either safe or were neutral. Five discrete respondents reported feeling 
unsafe in at least one domain during their journey, giving an incident rate of 12.2% during 
the journey. No respondents reported feeling unsafe overall. Two of the five respondents 
that had reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain did not answer this question; two 
reported feeling safe overall and one reported being neutral or not applicable. 
 
One respondent rated ‘other’ safety as neutral, however they did not expand on their 
answer. Two service users expanded on their answer without giving a rating to their safety. 
The first of these was ‘Had pain’ [090, Reporting Mechanism]. The second was ‘Ambulances 
come too early. Taxi yes (journey running to schedule). Medication N/A’ [125, Reporting 
Mechanism], which related to the items that were left blank. This data could not be easily 






















Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
28 4 2 27 7 1 21 9 4 21 10 2 
 
Medication Hygiene Other Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
23 9 3 24 8 1 3 1 3 20 0 2 
 
Table 7.7: Service user reports of safety during their arrival (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
During their arrival, there were 147 reports of feeling safe across the seven domains, whilst 
there were 16 reports of feeling unsafe across the seven domains, with some respondents 
reporting feeling unsafe across more than one. The majority of respondents felt either safe 
or were neutral. Six discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain 
during their arrival, giving an incident rate of 14.63%. Three that had reported feeling unsafe 
in one or more domains did not answer the overall question, two reported feeling unsafe 
overall and one reported feeling safe.  
 
Seven respondents gave a rating for ‘other’ safety issues. Three of these reported feeling 
safe, one reported neutral or not applicable and three reported feeling unsafe. Those that 
reported feeling safe expanded on their answers with ‘Staff had arranged for me to be in 
room next to my wife which made me feel champion. It was heaven’ [029, Reporting 
Mechanism] and ‘Felt very safe and comfortable’ [033, Reporting Mechanism]. The third 
respondent did not expand on their answer. The service user that reported neutral also did 
not expand on their answer. Those that gave a rating of unsafe expanded on their answers 
with ‘Waiting times too long’ [125, Reporting Mechanism], ‘Too tired and cold’ [087, 
Reporting Mechanism] and ‘Resident confused in A&E’ [090, Reporting Mechanism]. The 
latter of these was completed by an advocate that had gone with the service user during the 
organisational care transfer and completed the mechanism with their assistance.  
 
One respondent rated ‘other’ safety as neutral, however they did not expand on their 
answer. Two service users expanded on their answer without giving a rating to their safety. 
The first of these was ‘Had pain’ [090, Reporting Mechanism]. The second was ‘Ambulances 
come too early. Taxi yes (journey running to schedule). Medication N/A’ [125, Reporting 
Mechanism], which related to the items that were left blank. This data could not be easily 
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translated into the blank reports and so was not included in the total values reported in Table 
7.7.  
 
Despite having data to suggest that targeting service users entering the service would have 
increased the response rates, this was not the objective of this study. The objective was to 
develop the reporting mechanism, and so any changes to the sampling strategy would have 
impacted upon any comparisons that could have been made between Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 
of the piloting; i.e. it would not have been possible to determine if the changes to the 




Figure 7.3: Where the Reflection stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles (Phase 2 
Cycle 1). 
 
Evaluation data on Cycle 1 of piloting was collected through evaluation forms and two 
interviews with service users (Pil01 and Pil02a). Pil02a’s carer also participated in the 
interview (Pil02b). This data is presented in terms of the seven items on the evaluation form. 
Not all respondents returned the evaluation form with the reporting mechanism, whilst out of 
those that did, some did not complete every question. Caution was taken when considering 
the responses as there is potential for self-selecting bias. It was possible that those that 
were happy with the reporting mechanism completed the evaluation form, whilst those 
unhappy with the reporting mechanism did not complete and return it.  
 
Where changes were made to the reporting mechanism for Cycle 2 of piloting, these are 
detailed in the Design (Plan) stage of that research cycle (Page 171). The rest of the 
feedback is reflected upon within this section.  
 
 








1 I understood the purpose of the Patient 
Safety Survey 
23 6 0 
2 I understood what was meant by ‘your 
transfer’ 
21 5 2 
3 I understood each of the questions 24 4 0 
4 The questions were appropriate 23 4 0 
5 There was nothing missing from the 
Patient Safety Survey 
20 6 2 
6 I had no concerns about completing the 
Patient Safety Survey 
28 0 1 
7 I feel the Patient Safety Survey allows 
me to provide useful feedback about the 
healthcare I have received 
25 4 0 
 
Table 7.8: Answers to the seven items on the evaluation form (Phase 2 Cycle 1). 
 
Item 1: ‘I understood the purpose of the Patient Safety Survey’ 
Out of 32 respondents, 23 agreed with the statement, six neither agreed nor disagreed and 
three did not select an answer. No participants disagreed. This suggests that the 
respondents were in general satisfied that the purpose of the reporting mechanism was 
appropriately incorporated into the reporting mechanism. Based upon this evaluation data 
and the good response rate from service users it was felt that the general design of the 
reporting mechanism was successful in that it achieved a good degree of saliency amongst 
participants, with only minor amendments needed.  
 
Item 2: ‘I understood what was meant by ‘your transfer’’ 
From 32 respondents, 21 agreed with the statement, five neither agreed nor disagreed and 
four did not select an answer. Two participants disagreed. One participant that disagreed 
expanded upon their answer by stating: 
− ‘It was not clear whether you meant transfer from home to hospital (admission) or 
transfer from hospital to community care home’ [004, Evaluation Form] 
 
One interview participant (Pil01) also struggled with what was meant by ‘your transfer’, 
particularly location, departure / journey and what was entailed with each one. Despite this, 
interview data from Pil02a and Pil02b suggests that the term ‘your transfer’ is clear. 
− “So for example, the departure, journey and arrival, did they all make sense when 
you were filling it out?” [JS, Interviewer] 
− “From oneT departure you mean from one association to another?” [Pil02b] 
Page | 166  
 
− “Yeah.” [JS, Interviewer] 
− “Yeah, yeah we do because the hospital transferred you and we understand it was a 
transfer from the hospital caring into this caring, yeah?” [Pil02b]  
− “Oh yeah, yeah.” [Pil02a]  
 
Although two participants did not understand what was meant by ‘your transfer’, no changes 
were made to the reporting mechanism based upon this feedback. For the majority of 
respondents the term and its definition were clear. Without receiving detailed feedback from 
service users on how the term could be made clearer it was not possible to make any 
changes.  
 
Item 3: ‘I understood each of the questions’ 
24 respondents agreed with this statement, 4 neither agreed nor disagreed, nobody 
disagreed and 4 did not select an answer. There was no interview data to support these 
findings. The wording of the questions remained the same within the reporting mechanism 
for Cycle 2 of piloting. 
 
Item 4: ‘The questions were appropriate’ 
Out of the 32 respondents, 23 agreed with this statement, 4 neither agreed nor disagreed, 
none disagreed and 5 did not select an answer. This was supported by the interview with 
Pil02a and Pil02b, who found the questions appropriate, although they felt that there needed 
to be a clear option for ‘not applicable’. Participants were expected to tick the middle box if 
the answer was not applicable, but the number of people who missed sections out make it 
appear that they were doing so as they were not applicable, as explained below in an 
interview.  
− “Medication problems or concerns, well there’s no tick on any of them there. So 
medication problems and concerns” [Pil02b] 
− “We didn’t have any” [Pil02a]  
− [T] 
− “Can I just ask the ones where you haven’t ticked, for example [the journey section], 
was that because you didn’t feel like they didn’t apply to you?” [JS, Interviewer] 
− “Because it was a private car” [Pil02b] 
 
This was further clarified later in the interview. 
− “he’s left it blank because it wasn’t applicable so how do you feel about that Alan, 
because you obviously understood that you didn’t have to reply to it” [Pil02b] 
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− “Well I must have done at the time but now I don’t remember you know. But I 
suppose you’re right, possibly put a not applicable option in, yeah.” [Pil02a] 
 
Furthermore, questions posed about the date and location were deemed to be unnecessary, 
which is apparent from the number of respondents that did not complete them (departure 
date n=22, departure location n=25, journey date n=23, journey location n=33, arrival date 
n=23, arrival location n=27). Interview data from Pil02b further supports this, displaying 
confusion at the need for the information. 
− “Well we’re not answering it are we, you’re not asking us to fill it in so why is it on 
there?” [Pil02b] 
 
Interpreting the reports of safety also suggests that the overall section is often not completed 
(departure n=21, journey n=20, arrival n=19), perhaps as a result of people not associating it 
with the main questions or not seeing it as important. Changes were made to the reporting 
mechanism for Cycle 2 of piloting based upon this feedback, which are recorded on pages 
171-175.   
 
Item 5: ‘There was nothing missing from the Patient Safety Survey’ 
20 respondents agreed that there wasn’t anything missing, 6 neither agreed nor disagreed, 2 
disagreed and 4 did not answer the question. It was unclear what one of the respondents 
that had disagreed was trying to disclose. 
− ‘On another occasion I had to wait 13 hours to be transferred from hospital to home 
and arrived at 2.50am’ [033, Evaluation Form] 
 
It is possible that they felt the form did not capture the length of waiting times for the transfer 
or the time that they arrived home was inappropriate. Without further information or being 
able to speak with the service user it was not possible to explore this further.  
 
The need for service users to expand upon their answers became apparent shortly after 
piloting began. A number of instances of people feeling unsafe were reported (discharge 
n=17, journey n=7, admission n=16), however it was not possible to determine exactly why 
they felt unsafe. 
 
During an interview with a respondent, she recommended some changes in order for her to 
be able to complete the form. 
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− ‘The participant stated that she found it difficult to complete the form as she couldn’t 
express what had happened, i.e. give a detailed explanation of events.’ [JS interview 
notes, Pil01 interview] 
− ‘A section was suggested for when in hospital as well as the transfer’ [JS interview 
notes, Pil01 interview] 
 
During a different interview, the Pil02b stated that having any more sections would make the 
form confusing for people to complete. 
− “It’s going to make your leaflet frightening for people to take too much in” [Pil02b] 
 
Interview data from Pil02b suggests that there weren’t any questions missing, explaining that 
because they hadn’t filled out the ‘other’ section it meant they couldn’t think of anything that 
may be missing. 
− “you’ve covered everything on there and we haven’t thought of anything that you 
haven’t covered” [Pil02b] 
 
The changes made to the reporting mechanism based upon this feedback are detailed on 
pages 171-175. 
 
Item 6: ‘I had no concerns about completing the Patient Safety Survey’ 
28 agreed that they had no problems, none neither agreed nor disagreed, 1 disagreed and 3 
didn’t select an answer. The person that disagreed found the colour system confusing. 
− ‘Being visually impaired I found the form difficult to complete. The colour system was 
confusing’ [105, Evaluation Form] 
 
This was an interesting response as the colour system has previously been identified as 
being a particular strength of the reporting tool, as outlined by Pil02b who stated that she 
has experience of caring with a relative who has very poor eyesight. 
− “I think this is very easy to follow, your colour co-ordination of it. That makes it easy 
for people with bad eye-sight, so I think it’s a good leaflet.” [Pil02b] 
 
Size of the text was also highlighted in an interview with a service user. 
− “If it’s all that size [pointing to the main title] it’d be better for me because my eyesight 
is very poor” [Pil02a] 
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− “anything that is controversial, [Pil02a] would get me to read it through and sight it 
first anyway, so the print on there wouldn’t really matter. It would matter if he was on 
his own.” [Pil02b] 
 
Coupled with the text was the size of the tick-boxes, which were recommended to be 
increased in size for people with poor vision. 
− “For not very well sighted persons, could your tick boxes be a bit bigger do you 
think?” [Pil02b] 
− “Aha.” [Pil02a] 
− “make your tick boxes a bit bigger I’d say, remove [the date and location parts] and 
take your tick boxes just a bit bigger because you’ll have a bit more room” [Pil02b] 
 
Continuing the theme of making the reporting tool suitable for service users with poor 
eyesight, the participants stated that the lines in between each question help to guide the 
respondent. 
− “I think the lines are helpful” [Pil02b] 
− “I think the lines are helpful” [Pil02a] 
− “Because you get one, you know you’ve got quite a bit to fit in, and one, if you didn’t 
have the lines could grow into the other when the person is not really good sighted.” 
[Pil02b] 
 
To make the form clearer it was also recommended that the main section of the form, the 
reporting of how safe the person felt, should take up the most amount of space. 
− “And you’ve got quite a lot of space allocated there and you perhaps don’t need it as 
much there [the leaving point / transport type / arriving point], it might be here [the 
central part] where you need to space it out more.” [Pil02b] 
− “Where the most important part is?” [JS, Interviewer] 
− “Yeah.” [Pil02b]  
 
Another written comment stated (despite agreeing that there were no concerns): 
− ‘I could not write because of difficulties with my hands and needed staff to help’ [029, 
Evaluation Form] 
 
This is an artefact of using a paper-based reporting mechanism. However at this point in 
time there was no alternative, and so it is promising that the service user was able to ask for 
help in completing the mechanism and evaluation form.  
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Changes were made to the reporting mechanism for Cycle 2 of piloting based upon this 
feedback, which are recorded on pages 171-175. 
 
Item 7: ‘I feel the Patient Safety Survey allows me to provide useful feedback about 
the healthcare I have received’ 
25 respondents agreed with this statement, 4 neither agreed nor disagreed and 3 didn’t 
select an answer. No respondents disagreed. During an interview with a respondent and 
their carer they stated that if they were asked to, they would complete the reporting tool 
again in the future. 
− “Yeah I don’t see why not” [Pil02a] 
− “Well yeah because it’s easy to understand. I think with the changes you’ve said it’s 
quite easy to understand, yes.” [Pil02b] 
 
The responses to this question suggest that there was a high degree of saliency amongst 
respondents as they were able to perceive the benefits of completing a reporting mechanism 
on their safety when going through an organisational care transfer.  
 
7.2.4 Summary of Cycle 1 
There was a high distribution rate amongst the different organisations. The full quotas 
(100%) of reporting mechanisms were distributed by the NHS community care teams over 
the period of piloting. The social care homes did not distribute their full quota for reasons 
unknown, with 62.5% of their reporting mechanisms distributed to service users. The private 
nursing home distributed far fewer (30%), although this was due to having fewer 
organisational care transfers of service users that would have been eligible to participate. 
This was further exacerbated by the private nursing home specifically targeting service users 
willing to respond, which reduced the potential number of service users they were able to 
distribute to.  
 
Out of the reporting mechanisms that were distributed, responses were of an acceptable 
level. Those in NHS community care teams were less likely to respond than those in social 
care homes, perhaps indicative of the nature of care that those in the social care homes 
were receiving; they were more reliant on their healthcare professionals than those in the 
community, and were perhaps more inclined to complete the reporting mechanism. There 
were no large differences in the age or gender balance of respondents in comparison to the 
target population. However responses were higher when the reporting mechanism was 
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distributed to service users on arrival into the service in comparison to being distributed on 
departure. Again this is perhaps reflective of service users being dependent upon their 
healthcare professionals and therefore felt more inclined to complete the reporting 
mechanism. An alternative explanation is that the healthcare professionals were able to 
remind service users to complete it.  
 
From the actual reports on safety, it was evident that service users were able to identify and 
report how safe they felt during their organisational care transfer. These reports of safety 
varied depending upon the stage of the transfer; the discharge gave the most amounts of 
reports of feeling unsafe, followed by the admission and finally the journey itself. This is 
indicative of the nature of healthcare, where transitions and handovers across organisational 
boundaries are amongst the most risky. That the journey itself resulted in the fewest reports 
further signifies this, as at this point of the transfer the service user is under the care of one 
team of healthcare professionals; it is representative of one episode of healthcare.  
 
Finally, evaluation feedback from service users was largely positive in both the interviews 
and returned evaluation forms. Small changes to the reporting mechanism were 
recommended, although some of these were unable to be implemented due to cost 
restraints (such as catering for sight difficulties).  An overview of the changes that were 
made to the reporting mechanism based upon this feedback is provided in 7.3.1; the Design 
(Plan) of Cycle 2 of the AR (AI) research process.  
 
7.3 Cycle 2 
7.3.1 Design (Plan) of the Mechanism 
 
Figure 7.4: Where the development of the reporting mechanism fits into the methodological 
cycles (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
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This stage of the AR cycle was to further develop the reporting mechanism based upon the 
evaluation data, patient safety reports and success of the piloting (in the form of distribution 
and response rates). The following section details the changes that were made to the 
reporting mechanism and the rationale for doing so, linking in with the findings from Cycle 1 
of piloting. This takes the same format as the Design (Plan) stage from Cycle 1 of piloting, 
which was detailed in Chapter 6; development of the reporting mechanism. Any places 




Figure 7.5: Outside of the patient reporting mechanism v2. 
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Figure 7.6: Inside of the patient reporting mechanism v2. 
 
Number 1: Removal of details for service users to provide further information 
Following Cycle 1 of piloting, no service users had expanded upon their answers for why 
they felt either safe or unsafe. It was thought that providing space within the reporting 
mechanism would encourage responses, especially considering some service users had 
expanded on their answer for ‘other’ safety within the reporting mechanism. See Number 5 
for the inclusion of the extra space.  
 
Number 2: Change to the title of the reporting mechanism 
The title of the reporting mechanism was changed from ‘Sure Care Patient Safety Survey’ to 
‘Sure Care Safety Survey’. This was done after the private nursing home manager provided 
feedback that the use of the term patient was not representative of the ethos of the study, in 
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Number 3: Changes to the details of the service user’s organisational care transfer 
information 
Evaluation data and responses to the reporting mechanism suggested that the way in which 
information about the service user’s organisational care transfer was captured was not 
always appropriate. Location and date were not always appropriate with most service users 
leaving them blank for all three stages of the organisational care transfer. This was 
understandable as the location in particular did not make sense for the journey, where 
service users would not have been in one individual place. Date was also duplicated as 
almost all organisational care transfers were conducted over a short space of time. Location 
was removed from the reporting mechanism for Cycle 2 of piloting, and a single space for 
the date was included.  
 
Number 4: Changes to the reports on how safe or unsafe the service user felt 
In addition to the six questions on safety, service user’s rating of their overall safety was also 
added to this section. This was a result of the limited number of responses to the overall 
section in comparison to the other questions on safety. By incorporating into the other 
questions, it will be possible to determine if it was because service users did not want to 
report their overall safety, or if it was because it seemed disjointed from the rest of the 
reporting mechanism.  
 
A further modification to this section was to increase the size of the text and the smiley 
faces, utilising the space that was obtained from the removal of the location and date 
sections. This was based on evaluation feedback where respondents sometimes had 
difficulty reading the text. Furthermore the yellow smiley faces were made to represent just a 
neutral feeling of safety rather than the mixture between neutral or not applicable. This was 
to remove any confusion that had arisen about what to do when questions were not 
applicable to the care that the service user received or the organisational care transfer that 
they had gone through. This was aided by the inclusion of an instruction in what to do when 
a question was not applicable. 
 
Number 5: Inclusion of space for service users to expand on their answers 
By moving the ‘overall’ question and embedding it with the rest of the questions, space was 
created for participants to expand upon their answers. This was in response to Pil01 who 
stated that there was a lack of space in which to expand on answers and tell their story. 
Although the patient reporting mechanism is not able to account for in-depth answers on the 
service user’s organisational care transfer, it was possible to provide some space for free 
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text in which service users could expand on their answers rather than requesting that they 
enclose it on a separate page.  
 
7.3.2 Delivery (Action) of the Mechanism 
 
Figure 7.7: Where the (Deliver) Action stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles 
(Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
Out of the 120 reporting mechanisms distributed to the six organisations, 61 were distributed 
to service users. This is 30 fewer than Cycle 1 of piloting, where 91 were distributed. The 
largest difference was from the two social care homes, which were unable to distribute any 
reporting mechanisms due to organisational budget cuts and restructuring. One social care 
home closed shortly after being given the reporting mechanisms to distribute to service 
users. The other organisations faced similar issues during the piloting of the reporting 
mechanism, which had a larger impact on the collection of participant information than the 
distribution of the reporting mechanisms.   
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Organisation Number Distributed Response Rate 
NHS Community Care Team 
1 
16 / 20 (80%) 1 / 16 (6%) 
NHS Community Care Team 
2 
20 / 20 (100%) 7 / 20 (35%) 
NHS Community Care Team 
3 
20 / 20 (100%) 9 / 20 (45%) 
Social Care Home 1 0 / 20 (0%) - / - 
Social Care Home 2 0 / 20 (0%) - / - 
Private Nursing Home 5 / 20 (25%) 5 / 5 (100%) 
Total 61 / 120 (51%) 22 / 61 (36%)  
 
Table 7.9: Distribution rate from organisations to service users and response rates (Phase 2 
Cycle 2). 
 
The private nursing home reported a lower distribution rate due to a limited number of 
organisational care transfers into and out of the organisation. The lower distribution rate was 
also a result of targeting service users who were willing and able to participate, which 
resulted in the 100% response rate. No information was given on how many service users 
from the private nursing home refused or were unable to participate.  
 
From the 61 reporting mechanisms distributed, 16 were given to patients, two were given to 
a family member or a carer and three were given to an advocate. Data for the other 40 
reporting mechanisms is unavailable. The average age of service users that the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to, based on available data was 78 years, with 27 females and 
12 males. Although data was collected on medical conditions, this was not extensive enough 
to be used in an exploration of the findings. 15 reporting mechanisms were given to service 


















Male Female Arrival Departure 
NHS Community Care Team 
1 
75 5 11 -* -* 
NHS Community Care Team 
2 
-* -* -* -* -* 
NHS Community Care Team 
3 
79 7 13 14 6 
Social Care Home 1 - - - - - 
Social Care Home 2 - - - - - 
Private Nursing Home 90* 0* 3* 1* 1* 
Total 78 12 27 15 7 
*Denotes that some or all data is missing 
N.B. Average age is rounded to 1 decimal place. Where the value is 0, it was not included in the Total 
calculation 
 
Table 7.10: Description of who the reporting mechanism was distributed to by organisation 
(Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
In total 22 (36%) people responded to the reporting mechanism. The average age of 
respondents was 78, four were male and nine were female. Nine respondents were given 
the reporting mechanism on arrival and three were given it on departure. These are broken 
down by organisation in Table 7.11.  
 
Organisation Respondents 




Male Female Arrival Departure 
NHS Community Care 
Team 1 
1 67 - 1 - - 
NHS Community Care 
Team 2 
7 -* -* -* -* -* 
NHS Community Care 
Team 3 
9 82 4 5 7 2 
Social Care Home 1 - - - - - - 
Social Care Home 2 - - - - - - 
Private Nursing Home 5 90* 0* 3* 1* 1* 
Total 22 83 4 9 8 3 
*Denotes that some or all data is missing 
N.B. Average age is rounded to 1 decimal place. Where the value is 0, it was not included in the Total 
calculation 
 
Table 7.11: Description of who responded to the reporting mechanism by organisation (Phase 
2 Cycle 2). 
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Where data was available, the ratios of respondents have been developed as a form of 
comparison between the respondents and the overall sampled population that the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to. The ratio of females to males that responded to the reporting 
mechanism (2.25) remained the same as who it was distributed to (2.25). However there 
was a difference between the ratio of respondents (2.67) who were given the reporting 
mechanism on arrival instead of departure in comparison to the distribution of the reporting 
mechanism (2.14). The average age of respondents (83) was also higher than the average 
age of those it was distributed to.  
 
This suggests that gender does not impact upon the willingness or ability to respond. 
However in this cycle of piloting, there was a difference in the age of respondents. Given the 
low amount of data collected by healthcare professionals on who the reporting mechanism 
was distributed to, it is not possible to attribute this to age differences as it may have been 
an artefact of either the sampling or lack of data. For example the average age of 
respondents from the private nursing home (90) may have skewed the data away from the 




Figure 7.8: Where the Observation stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles (Phase 
2 Cycle 2). 
 
When completing the reporting mechanism, service users were asked the location of their 
departure and arrival points (Hospital, Home, Nursing or Residential Home, Community Care 
or Other) as well as their mode of transport (Ambulance, Private Car, Taxi, Patient Transport 
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Departure 






11 5 5 0 0 1 
 
Journey 
Ambulance Private Car Taxi Patient 
Transport 
Other Unstated 
12* 6 2 2* 0 1 
 
Arrival 






9 7 5 1 0 0 
*One respondent selected both ambulance and patient transport 
 
Table 7.12: Self-reported locations and journey types by respondents. 
 
Service users reported their safety across a number of domains, each of which was based 
on the findings from Phase 1. As no new domains had been highlighted in the first cycle of 
piloting, these remained the same. The following section details how safe the respondents 
felt during their departure (Table 7.13), journey (Table 7.14) and arrival (Table 7.15). Where 
the totals do not equate to 22, data for that domain was either missing or was not applicable 
and therefore left blank by the respondent. Out of the 22 organisational care transfers that 
were reported on, six (27.3%) discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one 
domain.  
 
For this cycle of piloting there was no ‘other’ question for each of the three stages of the 
organisational care transfer. Therefore there are only six domains of safety included in this 
cycle of piloting instead of the seven that were included in Cycle 1. To replace the ‘other’ 
question, a section was included at the end of the reporting mechanism for service users to 
provide any further information on why they felt safe or unsafe. Where possible, these 
comments have been placed in their appropriate stage of the transfer. Those that were not 
applicable to one specific stage of the organisational care transfer are presented in the 
‘Additional Comments’ section that follows the reports of safety. The majority of these 
additional comments are by advocates who completed the reporting mechanism for the 
service user. In the same manner as Cycle 1 of piloting, the overall rating of safety was not 
included in any of the incident rate calculations or total number of incidents reported.  
 










Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
15 2 1 14 4 1 14 3 1 12 3 2 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
11 4 2 13 4 1 14 3 1 
 
Table 7.13: Service user reports of safety during their departure (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
During their departure from services, respondents reported feeling safe a total of 79 times 
across the six domains whilst feeling unsafe eight times, with some respondents reporting 
feeling unsafe across more than one. The majority of respondents felt either safe or were 
neutral. Three discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain during 
their departure, giving an incident rate of 13.6% for the point of departure. One of the 
respondents that had reported feeling unsafe proceeded to report the same overall, another 










Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
14 3 0 14 2 1 15 1 0 13 1 1 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
12 3 0 13 2 0 16 0 0 
 
Table 7.14: Service user reports of safety during their journey (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
During the journey stage of the transfer, service users reported feeling safe 81 times and 
unsafe three times across the six domains. The three reports of feeling unsafe were made 
by two respondents, giving an incident rate of 9.1%. The majority of respondents felt either 
safe or neutral. No respondents reported feeling unsafe overall. The respondent that had felt 
unsafe regarding falls or potential falls reported feeling safe overall, whilst the respondent 
that felt unsafe regarding staff listening to them was neutral overall.  
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One service user expanded upon their answer with ‘Felt secure in ambulance – strapped in’ 
[224, Reporting Mechanism], suggesting that this had made them feel safe. Being strapped 
in does not currently fit with any of the current domains, so could potentially be a new 










Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
16 1 1 12 3 2 10 4 4 13 2 1 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
12 5 1 9 5 2 12 5 1 
 
Table 7.15: Service user reports of safety during their arrival (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
During their arrival, service users reported feeling safe 72 times and unsafe 12 times across 
the six domains, with some respondents reporting feeling unsafe across more than one 
domain. The majority of respondents felt either safe or were neutral. Five discrete 
respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain during their arrival, giving an 
incident rate of 22.7%. Only one of these reported feeling unsafe overall, whilst the other 
four were neutral.  
 
The service user that had felt unsafe overall gave an explanation for their answers.  
− ‘Departure: Management twice daily of the arm halter with my left hand only available 
for tasks. Arrival: My abilities to dress / undress and wash hair etc. were problematic. 
A visit to the Dr’s surgery halted my concern with offer of home visit support’ [267, 
Reporting Mechanism] 
 
This resonates closely with the story told by P06 from Phase 1 who was discharged from 
hospital without a care team in place when she was unable to care for herself due to having 
a broken arm. This justifies the need for space for respondents to either expand on their 
answers or to provide new information. It also highlights that the reporting mechanism is able 
to capture similar incidents to those from which it was based on. Although the reporting 
mechanism does not specifically target this issue of having adequate support on discharge, 
it could be tailored to do so when being piloted in organisations or teams to which it is 
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specific; in these cases either the hospital (if given on departure) or the community care 
team (if given on arrival). 
 
Additional Comments 
In the additional comments, three respondents expanded upon their answers to reaffirm why 
they had felt safe. P235 
− ‘No problems this round trip for routine hospital checkup’ [P233, Reporting 
Mechanism].  
− ‘Pre-booked transfer for arranged transport with home staff escort. Smooth journey. 
Efficient and to time transfer and return’ [P255, Reporting Mechanism] 
− ‘Quick trip. Got cup of tea straight away when I get here’ [P236, Reporting 
Mechanism] 
 
A further two respondents expanded upon why they had felt safe. Both of these were 
advocates for the patient who had been transferred out of the private care home to an 
accident and emergency department.  
− ‘Resident fall - suspected fractured neck of femur. Ambulance staff refused 
assistance of home staff and equipment to manually lift resident from bed to 
wheelchair for ambulance transfer / resident manually lifted from wheelchair to 
ambulance stretcher for transfer to hospital. / long wait for resident to be seen in A&E 
x-ray and ward transfer’ [P234, Reporting Mechanism 
− ‘Ward telephone to inform resident transfer when resident had already arrived. No 
discharge letter. Home informed 'nothing to do with you' / Resident reports - home 
quickly but no breakfast (resident arrived at home 9.15am) / Resident received home 
as before. No discharge letter. Home telephoned ward to obtain verbal update. No 
written confirmation of verbal information until 48 hours later’ [P267, Reporting 
Mechanism] 
 




Figure 7.9: Where the Reflection stage of piloting fits into the methodological cycles (Phase 2 
Cycle 2). 
 
Evaluation data on Cycle 2 of piloting was collected through evaluation forms given to 
service users at the same time as the reporting mechanism. This was a modified version of 
the evaluation form given to service users in Cycle 1 of piloting (Table 7.16). Item 4 changed 
from ‘The questions were appropriate’ to ‘The questions that were asked accurately captured 
what made me feel safe or unsafe’ as it was felt that the former was ambiguous. Item 6 was 
included to determine if there were any barriers to service users completing the reporting 
mechanism. Items 7 and 8 were included in response to feedback from service users in 
Cycle 1 of piloting that they had found it difficult to complete either due to the text size or the 
use of the colours. All items included in the evaluation form in Cycle 2 are located in Table 
7.16. 
 
No respondents volunteered to participate in an interview. Not all respondents returned the 
evaluation form with the reporting mechanism, whilst out of those that did, some did not 
complete every question. Consideration was again taken when analysing the responses as 
there was the potential for self-selecting bias, especially as no service users returned the 
evaluation form without completing the reporting mechanism. 
  









I understood the purpose of the Safety 
Survey 
14 3 0 
2 
I understood what was meant by ‘your 
journey’ 
15 1 0 
3 I understood each of the questions 14 2 0 
4 
The questions that were asked 
accurately captured what made me feel 
safe or unsafe 
13 4 0 
5 
There was nothing missing from the 
Safety Survey 
7 7 1 
6 
I experienced difficulties completing the 
Safety Survey 
2 3 10 
7 I felt that the colour scheme was useful 9 5 1 
8 The size of the text was appropriate 10 3 2 
9 
The Safety Survey allows me to provide 
useful feedback about the healthcare I 
have received 
13 3 0 
 
Table 7.16: Answers to the nine items on the evaluation form (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
17 respondents completed and returned the evaluation form. For item 1, 14 agreed with this 
statement, and three neither agreed nor disagreed. No participants disagreed with the 
statement. These figures show a similar distribution as those in Cycle 1 of piloting, 
suggesting respondents were able to understand the purpose of the reporting mechanism, 
and that the purpose was clearly articulated. For item 2, 15 respondents agreed with this 
statement, one neither agreed nor disagreed and none disagreed. One did not select an 
answer. This was an improvement on the first cycle of piloting, where two respondents had 
disagreed with the statement. This may be reflective of the smaller sample, where given the 
same size sample as Cycle 1 it may have been expected that more people disagreed with 
the statement. However regardless of this, the high proportion that agreed with the 
statement again suggests that the term ‘your transfer’ is clear to respondents and would not 
need to be revised in the future. 
 
For item 3, 14 respondents agreed, two neither agreed nor disagreed and none disagreed. 
Given that the questions had not been modified, this supports the conclusions from Cycle 1 
of piloting that the questions were clear. This was a similar distribution to respondents in 
Cycle 1 of piloting, where 24 agreed, four neither agreed nor disagreed and none disagreed. 
For item 4, 13 respondents agreed, four neither agreed nor disagreed and none disagreed.  
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Respondents were not as positive about item 5, with only 7 agreeing with the statement, 7 
neither agreeing nor disagreeing and 1 disagreeing. The participant that disagreed 
expanded upon their answer, reaffirming what they had written in the reporting mechanism. 
The implication of this is discussed in the summary. 
− ‘My concerns re home care assistance should have been addressed at the hospital 
after my right arm operation. It was only suggested some 4 days later at my Dr's 
practice when the practice nurse observed my discomfort and concern’ [267, 
Evaluation Form] 
 
Item 6 was a negatively weighted question. 2 respondents had difficulties completing the 
reporting mechanism, three neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement and 10 did not 
have any difficulties. One respondent (269) that reported having difficulties had left the 
reporting mechanism blank, with the exception of completing the date, leaving point, 
transport type and destination. They neither agreed nor disagreed with every other 
statement on the evaluation form, and did not expand on their answers. It is therefore not 
possible to determine what difficulties this respondent had in completing the reporting 
mechanism. The other respondent that reporting having difficulties also disagreed with item 
8, suggesting that their difficulties were due to the size of the text. Despite this they still 
completed the reporting mechanism in full.  
 
For item 7, nine respondents agreed that the colour scheme was useful, five neither agreed 
nor disagreed and one disagreed. For item 8, 10 felt that the text size was appropriate, three 
neither agreed nor disagreed and two disagreed. All that agreed with these two statements 
still completed the reporting mechanism in full, suggesting that for these respondents despite 
having difficulties it was still possible to complete the reporting mechanism. However based 
on evaluation data from both rounds of piloting, consideration needs to be given for service 
users who may have sight difficulties.  
 
13 respondents agreed with item 9, with 3 neither agreeing nor disagreeing and none 
disagreeing. This is a similar distribution to Cycle 1 of piloting, where the numbers were 25, 
four and zero, respectively.  
 
One other respondent expanded upon their answers, but instead of making evaluative 
comments they used the space to expand on why they had felt safe, which had already been 
captured in their reporting mechanism.  
− ‘I received excellent care from urgent care nurses, the ambulance service and 
hospital treatment’ [196, Evaluation Form] 
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7.3.5 Summary of Cycle 2 
The number of reporting mechanisms distributed by the healthcare professionals to service 
users was low (50.8%). The two social care homes had the greatest impact upon this, 
having not distributed any. The reason for this was that reforms to health and social care 
policy had impacted upon their services, resulting in them not having the available resources 
to continue participating in the study. There was also limited information from other 
organisations as to who the reporting mechanism was distributed to, again due to the 
reforms to health and social care that put a strain on their resources.  
 
Despite the limited number of reporting mechanisms distributed to service users, the 
response rate was again acceptable, although on the lower end of the variance that is 
reported in the literature. There were no differences in gender of respondents that it was 
distributed to and who responded. However those that responded to the reporting 
mechanism were on average older than those that it was distributed to, and service users 
were more likely to respond to the reporting mechanism when it was given on arrival into, 
rather than departure from the service.  
 
From the 22 reports on safety, service users were able to identify and report on feeling 
unsafe. These reports were varied depending upon the stage of the organisational care 
transfer; the discharge and journey displayed similar incident levels (13.6% and 9.1% 
respectively), whilst the number of incidents on arrival were much higher at 22.7%. These 
represent a slightly lower incident rate than in Cycle 1 of piloting, although it is likely to be as 
a result of the low distribution rate, especially from the two social care homes, rather than 
other extraneous variables.  
 
The evaluation feedback from service users, collected solely via the evaluation forms, 
suggested similar levels of support for the reporting mechanism as Cycle 1 of piloting. The 
greatest finding from the evaluation form was that the size of the text may not have been 
appropriate for all service users, suggesting that future piloting and roll-out of the reporting 
mechanism should make it available in large print. This is especially of importance when 
given to elderly people who are more likely to have poor eyesight or other conditions that 
make reading small print difficult.  
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7.4 Collated Results 
In addition to the individual rounds of piloting, it is also possible to collate the results together 
to give a wider overview of safety as reported by service users. This is possible as a result of 
using the same questions in both rounds of piloting, although ‘other’ was moved into free-
text in Cycle 2. Consequently the ‘other’ section has been removed from the collation as it 
has already been reported previously. The evaluation is not repeated in this section as many 









Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
43 6 3 41 11 2 35 12 5 33 13 4 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
34 13 5 37 12 2 34 3 3 
 
Table 7.17: Service user reports of safety during their departure (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
During their departure from services, service users reported feeling safe 223 times and 
unsafe a total of 24 times across the six domains, with some respondents reporting feeling 
unsafe across more than one. The majority of respondents felt either safe or were neutral. 
12 discrete respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain during their 










Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
42 7 2 41 9 2 36 10 4 34 11 3 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
35 12 3 37 10 1 36 0 2 
 
Table 7.18: Service user reports of safety during their journey (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
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During their journey, service users reported feeling safe 225 times and unsafe 17 times 
across the six domains, with some respondents feeling unsafe across more than one 
domain. These were split between seven respondents (11.11%), who reported feeling 
unsafe at least once across each of the seven domains. The majority of respondents felt 










Falling or Potential 
Falls 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
44 5 3 29 10 3 31 13 8 34 12 3 
 
Medication Hygiene Overall 
Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe Safe Neutral Unsafe 
35 14 4 33 13 3 32 5 3 
  
Table 7.19: Service user reports of safety during their arrival (Phase 2 Cycle 2). 
 
During their arrival, service users reported feeling safe 206 times and unsafe a total of 27 
times across the six domains, with some respondents reporting feeling unsafe across more 
than one domain. The majority of respondents felt either safe or were neutral. 11 discrete 
respondents reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain during their arrival, giving an 
incident rate of 17.46%. An overview of the collated results is provided in the following 
section, the summary of the chapter.  
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The findings of each cycle have been summarised individually previously (7.2.4 and 7.3.5 
respectively). The reports from each cycle have been collated and reported in 7.4. This 
section presents comparisons between the two and an amalgamation of the findings where 
appropriate to provide aggregated results.  
 
There was a large difference in the number of reporting mechanisms that were distributed to 
service users, with 91 distributed to service users in Cycle 1 of piloting in comparison to 61 
distributed in Cycle 2. The two social care homes that dropped out of the study due to health 
and social care reforms made the largest impact upon this number, whilst NHS community 
care team 1 had similar issues, although they still managed to distribute the majority of their 
reporting mechanisms. Other impacts that the reforms had on the piloting of the reporting 
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mechanism were that the healthcare professionals from two of the NHS community care 
teams were unable to complete the form detailing who the reporting mechanisms had been 
distributed to. As such it was not possible to provide a direct comparison between the two 
rounds of piloting, for example between the response rates to determine if there were 
differences based upon the changes made.  
 
Despite this, a large enough number of reporting mechanisms were distributed to service 
users to determine if there was interest in the reporting mechanism and to determine if 
service users were able to report on their safety. This was achieved by aggregating the data 
from the two rounds of piloting together, which was made possible by collecting the same 
information on safety. From both rounds of piloting, 19 out of 63 (30.16%) respondents 
reported feeling unsafe in at least one domain of safety across the three stages of the 
organisational care transfer. Therefore service users within this study felt unsafe during the 
organisational care transfer to a greater extent than is currently reported in the literature. A 
wider discussion of the implications of this finding is presented in the discussion chapter.  
 
Furthermore, service users across both rounds of piloting were more likely to respond to the 
reporting mechanism when it was given on arrival into the service than on departure from the 
service. There are two potential explanations for this outcome. Firstly, healthcare 
professionals may have been in a position to provide reminders to service users to complete 
the reporting mechanism. Although the quantity of reminders is speculative, literature 
supports the notion that providing service users with one or more reminder is likely to 
significantly increase response rates (McColl, et al., 2001). Secondly, service users may 
have felt obliged to complete the reporting mechanism whilst still under the care of their 
healthcare team. Healthcare professionals were asked to inform the service user that 
participation was voluntary and the process of returning the reporting mechanism via a free 
postal service supported this. However some service users may have still believed that there 
was an implicit requirement to complete the reporting mechanism.  
 
With regards to perceptions of safety reported by service users under the domain of ‘other’, 
there were very few that were not already captured in the reporting mechanism. One 
perception of safety that was missing was the lack of care support put into place on 
discharge from hospital to home. This was a similar scenario to that depicted by P06 in 
Phase 1, and constitutes a lapse in the systems used to identify post-discharge care 
requirements. Within this study this issue is only of relevance to the NHS community care 
teams and not the social care or private nursing homes. This provides a reminder that the 
reporting mechanism may need to be tailored to the organisations in which it is to be utilised, 
Page | 190  
 
as different types of care transfers may exhibit difference characteristics or components of 
safety.  
 
The evaluation data suggested that the reporting mechanism works and participants 
generally agree that they understand it, the questions were appropriate and it allowed them 
to provide useful feedback about their healthcare. However the potential responses from 
non-respondents need to be taken into consideration as it is possible that the service users 
who disagreed with these statements are the ones that did not respond. Effort was made to 
capture these responses through asking people to return the evaluation form even if they did 
not complete the reporting mechanism. However during Cycle 1 of piloting nobody did this, 
whilst during Cycle 2 of piloting, one respondent (212) completed the evaluation form without 
the reporting mechanism, and agreed with all statements except ‘I felt that the colour 
scheme was useful’, to which they neither agreed nor disagreed.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Chapter Overview 
The final chapter of this thesis will firstly discuss the main findings of the study. The aims 
and objectives are restated in order to address how these were answered, reflecting the way 
in which the findings are reported in the previous three chapters, providing a chronological 
order to the development of the reporting mechanism. This begins with the patient 
perceptions of safety, which were integral to all further aspects of developing and piloting the 
reporting mechanism. Following this, the actual development of the reporting mechanism 
and the results of piloting the reporting mechanism are reported individually.  
 
The findings from these three stages and phases will then inform a theoretical and policy-
driven discussion of patient reporting of safety within organisational care transfers, followed 
by implications for practice. The chapter ends with an overview of the limitations of this 
study, potential areas for future research and concluding remarks. 
 
8.2 Discussion of Findings 
8.2.1 Aims & Objectives 
The aims of the research were to investigate service user perceptions of safety and to 
develop a method of facilitating service users to identify and report self-defined patient safety 
incidents in a care transfer setting, as defined by the Patient Safety Strategic Framework 
(NHS North East, 2008). To achieve these aims, the research was structured into two 




• Explore the concepts, explanations and terms used by service users when talking 
about safety in organisational care transfers, 
• Explore what safe care feels like to service users in organisational care transfers, 




• Create a reporting mechanism that would facilitate service users to report on their 
self-defined safety when going through an organisational care transfer. 
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8.2.2 Phase 1: Patient Perceptions of Safety 
8.2.2.1 Overview of Findings 
In response to the aims and objectives relating to Phase 1 of the study, the findings 
identified the concepts, explanations and terms used by service users when talking about 
their safety within the context of organisational care transfers. These were reduced into an 
operational definition of safety within organisational care transfers that was utilised 
throughout the rest of the study, in particular in the development of the reporting mechanism.  
 
Service users that participated in this study discussed safety around three key themes; 
communication, responsiveness and traditional safety issues. In addition to these three key 
themes, there are also other issues that were of importance to service users. These included 
the role that trust plays in relation to how patients perceive and define safety, and participant 
attitudes towards safety and the reporting of safety.  
 
The communication theme consisted of five components which spanned two levels of sub-
themes. These included healthcare professionals apologising after an incident, being friendly 
and reassuring, listening, providing a means to contact them and keeping the service user 
informed. With the exception of apologising, each of the components has an additional layer. 
Being friendly and reassuring included being civil and respectful and having somebody to 
talk to when going through the organisational care transfer. Listening was linked to having a 
choice, which in turn linked into the second theme of responsiveness. Having a means to 
contact a healthcare professional included either having contact details, in the case of those 
service users recruited from and in the care of the NHS community care teams, or having an 
alarm that links in to a healthcare professional in case of emergency. Being informed 
consisted of being able to understand instructions, being kept updated throughout the 
transfer, healthcare professionals fully identifying themselves and having the knowledge that 
support is in place prior to a transfer; in particular when being discharged home. Each of 
these contributed to the service user feeling safe when being transferred. 
 
8.2.2.2 Relationship to the Current Literature 
The Phase 1 findings show that service users define safety differently to healthcare 
professionals when going through organisational care transfers by including communication 
and responsiveness as being important concepts relating to their safety, along with the 
traditional safety issues of falls, HCAIs, drug incidents, missed diagnosis and inadequate 
care.  
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Where previous literature on service user perceptions of safety has focused on perceptions 
within hospitals (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Burroughs, et al., 2007; Masso Guijarro, et al., 
2010) or primary care (Kuzel, et al., 2004), the findings within this study provide an insight 
into patient perceptions of safety when going through an organisational care transfer. The 
perceptions of safety in the above articles share many similarities to the findings of this 
study. Service users in the studies by Burroughs et al. (2005; 2007) shared concerns around 
medication errors, misdiagnosis, falls, staff not taking the time to listen to patients and not 
being responsive to patient requests. Similarly, service users in the study by Kuzel et al. 
(2004) focus on breakdowns in communication and relationship with their provider along with 
technical (traditional) errors. Each of these resonates closely with the themes identified 
within this study. 
 
However there are also distinct differences in the reported perceptions. Burroughs et al. 
(2005; 2007) included problems with medical equipment, mistakes by nurses and 
physicians, being mistaken for another patient and having the wrong test or procedure 
conducted also impact upon safety, whilst Kuzel et al. (2004) included a breakdown in 
access and inefficiencies of care.  
 
Based on these similarities and differences, it would appear that patient perceptions of 
safety differ depending upon the healthcare setting in the same manner that healthcare 
professional definitions of safety differ. For example venous thromboembolisms and bed 
sores are not applicable safety incidents to primary care where patients do not spend a lot of 
time in one location. The key themes identified in this study; communication, responsiveness 
and traditional safety issues are discussed individually in relation to the wider literature on 
patient safety and why they may be of importance to making patients feel safe.  
 
Communication 
As a general component of safety, communication has received much attention in the 
literature. The emphasis is placed upon the role of communication between healthcare 
professionals, such as the transfer of patient information (Kripalani, et al., 2007) or the role 
of teamwork that is associated with human factors (Kerr, 2009; Tjia, et al., 2009; Whyte, et 
al., 2009). Within this study, patients did not approach communication from a provider’s 
perspective, instead focusing on the communication between their healthcare professional 
and themselves.  
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The sub-theme of ‘being friendly and reassuring’ relates to the personality types of 
healthcare professionals and their interaction styles with their service users. Kuzel et al. 
(2004) indicated a similar perspective of safety, though they classified it as a relationship 
breakdown rather communication. The largest proportion of relationship breakdowns related 
to disrespect or insensitivity, which shares many similarities to ‘being friendly and 
reassuring’, although on the opposite end of a continuum where a relationship breakdown is 
significant of being unsafe, whereas ‘being friendly and reassuring’ is indicative of being safe 
and a reflection of the AI.  
 
Similarly, Hovey et al. (2011) and Burroughs et al. (2007) have identified that communication 
and relationship with their healthcare provider impacted upon the patient’s experience of 
safety. The importance of this component of communication is already recognised, as can 
be evidenced in the training of future healthcare professionals (Warmington, 2011). However 
despite this, healthcare professionals still sometimes exhibit inadequate concern or 
insensitivity towards the patient (Frank, 2002).  
 
The sub-theme of ‘being informed’ related to the information that was provided to service 
users and its accessibility. This can be seen to be of particular importance when service 
users are being transferred as there can be confusion and uncertainty about the 
organisational care transfer, such as what facilities or healthcare provision would be 
available on arrival, and the length of the organisational care transfer. This differed to the 
components of safety identified by service users in primary care (Kuzel, et al., 2004), 
hospitals (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Burroughs, et al., 2007) and with healthcare in general 
(Hovey, et al., 2011); perhaps representative of the organisational care transfer setting.  
 
Likewise the sub-theme of ‘having a means to contact a healthcare professional’ can also be 
seen as being dependent upon the organisational care transfer setting. This finding 
represents the concern that patients have when their care has been transferred into a new, 
unfamiliar care setting, such as when returning home or going into a nursing or social care 
home. It can be argued that a feeling of security and safety is achieved through being in 
close contact with someone that is able to provide that required level of safety. When this 
close, direct contact is unavailable, it may be possible for it to be recreated through 
technological links; in this study via personal alarms linked to healthcare teams or a 
telephone.  
 
Another sub-theme of communication was that of apologising if something had gone wrong, 
which would make service users feel safer in the future. Current healthcare policy suggests 
Page | 195  
 
that an apology should be given as soon as possible after an incident has occurred (NPSA, 
2005). This policy goes beyond apologising, encouraging a culture of openness where a full, 
honest explanation is provided to the patient. This full disclosure is seen as one of seven 
pillars that are essential in responding to a patient safety incident (McDonald, et al., 2010).  
 
It is thought that being open can reduce the psychological and emotional impact of a patient 
safety incident (Allan & McKillop, 2010; National Patient Safety Agency, 2005), whilst also 
reducing the chances of litigation (Vincent & Coulter, 2002). According to McDonald et al. 
(2010), apologising constitutes a second pillar, where remedial actions are proposed to 
reduce the chances of the same incident occurring again. These are distinguished from 
disclosure of an incident, as an apology should only be given when there is an admission of 
unreliable care. However in the UK, it is recommended that an apology is given when any 
patient harm occurs, regardless of severity or cause of the harm.  
 
The finding in this study that apologising is a key component to making people feel safe 
expands upon the known impacts of apologising after an incident. The participants in this 
study did not discuss the importance of full disclosure or the need for remedial actions, 
instead focusing specifically on the need for communication in the form of an apology. 
Therefore it is suggested that an apology alone can make patients feel safer, although it may 
also impact upon their psychological and emotional wellbeing as well as reducing the 
chances of future litigation.  
 
The final sub-theme within communication is listening. This relates closely to patient-centred 
care and responsiveness, and is therefore discussed in the following section.  
 
Responsiveness 
The components of the theme of responsiveness related to patient-centred care, where the 
patient and their needs are placed at the heart of the care process. One key point needs to 
be clarified when discussing patient-centred care; there is a general misconception that 
patient-centred care requires the sharing of all information and decisions (Stewart, 2001). 
Instead, the patient’s desire for information is taken into account and responded to, meaning 
that those who do not wish to be involved in the decision-making process need not be.  
 
The first of the components is that of ‘listening’, which also falls within the communication 
theme. It is reported here in the responsiveness rather than communication, as although 
listening is important to communication, it is essential to responsiveness; without listening to 
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the service user it is not possible to react to their needs and requirements, or to provide 
patient-centred care.  
 
Listening to service users is not a new approach in itself, with the Patient Charter 
(Department of Health, 1992) originally indicating that service users should be listened to, 
which received support in an editorial in the British Medical Journal written by Smith (1993). 
Within this study, the theme of responsiveness also consists of making the organisational 
care transfer an easy process whilst responding to the individual needs of the service user, 
providing personalised care depending upon their condition. Again these are not new 
concepts in themselves as approaches to providing quality care. Patient-centred care can be 
said to fall within the acceptability component of quality, defined by Donabedian (2003) as 
‘conformity to the wishes, desires and expectations of patients and their families’. However 
by applying these components of responsiveness or patient-centred care to safety, they can 
also form effective healthcare. Going beyond patient-centred care to patient and public 
involvement, research by Rise et al. (2011) has suggested that patient and public 
involvement is founded on mutual respect. One key component of patient and public 
involvement, highlighted by both service users and healthcare professionals is that of 
respect, dialogue and communication (Rise, et al., 2011).  
 
The theme of responsiveness expands beyond providing patient-centred care to also include 
waiting times. These were indicated by service users to impact upon how safe they felt. 
Although a full explanation was not given as to the reason why waiting times made people 
feel unsafe, the finding does resonate closely with the literature. For example Ackroyd-
Stolarz et al. (2011) identified that in older people, a prolonged stay in the emergency 
department of a hospital is associated with an increase in the rate of adverse events as a 
result of overcrowding. Any reduction in waiting times and overcrowding reduced the number 
of incidents. Although service users in this study discussed short-term waiting times, for 
example waiting to be seen on arrival to accident and emergency, longer waiting times for 
specialist diagnoses or surgery can also have physical and psychosocial impacts on service 
users (Robling, et al., 2009).  
 
Waiting times themselves have received much attention within healthcare policy, with 
service users being given “the right to access services within maximum waiting times” 
(Department of Health, 2010c, p. 8). However with the introduction of the white paper, Equity 
and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Department of Health, 2010a), the focus on waiting 
times has been reduced in an attempt to focus on healthcare outcomes. The findings that 
waiting times are of importance to service users feeling safe suggest that attempts should be 
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made to keep them low, in keeping with the focus on healthcare outcomes. Furthermore, the 
concept of opening up the private sector to reduce waiting times has been found to be 
unsuccessful, with the only outcome being to reduce the capacity of the public sector with no 
impact on waiting times (Duckett, 2005). A wider discussion of the political and policy 
implications of this study is provided in the conclusion chapter. 
 
Traditional Safety Issues 
There are a number of types of iatrogenic illnesses that are widely recognised and reported 
upon in the healthcare literature, such as nosocomial infections (e.g. Barrett-Connor, 1972), 
medication errors (e.g. Liu, Manias, & Gerdtz, 2011) and surgical errors (e.g. Hurlbert & 
Garrett, 2009). Within this study, the service users interviewed were able to identify a 
number of these traditional safety issues. As the interviews were appreciative, the majority 
focused on the avoidance of these traditional safety issues, including falls, medication 
difficulties, healthcare acquired infections, missed diagnosis, painful procedures, physical 
safety and the provision of adequate care.  
 
The majority of these have already been widely identified in the literature as being of 
importance to safety. For example, Knight et al. (2011) were able to identify that elderly 
people being discharged from hospital and their carers can often be confused with regards 
to the management of medication, which can potentially lead to an adverse event. Likewise 
falls have also received a great amount of attention. They have been identified to be the 
largest category of reported adverse events in hospitals (National Audit Office, 2005), 
however Davenport et al. (2009) highlight that service users experiencing a fall in hospital 
are at high risk of experiencing a fall post-discharge. 
 
Noticeably most of the traditional safety issues identified by service users in this study are 
also applicable to most other areas of healthcare, not just organisational care transfers, 
although the degree to which they are relevant changes upon care setting. The only issues 
that are specific to organisational care transfers are those within the sub-theme of physical 
safety, which comprise of careful driving and personal security. Within the literature these 
have received little attention, which is representative of a lack of research being conducted 
into service user perceptions of safety within organisational care transfers.  
 
Within this study the use of the term ‘traditional safety risks’ may be construed as being a 
catch-all theme to which there is no conceptual structure. This was done so as to represent 
that patients are able to identify many of the same hazards as clinicians. This concordance 
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between patient and medical definitions has been demonstrated in other studies (Burroughs, 
et al., 2005; 2007; Kuzel, et al., 2004; Masso Guijarro, et al., 2010). The findings from Phase 
1 provide further evidence for this concordance, and support the notion that patients are able 
to identify and report these traditional safety risks. However it is necessary to remember that 
this is dependent upon individual circumstances of patients, as some may not be able or 
willing to report on their safety (Davis, et al., 2007; Davis, Sevdalis, & Vincent, 2011).  
 
These themes developed during Phase 1 resonate very closely to research by Hovey et al. 
(2011) who identified three key themes that patients discussed in relation to unsafe care; 
loss of voice, loss of trust and the need to recover patient-centeredness. Although 
conceptualised slightly differently from the findings of this study, partly due to a focus on 
unsafe rather than safe care, the themes share strong similarities and consist of many of the 
same components. By applying these themes to a person-centred planning approach to 
healthcare, Hovey et al. (2011) propose that a model for safety can be developed that 
makes the patient the focal point of care and safety. A similar approach can be seen within 
this study where the reporting mechanism developed in Phase 2 performed in a similar 
manner; making patients the focal point in the identification and reporting of their safety. 
 
To do this, Hovey et al. (2011, p. 670) highlighted that ‘through the explication of multiple 
perspectives, hermeneutical inquiry creates a different or new way of understanding a topic’. 
However such an approach does not give an explanation of the links to the complex nature 
of safety in an ontologically single reality. The use of critical realism within the current study 
gives a similar allowance for multiple perspectives via the transitive dimension of reality, but 
eventually links into the intransitive dimension, providing a clearer link to the underlying 
causal mechanisms that constitute reality. 
  
A study using vignettes to compare healthcare outcomes, either positive or negative, with 
the relationship that the patient has with their care provider has suggested that the 
relationship itself has a greater impact on overall ratings of care than the healthcare outcome 
(Lawton, Gardner, & Plachcinski, 2010). Although this study was only conducted with 
mothers using hypothetical vignettes based on ante-natal care, the findings resonate closely 
with those of this study. In particular, the findings from Phase 1 suggest that communication, 
responsiveness and trust were all linked to how safe or unsafe the service users felt. These 
themes could be interpreted to be linked closely to the service users’ relationship with their 
healthcare provider, especially in the case of trust. Despite these similarities, there are still 
large discrepancies; mothers in an ante-natal setting are likely to have a much greater 
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relationship with their healthcare provider than service users going through an organisational 
care transfer.   
 
Additional Findings 
In addition to identifying what had made service users feel safe during their organisational 
care transfer in concordance with the aims and objectives of the study, a number of other 
findings were identified from the interviews.  
 
The findings on the attitudes that patients exhibited towards both safety and the reporting of 
safety provided a unique insight into how people perceived safety when going through an 
organisational care transfer. There were mixed attitudes to both, with some participants 
indicating that safety had not previously crossed their mind, whereas other participants 
reported that the thinking of safety was situation-dependent, where it would only occur in 
circumstances that allowed it. This has been a relatively unexplored field within patient 
safety, where the majority of research has focused on patient attitudes to being involved in 
safety, rather than how often they think about it. In particular there has been no research 
known to the author that explored this within the context of safe care, rather than unsafe 
care.  
 
Research with similar findings has explored patient willingness to be involved in their own 
safety. For example Davis, Sevdalis and Vincent (2011) found that patients were willing to 
be involved in their own safety depending upon the situation and the profession of the 
healthcare professionals. Similarly Davis et al. (2007) found five factors that influenced 
patient involvement in safety; patient-related, illness-related, healthcare professional-related, 
healthcare setting-related and task-related. Participants within this study fall directly within 
the former two factors; patient-related and illness-related. This is evident in the emphasis 
that participants placed on trust, where safety is not contemplated due to their individual 
attitudes, or where they state that safety is only an interest when they are well enough to 
consider it.  A further consideration is that patients are sometimes unaware of the risk that 
healthcare poses (Burroughs, et al., 2005; Evans, et al., 2006). 
 
Further to these attitudes to safety, many participants also disclosed their attitudes to the 
reporting of safety incidents. Again there were mixed attitudes, although these were perhaps 
an artefact of the processes of AI that formed the questions and the recruitment strategy. For 
example when dreaming of what may be, some participants stated a willingness to report 
their safety. However when discovering past experiences, participants stated that they had 
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had no reason to report safety. It is therefore plausible that the perceived lack of interest in a 
reporting mechanism was formed by positive experiences of care where they had had no 
reason to report safety. Although this is a limitation, it was not strong enough to impact upon 
Phase 2. However there is clear scope for future explorations into the potential impact that 
this may have on patient and public involvement in the reporting of safety.  
 
Asking participants about reporting positive experiences of safety as well as negative 
experiences posed an unusual situation in which some participants appeared to be unable to 
perceive the usefulness. Instead of discussing the reporting of positive experiences, they 
defaulted to discussing what would happen during a negative experience. This is perhaps an 
outcome of a large focus in both the media and healthcare policy that focuses on unsafe 
care and to a greater extent the traditional approach to safety of trying to correct mistakes 
rather than building on what works well, as required by AI.  
 
Overall the concept of patient reporting of safety incidents within the literature is limited 
(King, et al., 2010). Wasson, MacKenzie and Hall (2007) explored patient reporting of safety 
through an internet-based survey capturing adverse events and found that patients were 
willing to report their safety. There are no studies known to the author that have directly 
explored general attitudes to the reporting of safety incidents, perhaps because very few 
organisations have implemented such reporting and feedback mechanisms. However there 
is an increasing body of research exploring the reliability of patient reports of safety, 
suggesting that where appropriate, patients are able to act as a safety buffer (Davis, et al., 
2007) and report on their own safety (Masso Guijarro, et al., 2010). This research in 
combination with the findings from Phase 1 provided a strong rationale for the development 
of the reporting mechanism.  
 
In addition to attitudes to safety and the reporting of safety incidents, another additional 
finding was that trust was often discussed by service users in relation to their safety. Service 
users were quick to state that having trust in their healthcare professionals was important to 
them feeling safe. There was an element of unconditional trust for healthcare professionals, 
although this did not always extend to the organisations that they operated within. For 
example where service users indicated that they had felt unsafe, it was not due to the 
healthcare professional’s actions but rather due to external factors, such as a lack of 
resources. This finding opposes research that states that trust is never ‘blind trust’, but rather 
conditional (Skirbekk, et al., 2011). One potential explanation for this is due to the 
differences in care settings across the two studies. The majority of studies exploring trust 
(e.g. Skirbekk, et al., 2011) do so within a primary care setting during a consultation, and so 
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any differences may reflect trust within an organisational care transfer setting, where service 
users are sometimes seen as passive rather than active recipients of care.  
 
The role of trust within safety has previously been seen to be an outcome of a patient safety 
incident, with patients potentially losing trust in their clinicians as a result of a safety incident 
(Quick, 2006), although this has been contested (Entwistle & Quick, 2006). The role of trust 
within Phase 1 was twofold. Firstly, participants often made excuses for clinicians, possibly 
as a result of cognitive dissonance; a feeling of unease when considering the people trying 
to help them may in fact harm them, or it could be alluding to their ability to identify latent 
conditions, e.g. resource limitations that have the potential to result in adverse events. If the 
last point is correct it supports the notion that patients can play a role in identifying and 
reporting safety incidents (Masso Guijarro, et al., 2010; Schwappach, 2008; Weissman, et 
al., 2008). Secondly, trust helped to make patients feel safer, potentially acting as a 
hindrance to their involvement in their own safety. It is therefore conceivable that trust may 
be both a mitigating factor and outcome of safety, although the exact interactions need 
further exploration.  
 
8.2.3 Phase 2: Development and Piloting of the Reporting Mechanism 
8.2.3.1 Development 
During the two workshops, a number of different potential reporting mechanisms were 
identified and suggested by service users, including service user meetings, generic open-
ended questionnaires, one-to-one interviews, verbal reports, Patient Advice and Liaison 
service (using service user complaints) and leaflets. Out of these, participants felt that a 
questionnaire and / or a leaflet were the most appropriate method of capturing patient 
reports of safety. Due to time and resource constraints there was only scope to develop and 
pilot one suggestion, meaning that in the second workshop a leaflet was the favoured type of 
reporting mechanism to be developed.  
 
Although other suggestions were viable options for service user reporting mechanisms, the 
questionnaire was developed in the form of a leaflet based on the support that it received 
from service users and healthcare professionals. It also provided the greatest flexibility and 
could obtain the greatest amount of service user reports using the minimum amount of 
resources, along with having the capability to be embedded into organisations once the 
study had been completed. Other methods of collecting patient reports of safety, such as 
interviews, service user meetings and verbal reports did not contain these characteristics, 
although participants were not necessarily aware of these limitations. The use of PALs to 
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collect service user reports of safety would have simply duplicated existing methods of 
identifying safety incidents (e.g. Department of Health, 2009a; Jonsson & Ovretveit, 2008). 
 
When exploring what the reporting mechanism should look like in Workshop 1, participants 
also identified key principles that should underpin the reporting mechanism. Key principles 
highlighted by participants were that the reporting mechanism needed to be patient-centred, 
short and concise with clear signposting, optionally anonymous and have a focus on both 
safe and unsafe care. These features were carried over into Workshop 2 and subsequently 
included in the reporting mechanism.  
 
The reporting mechanism that was eventually developed, the safety survey, is similar in 
composition to other methods that have been reported to capture service user experiences 
of safety. King et al. (2010) have conducted the most extensive review of service user 
reports of safety to date, and found that three studies (Agoritsas, Bovier, & Perneger, 2005; 
Schwappach, 2008; Solberg, et al., 2008) used a written questionnaire to capture service 
user reports of safety. Of note, these studies only explored service user reporting of safety 
within individual healthcare settings including primary care (Schwappach, 2008), primary and 
speciality care (Solberg, et al., 2008) and in a hospital (Agoritsas, Bovier, & Perneger, 2005). 
Other forms of surveys have also been popular methods, such as web-based surveys, 
newspaper surveys and telephone surveys (King, et al., 2010).  
 
These studies did not indicate how the survey was developed, suggesting that the use of 
Participatory AR within this study to involve service users and the healthcare professionals 
that would be responsible for piloting the reporting mechanism is a unique approach to 
developing a service user reporting mechanism. The two workshops consisted of 
collaborations between healthcare professionals and service users, working towards a single 
objective of developing a service user reporting mechanism. Collaborative, or partnership 
working between patients and healthcare professionals has been increasing, however 
concerns have been reported around the extent that patients’ perspectives are included in 
the outcomes of such partnerships (Elberse, Caron-Flinterman, & Broerse, 2011).  
 
The themes of safety within the final reporting mechanism were developed based upon the 
patient perspective, and the development of the reporting mechanism had an equal 
weighting between the patients and the healthcare professionals. For example once the 
reporting mechanism had been constructed following the two workshops, both the 
healthcare professionals and service users were asked to provide feedback and to highlight 
anything that may have been missing from the two workshops. This was particularly 
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necessary as for a patient reporting mechanism to be successful, there needs to be a high 
degree of saliency, which is best achieved through working closely with patients so that the 
reporting mechanism is based upon their needs and requirements. It can actually be argued 
that a limitation of this study is the reverse of Elberse, Caron-Flinterman and Broerse (2011), 
where the collaboration did not take into account the healthcare professionals’ perspective 
as much as it should. A wider discussion of this and other limitations associated with using a 
survey are discussed in 8.2.3.3 in conjunction with the findings from the piloting of the 
reporting mechanism.  
 
During the two workshops, in particular in Workshop 1, participants also explored practical 
issues of implementing the reporting mechanism. It needed to comply with current processes 
that are already in existence within each of the services. It was also identified that there are 
already numerous feedback mechanisms for when care is already in place, but there are no 
mechanisms for the admission and discharge processes within the organisations 
represented in this study. Discussions around the distribution of the mechanism focused on 
an individualistic approach in that it should be given to service users after each episode of 
healthcare. However there were uncertainties around if this should be via continuous 
distribution or batch distribution, depending upon available financial and time resources.  
 
It was felt that legislation would be necessary as a driver to implement the reporting 
mechanism on a wider scale, with funding issues focusing on any potential advertising of the 
reporting mechanism and a sustained roll-out. The final issue of implementing the reporting 
mechanism discussed by participants was who the responsibility for monitoring and acting 
upon the reports rested with. These two points are discussed in greater detail in 8.5 where 
the role of commissioning is discussed in relation to obtaining service user reports of safety. 
 
8.2.3.2 Piloting 
Two rounds of piloting the reporting mechanism were conducted, each constituting one AR 
cycle. In each cycle of piloting, 20 reporting mechanisms were distributed to each of the six 
organisations that were involved in the development of the reporting mechanism; three NHS 
community care teams, two social care homes and a private nursing home. The reporting 
mechanisms were then distributed by the healthcare professionals to service users that they 
identified as fulfilling the recruitment criteria.  
 
From the piloting of the reporting mechanism three major outcomes were explored; the types 
and frequencies of incidents reported by service users, the distribution and response rates 
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from service users and the evaluation of the reporting mechanism. The following section 




Before exploring the types and frequencies of incidents reported by service users, it is 
necessary to discuss the distribution and response rates of the reporting mechanism as they 
invariably impacted upon who did or did not provide reports of safety.  
 
Distribution rates by the healthcare professionals were relatively high during the first cycle of 
piloting, with 76% of all reporting mechanisms distributed to service users. In addition, the 
majority of healthcare professionals were able to complete the required form that records 
who the reporting mechanism had been distributed to. During the second cycle of piloting the 
distribution of the reporting mechanism was substantially lower, with 51% of all reporting 
mechanisms distributed to service users. The information that healthcare professionals were 
asked to collate on who the reporting mechanism was distributed to was often lacking during 
this cycle of piloting, suggesting that engagement with the research study had reduced 
despite being given longer to distribute the reporting mechanism.  
 
This represented a large change between the two rounds of piloting, and one that can be 
explored with theories of organisational development. Although this study primarily looked at 
patient perceptions of safety within organisational care transfers and the development of a 
reporting mechanism based upon these perceptions, the role of organisational development 
also played a key role. Healthcare is a series of complex systems and processes, and so for 
any new mechanism to be introduced, an organisation needs to go through a process of 
organisational development, even during a piloting or feasibility study.  
 
There are two different paradigmatic approaches that explore how organisational 
development occurs. The first of these posits that organisations gradually develop over a 
sustained period of time, going through many incremental changes as is suggested within 
traditional evolutionary theories through mutations. However this paradigm has been 
described as being overly simplistic. The alternative to the traditionalist paradigm is the 
punctuated equilibrium paradigm, which argues that small changes occur during periods of 
stability which are then punctuated by revolutionary periods of change. Within these 
organisations, there are five fundamental or ‘deep’ structures which determine the overall 
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activity of the organisation; culture, strategy, structure, power distribution and control 
systems.  
 
This resonates very closely with the organisational structure of the NHS, whereby periods of 
revolution are occurring with increased frequency. Moving away from PCTs towards CCGs 
can be argued to be a revolution in the deep structures of strategy, structure, power 
distribution and, with the creation of the NHS Commissioning Board and the removal of 
many arms-length bodies, a revolution in the control systems. The argument for a cultural 
shift is harder to provide. Instead, it can be argued that organisational cultures do not 
undergo the same process of change that other basic structures do, but require a more 
sustained period of development. For example the move towards a systems approach (and 
a culture of being open) within patient safety has been occurring for over a decade, and 
although it has achieved great success, it is still occurring. It is here that there is a distinction 
between practices, which can be controlled by top-down processes, and cultures, which are 
normally developed from the bottom-up.  
 
The difference between incremental change and periods of revolution can play an important 
role within this study, particularly as a period of revolution cannot always be perceived prior 
to the event. At the outset of this study, the NHS was in a state of relative equilibrium or 
stability, with small changes occurring frequently with the intention of improving practice, 
which fits within the framework of the study of providing a small-scale change within the 
structure of patient reporting of safety.  
 
However since the inception of the study, healthcare has gone through a period of revolution 
with the movement towards CCGs and the related changes in the deep structures within the 
NHS. These include the move away from targets towards an emphasis on individual 
responsibility and increased competition from the private sector which can have an 
unanticipated impact upon the processes of organisational development that occur during a 
period of stability. In particular it has been suggested that when organisations go through 
periods of revolution, small-scale organisational development projects can lose the 
prioritisation that they once had until the revolutionary period is over (Hayes, 2010).  
 
The impact of the reforms to the study are evident in the difficulties that arose during the 
second cycle of piloting where the distribution rates of the reporting mechanism reduced 
significantly, and the quality of information on who the reporting mechanism had been 
distributed to also reduced. This mirrors similar findings by Fulop et al. (2002) who 
highlighted that when organisations merge together, managerial focus reduces and impacts 
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upon the delivery of services. They concluded that other healthcare organisations that are 
going through transformations should take the potential disruptions into account. The 
difficulties that arose during the development of the reporting mechanism in this study 
suggest that it does not only apply to operational aspects of an organisation but also 
developmental aspects as well.  
 
Another important factor that may have influenced the overall distribution of the reporting 
mechanism is that of organisational culture. It has already been highlighted that having a 
safety orientated culture can improve incident reporting amongst healthcare professionals 
(Department of Health, 2000b; Reason, 1998, 2000; Reiman, Pietikainen, & Oedewald, 
2010; Woodward, Lemer, & Wu, 2009), and this can also be extended to their involvement 
within this study. A healthcare organisation with a poor patient safety culture would likely not 
want to encourage the reporting of safety, regardless of who was providing the reports. 
Within this study, it is not believed that organisational cultures impacted upon the distribution 
rate of the reporting mechanism to service users. The healthcare professionals responsible 
for distributing the reporting mechanism had also been involved throughout each of the 
earlier stages of the research process and had many opportunities to either not participate in 
to begin with or to drop out of the study if they had a poor safety culture. 
 
This does not mean that the culture of an organisation is not important in service user 
reporting of safety. Healthcare professionals were purposively sampled in this study based 
upon indicators of their organisations having a strong patient safety culture. Some 
organisations did not wish to participate once they were informed of the aims and objectives 
of the study. It is possible that this was due to a fear of retribution, given that the study was 
funded by the North East SHA. It is far less likely that organisations dropping out of the study 
did so due to their organisational culture, as they probably would not have participated in the 
first place if this was the case. Any future studies will still need to take into account 
organisational cultures when developing any reporting mechanism, regardless of if it is 
healthcare professional or service user reporting of safety. 
 
Response Rates 
Across both rounds of piloting the response rate from service users was 41.44%. The 
response rates reduced slightly from Cycle 1 (45%) to Cycle 2 (36%). The most likely 
explanation for this difference in response rates is a natural variance caused by the different 
numbers of reporting mechanisms that were distributed in each cycle of piloting; 91 in Cycle 
1 and 61 in Cycle 2.  
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Regardless of the differences in response rates across both rounds of piloting, they were still 
of an acceptable level when considered in relation to the sample. McColl et al. (2001) found 
in an extensive literature review of surveys that non-respondents are more likely to be 
elderly people than younger people. This helps to explain why the expected response rate of 
between 55.6% (Baruch, 1999) to 67% (Sitzia & Wood, 1998) that has been identified to be 
standard within healthcare service surveys was not achieved in this study. Furthermore, the 
review of methods to obtain service user reports of safety by King et al. (2010) identified that 
self-initiated reports, where the onus was on the service user to report safety yielded lower 
responses than solicited reports, where service users were requested to answer questions. 
Although there was a degree of solicitation in this study, the onus was still on the service 
users to complete and return the reporting mechanism if they wished to do so, therefore 
potentially reducing the response rates in comparison to direct solicitation of service user 
reports of safety. 
 
Sitzia and Wood (1998) highlight the impact that response rates have upon the 
generalisability of the findings, where results will be negligible if less satisfied service users 
do not respond. Although this may have been the case in this study where only people 
happy with the reporting mechanism responded (as can be summarised from the largely 
positive responses in the evaluation data), it was possible that this did not impact upon the 
patient reports of safety as incidence rates are similar to those reported by healthcare 
professionals in organisational care transfers (Tsilimingras & Bates, 2008). This suggests 
that service users were able to distinguish between being unsafe and being unhappy with 
the reporting mechanism. Future research or future piloting of the reporting mechanism 
needs to capture patient reports of safety from those that may have been unwilling or unable 
to complete the reporting mechanism to determine if there were any differences in reports on 
safety and to further improve the reporting mechanism so that it yields a higher response 
rate (and is therefore more representative). 
 
Reports of Safety 
The reports of safety provided by service users across the two rounds of piloting suggested 
that where service users were willing and able to respond, they could identify a number of 
different issues that impacted upon their safety, either positively or negatively. There are two 
ways in which to explore the data; either by reducing the organisational care transfer down 
into its individual stages (departure, journey and arrival) and classify each one as an episode 
of care, or to combine all three together to provide a single episode of care.  
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By exploring the stages of the organisational care transfer as individual episodes, it is 
possible to establish an incident rate for each stage so as to create a comparison between 
the three and to determine at which point of the transfer service users felt most unsafe. 
During the departure stage of their transfer, service users reported feeling unsafe 24 times. 
From these 24 reports, 12 were from discrete service users which gives an incident rate of 
19.05%. During their journey, service users reported feeling unsafe 17 times. From these 17 
reports, seven were from discrete service users which give an incident rate of 11.11%. 
During their arrival, service users reported feeling unsafe 27 times. From these 27, 11 were 
from discrete service users which give an incident rate of 17.46%.  
 
These figures suggest that service users often felt the most unsafe during the admission and 
discharge processes of the organisational care transfer. These findings are similar to those 
reported elsewhere in the literature for organisational care transfers. For example 
Tsilimingras and Bates (2008) identified that one in five elderly people discharged from 
hospital suffered an adverse event, although the methods of the studies included in this 
review differed significantly to those used within this study as patient perceptions of safety 
were not measured. Despite this, the levels of incidents on both admission and discharge 
are similar to those identified using these methods. This suggests that service users in this 
study were able to identify a similar level of incidents as previous studies. However caution 
should be taken as Tsilimingras and Bates (2008) identified themselves that there were very 
few studies exploring the number of incidents post-discharge.  
 
Service users reported feeling unsafe fewer times during the journey stage of the 
organisational care transfer. This was consistent across both rounds of piloting and when the 
two rounds were collated together. In order to explain this finding, it is necessary to refer 
back to the literature on where incidents are most likely to occur within a healthcare setting. 
It has already been identified that organisational care transfers, through the exploration of 
gaps in healthcare, are higher in risk than other areas of healthcare (Cook, Render, & 
Woods, 2000). This provides the explanation for the increased number of reports of unsafe 
care during the departure and arrival stages of the organisational care transfer. However it 
can be argued that the journey stage of the organisational care transfer is one single 
episode of healthcare where service users are not crossing any organisational or institutional 
boundaries. Therefore the 11.11% incident rate identified by service users within this study is 
of a similar level of incidents identified elsewhere within a single episode of care 
(Department of Health, 2000b; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; Mendes, et al., 2009; 
Soop, et al., 2009; Vincent, Neale, & Woloshynowych, 2001). 
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When the organisational care transfer is classed as a single episode of care, service users 
reported feeling unsafe 71 times. These 71 reports were made by 19 discrete service users, 
resulting in an incident rate of 30.16%. This rate is significantly higher than that reported 
elsewhere in the literature, where within organisational care transfers it has been reported 
that it is around 20%.  
 
The difference in the two rates is potentially due to service users feeling unsafe in just one 
stage of the organisational care transfer and not the other stages. There are three alternative 
explanations for this outcome. Firstly, the variation may be a natural and expected change 
that was a result of the methods utilised within this study; a combination of the sample being 
predominantly elderly service users and the reliance of service user reports. As has been 
highlighted, incidents occur in around 20% of organisational care transfers (Tsilimingras & 
Bates, 2008), however the variance can be explained by a finding that incidents are more 
likely to occur in elderly people (Tsilimingras, Brummel-Smith, & Brooks, 2009) and that 
service users report more incidents than healthcare professionals via medical record review 
(Weissman, et al., 2008). 
 
Secondly, service users may not identify the organisational care transfer being a single 
episode of care, and they potentially recognise that it constitutes different stages depending 
upon the organisation in which they are a part of, for example recognising that the 
ambulance service is a different entity to the nursing home, community care team or 
hospital. These two explanations can work in combination. The third and an alternative 
explanation is that these boundaries in the stages of the organisational care transfer were 
created by the reporting mechanism itself, and that they imposed artificial boundaries upon 
the service users in the reporting of their safety. 
 
In addition to the reports provided by service users within the pre-designated components of 
safety that were identified during Phase 1, service users were also able to detail other 
experiences that impacted upon their safety via slightly different methods in each cycle of 
piloting. Despite having this option available to them, there were very few reported by 
service users. This suggests that there was a degree of saliency associated with the 
components of safety by service users, where they recognised that the components of safety 
included within the reporting mechanism had accurately captured what had made them feel 
safe or unsafe during the organisational care transfer. An alternative explanation is that it 
may have been an artefact of the reporting mechanism itself, where service users felt that 
they were unable to expand on their answers or were unsure of what had made them feel 
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safe or unsafe; a case of unknown unknowns. This needs to be taken into consideration as 
the lack of reports on other components of safety not identified within the sample of service 
users in this study does not indicate that safety can be easily reduced down into the six 
domains.  
 
The findings can also be placed within the context of other studies exploring service user 
reporting of safety. As has already been identified, service users have been reported to 
identify more safety incidents than healthcare professionals (Weissman, et al., 2008). 
Burroughs et al. (2007) also found similar, where 39% of all respondents to telephone 
interview questions stated that they had experienced at least one concern around their 
safety, although 94% of respondents reported their safety as good, very good or excellent.  
 
This resonates closely with how service users reported their overall safety within this study. 
Despite service users often reporting that they felt unsafe in one or more domains of safety, 
they still reported feeling safe overall for that stage of their organisational care transfer. 
However generally where people have reported feeling unsafe in one or more domains, 
there was a tendency to report that their overall safety was either neutral or unsafe. The lack 
of overall reports of feeling unsafe could be partially attributed to respondents that had felt 
unsafe not completing the overall question.  
 
However where they have stated feeling safe despite reporting feeling unsafe in one or more 
domains, this could be representative of different levels of safety. For example the ‘overall’ 
feeling of safety, by only having three categories of ‘safe’, ‘neutral’ and ‘unsafe’ may be 
overly reductionist and therefore unable to capture the exact degrees to which people feel 
either safe or unsafe. Taking these implications further, it may be that each of the individual 
domains of safety contributes to varying degrees to a service user’s overall feeling of safety. 
This would explain how service users who had felt unsafe in one or more domains of safety 
still felt safe overall.  
 
This is potentially a limitation of the reporting mechanism in that it breaks overall safety down 
into ordinal data with too few categories to represent true feelings of safety. This can also be 
extended to each of the individual domains of safety, but was only evident in the 
discrepancies that arose in the reporting of overall safety. This potential limitation is 
discussed in greater depth in the limitations of the reporting mechanism section.  
 
Based on the findings and that service users were able to identify when they had felt unsafe, 
it is possible that the reporting mechanism could be used to fill gaps in the reporting of safety 
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incidents. For example the North East Ambulance Service over a period of six months only 
reported five safety incidents (NPSA, 2011c). However it should be remembered that service 
users should not be relied upon to report on safety and overall responsibility should lie with 
the healthcare professional (Davis, et al., 2007).  
 
These findings also have important theoretical implications, in particular when they are 
applied to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety (Reason, 2000). The theoretical implications of 
these findings are presented on pages 213-217. 
 
8.2.3.3 Limitations of and Recommendations for the Reporting Mechanism 
There are a number of limitations of both the reporting mechanism and the study as a whole. 
This section highlights the limitations of the reporting mechanism that were uncovered as a 
result of the piloting and also in reflection of the use of a survey to collect service user 
reports of their safety. The limitations focus specifically on the design of the reporting 
mechanism, the distribution and responses, the reports that were received and the ability of 
the reports to improve services and make them safer in the future.  
 
The first of the limitations relates to the use of a survey to capture service user experiences 
of their safety. Although surveys as a whole have been the most popular option for capturing 
these experiences (King, et al., 2010), they may not be the most appropriate method for 
doing so. Within this study, one participant raised the concern that service users may 
become over encumbered with questionnaires and surveys about their experiences, which 
could potentially impact upon both the quality of responses if service users spent less time 
completing them, or even the total number of responses.  
 
Another limitation of the reporting mechanism came about as a result of the processes of 
development, both during the workshops and modifications that were made following each 
cycle of piloting. These modifications, and to an extent the development of the reporting 
mechanism, were all based on service user requirements for the reporting mechanism. 
However this overlooked the requirements of each of the organisations that the reports were 
relating to. Consequently the reporting mechanism, although tailored to the needs of the 
service user, did not provide detailed enough information from which to improve services. 
For example it was not evident what lessons could be learned from the service user reports 
unless they had specifically expanded upon any point.  
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Despite this being a limitation of the reporting mechanism, it is not a limitation of the study 
itself as it was not within the study’s original scope. Therefore any future development or 
implementation of the reporting mechanism should take into account the needs of the 
organisation in which they are being piloted and the systems that are available to them. One 
recommendation in order to capture more useful information from patients would be to 
include a section on the reporting mechanism requesting service users to expand upon their 
answers that are of most importance to them.  
 
An alternative manner in which the reporting mechanism could be utilised would be to move 
away from the focus on individual reports, similar to experience surveys, as a means to 
improve services and instead focus on the collection of a larger sample of service users to 
highlight underlying safety trends via root cause analysis and address them in a systematic 
manner; much the same approach used by the NPSA in the analysis of healthcare 
professional reports of safety. However this would introduce and increase further limitations 
of the reporting mechanism. One such limitation would be that it is not able to measure the 
severity of an incident, as defined by the NPSA (2011a). According to the NPSA, patient 
safety incidents can result in ‘no harm: impact prevented’, ‘no harm: impact not prevented’, 
‘low harm’, ‘moderate harm’, ‘severe harm’ and ‘death’.  
 
Any future development of the reporting mechanism needs to focus more specifically on 
what organisations require in order to improve their services, and one such way of doing this 
would be to categorise the service user reports of safety by severity. This should be coupled 
with capturing never events (detailed in Department of Health, 2011; National Patient Safety 
Agency, 2010a). Given that it has been identified that service users are unable to identify 
and report on technical errors (Solberg, et al., 2008), this could potentially provide service 
users with guidance in doing so. This is further supported by service users in Phase 1 
identifying both technical and interpersonal aspects of care during the interviews which are 
two central components of quality healthcare (Donabedian, 1988). However care should be 
taken to avoid moving away from the patient-centeredness of the reporting mechanism by 
incorporating service user perceptions into this future development.  
 
Also in relation to technical errors, a lack of communication, in particular documentation can 
result in a technical error, such as a misadministration of medication. This communication 
between healthcare professionals was not captured in the reporting mechanism, such as the 
accuracy and completeness of service user documentation on discharge and arrival. The 
same principle also applies to service users who are dependent upon their healthcare 
professional upon arrival into a care setting, such as when a service user is discharged from 
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hospital to a nursing home. If that service user requires the healthcare professional at the 
nursing home to provide them with medication, they may not become aware of any issues 
regarding their safety. In particular the private nursing home manager participating in this 
study indicated that the reports of safety were not as valuable as they could have been as 
the reporting mechanism was lacking in the ability to identify these technical errors.  
 
Cwinn et al. (2009) have reported that information gaps occur in 85.5% of organisational 
care transfers that occur between nursing homes and the emergency department, which 
explains why the priorities of the nursing home were leaning heavily towards this aspect of 
the organisational care transfer. This highlights how healthcare professionals and service 
users interpret and perceive reality differently, even though both are of importance. The 
private nursing home manager stated that the piloting of the reporting mechanism was useful 
in terms of highlighting that patients cannot always report all incidents and so greater work 
needs to be done interprofessionally and interorganisationally to improve safety. Again this 
emphasises the need for the safety of service users to be the ultimate responsibility of their 
healthcare professional, and it does not indicate that service user reporting of safety is not 
worthwhile.  
 
Furthermore based upon the feedback provided by service users during the evaluation of the 
reporting mechanism, few found it difficult to understand what was meant by the term ‘your 
transfer’. This was a key discussion point during the development of the reporting 
mechanism and received much attention in the workshops, however based upon this 
feedback it may need to be rephrased in a manner which is more understandable to service 
users. It is possible that this was a larger problem than was reported during the evaluation 
as many service users did not complete the evaluation form or the reporting mechanism, 
with this lack of understanding possibly being a contributing factor.  
 
8.3 Theoretical Discussion 
Prior to discussing the theoretical implications of this research and its findings, it is important 
to reflect again upon the philosophical assumptions of the study and the author, so that the 
theory can be positioned within these. The relationship between ontology and epistemology 
is often confused within traditional realist or interpretive research, where ontological 
questions are often reduced to epistemological ones; a mistake referred to as the epistemic 
fallacy (Nairn, 2012). The critical realist approach within this study avoids this mistake by 
creating a clear distinction between epistemology and ontology. According to Bhaskar, 
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epistemology is the way in which access to knowledge of the world is gained, whilst ontology 
is what constitutes the world. 
 
How safety is perceived by service users was addressed within Phase 1 of the study, 
exploring their perceptions and the terms that they used when discussing what had made 
them feel safe and unsafe when going through an organisational care transfer. This 
represented the transitive nature of reality, where these perceptions or interpretations differ 
between individuals or groups of people. The difference amongst individuals was reflected in 
this study in the different stories that service users told about their safety, which showed a 
degree of variance, which is expected amongst a small number of people who all experience 
difference situations. Likewise, asking 14 healthcare professionals from three different 
organisations with a relatively limited amount of experience of organisational care transfers 
would potentially result in a similar degree of variance.  
 
However the difference between groups was more apparent when these perceptions were 
aggregated, which resulted in a different definition of safety between service users in this 
study and healthcare professionals in the wider literature. These differences relate to the 
epistemological processes that occur when describing and making sense of the world, and 
so as not to fall into the epistemic fallacy, are distinct from the world itself. To further clarify, 
these differences are differences in how the world is perceived, not that different worlds are 
being perceived. These different interpretations are not classed as individual or multiple 
‘truths’, but are instead equally valid perceptions of a single reality. 
 
To reflect on where these findings fit within the philosophical framework, Phase 1 utilised 
qualitative methods to uncover the underlying truth behind safety, whilst Phase 2 through the 
utilisation of quantitative methods identified the patterns of practice, or frequency of this 
underlying truth (McEvoy & Richards, 2006). One particular facet of critical realism is that 
these can then be used to explore causal mechanisms; in this study the processes that 
impact upon a service users’ safety.   
 
To understand the importance  of these findings in relation to the causal mechanisms (as 
defined by Bhaskar, 1978) of safety, it is necessary to explore ways in which they can be 
applied to current structures and processes within healthcare and how they impact upon 
patient outcomes (Donabedian, 1966). In particular there has been a recent call to apply 
theories more widely to patient safety practices (Foy, et al., 2011). One such model that the 
findings can be applied to is the Swiss-Cheese model of safety developed by Reason 
(2000). According to this model, patient safety incidents occur when holes in the barriers, 
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defences and safeguards (hereby referred to as safety buffers) line up and allow a hazard to 
pass through. It is for this reason that a number of different safety buffers are implemented 
into healthcare, so that when one fails, it does not necessarily directly impact upon the 
patients’ safety as other safety buffers can stop the hazard.  
 
Through the application of communication and responsiveness to the Swiss-Cheese model 
of safety (Figure 8.1), additional defences, barriers or safeguards can be constructed so as 
to reduce the chances of a hazard resulting in an adverse event. This can be achieved by 
healthcare professionals adhering to the individual elements of the communication and 
responsiveness themes, enabling them to provide safer care by involving the patient as an 
extra safety buffer (Davis, et al., 2007). When clinicians do not adhere to these safety acts, 
holes in the Swiss-Cheese may open up, allowing for a hazard to become an adverse event. 
It is therefore reasonable to support the call by Burroughs et al. (2007) to include 




Figure 8.1: The role of communication and responsiveness in the Swiss-Cheese model of 
safety. 
 
Within this modified Swiss-Cheese model of safety (Figure 8.1), communication with the 
patient and being responsive to patient needs have purposively been placed as the last two 
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safety buffers, although their order is not of importance. This represents the conclusion of 
Davis et al. (2007) who stated that patients should only be involved in their own safety when 
they are willing and able. As these safety buffers are not present in every situation and 
patient safety should ultimately be the responsibility of healthcare professionals, it is 
reasonable that they operate as a final safety buffer, rather than as a first. The pre-existing 
defences, barriers and safeguards constitute many other aspects of care that make up the 
organisational care transfer which aim to reduce the number of traditional safety issues that 
are already known about. For example there are many procedures in place to reduce the 
number of falls and medication safety issues that exist within organisational care transfers.  
 
A key component of the Swiss-Cheese model of safety is that the reporting of safety is 
necessary in order to identify where holes in layers of the Swiss-Cheese open up, along with 
identifying resident pathogens already in existence within the system (Reason, 2000). The 
reporting mechanism developed in this study fulfils this role, allowing service users to report 
on their safety when going through an organisational care transfer and therefore identifying 
where these holes and resident pathogens exist. Through the use of critical realism within 
this study and the notion that different groups hold different interpretations of reality, there is 
consequently a need for service users to be able to report on these safety issues as 
healthcare professionals, due to their roles within healthcare services, are unable to identify 
and report.  
 
The findings also have theoretical implications for the recent International Classification of 
Patient Safety (ICPS) conceptual framework (Sherman, et al., 2009), which uses the Swiss-
Cheese model of safety (Reason, 2000) and Donabedian’s (1966, 1988, 2003) model of 
quality as foundations. Therefore any additions to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety also 
impacts upon the ICPS. As they share many of the same characteristics, the modification is 
only minor through expanding the detection of incidents to include service user reports in 
addition to healthcare professional reports.  
 
Caution should be taken when considering a modification to the Swiss-Cheese model of 
safety. Perneger (2005) identified that interpretations of the model differ amongst healthcare 
professionals, although the author correctly recognises that there are limitations in the 
methodology; namely that the sample was self-selecting and unrepresentative of healthcare 
professionals working in the field of quality and safety. A more likely rationale for the findings 
is that interpretations differ due to different levels of knowledge amongst healthcare 
professionals, of which improved awareness of the model and the expansion of the model 
proposed from the findings of this study would alleviate. 
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Of course by utilising a critical realist philosophical approach, the transitive dimension of 
reality is often likely to fluctuate and differ depending upon contextual and time factors. 
Therefore any such conclusions in relation to theory drawn in this section need to be 
explored within other healthcare settings and across time. This is particularly evident within 
the field of patient safety which is forever changing as healthcare modernises and the 
structures of healthcare, such as the manner in which the NHS is constructed, are forever 
changing. Similar conclusions have also been reached when developing the International 
Classification for Patient Safety (Sherman, et al., 2009) 
 
The involvement of service users in reporting their safety also has implications for patient 
and public involvement. According to Arnstein’s ladder of involvement (Arnstein, 1969) there 
are eight different levels of patient and public involvement with three overarching categories; 
nonparticipation, tokenism and citizen power. Within this study, service users fell within the 
citizen power category, mostly under the term of partnership where they had an equal voice 
to healthcare professionals when developing the reporting mechanism. This is a key 
component of AR which is said to be emancipatory in the processes it utilises by giving 
power to participants, or co-researchers to influence their own course of actions (Stringer, 
2007). This was further strengthened through utilising service user perceptions of safety to 
underpin the reporting mechanism.  
 
The reporting of safety sits on a lower rung of the ladder than the methods used to develop it 
within this study. It can be positioned within the tokenism category, or more specifically 
consultation. The negative connotations that can be associated with tokenism do not 
necessarily apply here. Any greater levels of participation may not be possible within the 
reporting of safety, especially when not all service users are willing or able to be involved in 
their safety. As Davis et al. (2007) identified there are five factors that may influence 
involvement in safety; patient-related, illness-related, healthcare professional-related, 
healthcare setting-related and task-related. The reporting mechanism developed in this 
study reduces the chances of healthcare professional-related factors, such as blame 
cultures, negatively impacting upon the service user involvement in their safety. It does this 
by bypassing individual knowledge and beliefs of healthcare professionals that may 
otherwise be a barrier to involving the service user.  
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8.4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
There are a number of implications for both practice and policy. As both practice and policy 
are interlinked, it is not always possible to split the implications, and as such they are 
reported together in this section. 
 
8.4.1  Broader Definition of Safety 
The first of the implications of the findings relate to Phase 1; the service user definitions of 
safety within organisational care transfers. The finding that service users perceive safety 
differently suggests that current working definitions of safety need to incorporate the service 
user perspective. This implication is supportive of the current focus on patient-reported 
outcomes, where an emphasis is placed upon what service users feel is important; in this 
study this included communication and responsiveness as being important to them feeling 
safe alongside traditional safety issues.  
 
8.4.2  Requirement for Service User Reports of Safety 
The findings that some service users were both willing and able to report on their safety has 
many implications for practice and policy, both locally and nationally. Given the emphasis 
placed upon patient-reported outcomes in current healthcare policy, the collection of service 
user reports on their safety is a viable method of organisational learning and capturing the 
patient experience of safety. These reports are able to be used in conjunction with 
healthcare professional reports in order to highlight any safety trends across both the service 
user- and healthcare professional-perceived domains of safety. The need for this is further 
supported when it is considered that patients are aware of changing trends in healthcare, 
such as the move away from hospital-based care to community care (Kielmann, et al., 
2011). According to Keilmann et al. safety is one of the most important factors in supporting 
this move, suggesting that service users are becoming more aware that safety is of 
importance, even in relation to organisational care transfers.  
 
By classifying these service user reports of safety as experience reports, the boundary 
between reporting safety and reporting satisfaction is further blurred. Rathert, May and 
Williams (2011) reported that safety perceptions may influence satisfaction, therefore any 
measures and subsequent improvements made to reduce negative reports of safety 
perceptions may have a positive impact upon an organisation’s overall satisfaction scores. 
This has particular implications for policy and practice when considered in relation to the 
objectives of the current government; “the service must be focused on outcomes and the 
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quality standards that deliver them. The Government’s objectives are to reduce mortality and 
morbidity, increase safety, and improve patient experience and outcomes for all.” 
(Department of Health, 2010a, p. 4).  
 
Given the link between patient perceptions of safety and satisfaction (Burroughs, et al., 
2005; Kuzel, et al., 2004; Rathert, May, & Williams, 2011), there is a strong argument that it 
would be beneficial for organisations to measure patient perceptions of safety, resulting in 
both improved safety and satisfaction by acting as an incentive for change (Longo, et al., 
1997; Riiskjær, et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is believed that the active measurement of 
service user experiences is a key facilitator for improving how patient-centred care is 
(Luxford, Safran, & Delbanco, 2011). 
 
Furthermore there have already been a number of pieces of research that have identified 
that where service users are to be involved in their safety there should not be a reliance 
placed upon them. Instead final responsibility should lie with their healthcare professional 
(Davis, et al., 2007). It is therefore important to highlight that the patient reporting of safety 
should not replace any other form of incident detection, and the service user should be used 
as a last line of defence. This is particularly relevant as some service users are unwilling or 
unable to report on their safety (Davis, et al., 2007).  
 
Despite some service users being unwilling or unable to report on their safety, it is still 
beneficial to capture reports from those that are. Naessens et al. (2009) identified that 
multiple methods of detection elicited different adverse events. In addition to this, the finding 
from this study that service user definitions of safety differ to healthcare professional 
definitions, suggests that they are the only ones able to identify and report on those aspects 
of their safety.  
 
8.4.3  Implementing Service User Reports of Safety 
Looking towards the future and how the reporting mechanism could be introduced into 
organisations, there are two different approaches that could be taken. The first relies upon 
individual healthcare professionals to identify the need for the patient reporting, and to 
implement the reporting mechanism based upon a self-desire for improving service quality. 
This method has a number of limitations in that healthcare professionals often have very 
limited time and resources available to them, and so by concentrating on the reporting 
mechanism would have implications for practice elsewhere. Furthermore, the resources 
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required to collate and react to safety reports by service users are not available to individual 
healthcare professionals or even teams.  
 
The second approach resolves these issues by taking a top-down, policy driven approach to 
the implementation of the reporting mechanism. High Quality Care for All (Department of 
Health, 2008a) introduced the need for an incentive for increased innovation that would 
improve healthcare quality. The Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment 
framework (Department of Health, 2008b) [also include 09/10 operating framework 
reference] provided this incentive for Acute Trusts, where contracts link payment to quality 
improvement. This was later revised to include community, mental health and ambulance 
services (Department of Health, 2010f). Although changes are currently underway with 
regards to how services are commissioned and by whom, the CQUIN payment framework 
will remain for the foreseeable future, and has actually been increased from 0.5% of provider 
contract value to 1.5% (Department of Health, 2010f), representing the emphasis that is 
placed upon improving quality via innovation.  
 
It is possible that the use of a CQUIN scheme, which “should address the three domains of 
quality: safety, effectiveness and patient experience; and reflect innovation” (Department of 
Health, 2010f), would provide the ideal opportunity for a policy-driven implementation of the 
reporting mechanism, where the relevant organisations (acute trusts and community 
services) are incentivised to collect patient reports of safety.  
 
8.4.4  Private and Social Care Homes 
Although the CQUIN provides an opportunity for NHS Trusts to receive funding for 
innovative services, there are no such incentives available in private and social care homes 
of which I am aware. If there are any such opportunities, both commissioners of these 
services and providers should implement the reporting mechanism to capture service user 
experiences of their safety, taking into consideration the particular population groups within 
these settings, which would produce the same learning outcomes as within NHS settings.  
 
Where incentives are not available, then the Care Quality Commission would be in a position 
to implement punitive measures for organisations not capturing the service user experience. 
However this is not recommended as it does not foster a safety culture as some features of 
punitive processes are synonymous with the blame culture of safety. An alternative would 
instead be to consider that the majority of organisational care transfers within private care 
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homes are to and from hospitals, where the transfer would be captured by the CQUIN 
funded organisations. This would also serve to avoid repetition for service users.  
 
8.4.5  The Need for Collaborative Working 
Organisational care transfers have already been identified to be particularly high in risk when 
service users cross organisational and professional boundaries (Cook, Render, & Woods, 
2000). There has been a large amount of research highlighting the need for better 
communication between healthcare professionals to increase safety (Arora, et al., 2008; 
Helleso, Lorensen, & Sorensen, 2004; Kripalani, et al., 2007; Vieira & Kumar, 2009). 
 
This is of even greater importance in the context of service user reporting of safety during 
organisational care transfers as the process of learning from the reports differs greatly. 
Healthcare professional reports are returned to the NPSA to be analysed for trends, from 
which root cause analysis is used to determine the origins of the incident. With reports 
collected from the service user reporting mechanism, they are returned to the organisation 
from which they were distributed. As they capture the departure, journey and arrival, this 
potentially represents three different organisations that are being reported about. There is 
therefore a larger requirement for collaborative working across the different organisations 
than with healthcare professional reports in order to share the information and subsequently 
the lessons learned to improve safety.  
 
8.5 Recommendations 
8.5.1 Implementing the Reporting Mechanism 
Based on the findings from the two rounds of piloting it is possible to establish 
recommendations for the future development of the reporting mechanism, whether that be 
piloting or the eventual implementation into organisations. These recommendations are 
based solely on the findings from the two rounds of piloting. The current processes and 
frameworks already in existence for how the reporting mechanism could be implemented 
into organisations have been discussed in the previous section (8.5).  
 
Based upon the two rounds of piloting, response rates were higher when the reporting 
mechanism was distributed to service users entering, rather than departing the service. 
Although both yielded satisfactory levels of responses, any future implementation or piloting 
should distribute the reporting mechanism to service users when departing from the service 
so that greater responses are achieved and there is more data with which to analyse, thus 
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being in a stronger position to identify any safety trends. Where this is not possible, for 
example when a service user is discharged home from hospital, the reporting mechanism 
should be distributed on departure. Another method of improving response rates would be to 
directly solicit responses from service users (King, et al., 2010), with a coherent strategy of 
distributing and inviting service users to complete the reporting mechanism in the same 
manner as other service user questionnaires (e.g. McColl, et al., 2001). 
 
A further finding from piloting the reporting mechanism was that the majority of service users 
that responded were supportive of the reporting mechanism. However it is unknown if this 
was a result of bias where only those happy with the reporting mechanism responded. 
Future piloting and implementation should include a more in-depth evaluation of the 
reporting mechanism where service users that do not want to complete the reporting 
mechanism are purposively sampled to explore the reasons why. Given a larger sample size 
it will also be possible to statistically determine service user characteristics that impact upon 
both responding to the reporting mechanism and the reports that they provide.  
 
The reporting mechanism was developed and piloted with elderly people going through an 
organisational care transfer into and out of NHS community care teams, social care homes 
and private nursing homes within the North East of England. Feasibility studies will be 
required to determine if it is transferable to other settings with different population groups, 
such as young people. Similarly as healthcare is constantly changing (Sherman, et al., 
2009), there should also be an ongoing evaluation of service user perceptions of safety to 
determine if they change, particularly as healthcare moves towards a more community-
based model.  
 
Consideration for people with sight difficulties should be made, such as colour blindness or 
the size of the text, especially when being given to elderly people who may have sight 
difficulties. A similar recommendation is that other languages should be available as all 
respondents within this study were White British, with the exception of one Irish person. It is 
presumed that their first language was English.  
 
A stronger process of learning from the service user reports should also be implemented into 
the organisations. For safe care, this should be a positive feedback loop for healthcare 
professionals. For unsafe care, this can be used to learn from the incidents, identifying any 
potential hazards that could lead to a patient safety incident.  
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The mechanism should also be tailored to the individual care settings in which it is being 
piloted or implemented in. One finding was that some service users, when being discharged 
home from hospital did not have adequate community support in place. The reporting 
mechanism should try to capture this in community care teams. 
 
8.5.2 Future Research 
In addition to further development of the reporting mechanism, there are also a number of 
other areas in which the research could be further developed in the future. The first of these 
is to explore perspectives of safe care from a range of other service users either in similar or 
different healthcare settings. The reason for this is that it may be possible that perceptions of 
safety differ across population groups, for example children may discuss other components 
of their care as being important to making them feel safe. Future research should also 
explore other service user demographics, such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity 
and geographic location.  
 
A more in-depth exploration of patient perceptions of safety is needed. Although those 
presented within this study represented how these participants perceived safety, it is 
currently unknown if definitions of safety differ by different populations, although the limited 
amount of research suggests that it is. For example Burroughs et al. (2007), when exploring 
perceptions of safety within an emergency department found distinctly different perceptions 
in comparison to this study. This reflects the differences in safety concerns from different 
healthcare settings. It would therefore be viable for an exploration of how patient perceptions 
of safety differ across healthcare settings, along with other variables such as gender, age 
and ethnicity of service users. Given that healthcare professionals, and consequently patient 
satisfaction, have been reported to impact upon perceptions of safety (Rathert, May, & 
Williams, 2011), it would also be viable to explore how other variables such as healthcare 
experience impact upon these. 
 
Finally, it is viable to explore both service user perceptions and reports of safety of service 
users who are independent in comparison to those who are dependent on the care that they 
receive. There may be differences between these two groups depending upon the reliance 
they place upon healthcare professionals, thus potentially perceiving the care and 
subsequently their safety differently to those with less reliance on their healthcare. It would 
be possible to build on the findings of this study that trust had a relationship with perceptions 
of and potentially the reporting of safety. This would be able to explore the combined 
relationship between dependence on healthcare services and trust.  
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8.6 Limitations of the Study 
8.6.1 Limitations of the Methodology 
By using AI, a form of AR itself, within a wider Participatory AR study introduced some 
methodological conflicts. The first of these is that AI predominantly explores what works well 
within an organisation, with the intention of building upon these factors. Although this has 
been shown to work within some settings, it has its limitations within a patient safety setting 
that traditionally focuses on what has gone wrong, although paradoxically this is also a major 
strength of the study. The major limitation is that it does not currently fit with theories of 
safety. For example the Swiss-Cheese model of safety (Reason, 2000) focuses specifically 
on hazards and ways in which hazards can be stopped before they become a patient safety 
incident. This therefore required a slight modification to the model, where safe care 
constitutes the barriers, safeguards and defences (safety buffers) to stop these hazards. The 
methodological limitation of this is that there is an assumption that what constitutes safe 
care, the opposite constitutes unsafe care.  
 
Although this appears to be an acceptable explanation, further work is required to determine 
if they sit as polar opposites on a continuum where equal weighting is placed upon each of 
the components of the modified Swiss-Cheese model of safety proposed in this study where 
the service user can act as an additional safety buffer. Similarly on a more fundamental 
level, the use of AI during interviews with service users to explore their experiences of safe 
care during organisational care transfers may have concealed other issues they may have 
considered pertinent to their safety. Although some service users broke away from the focus 
on safe care to speak of negative experiences, others may not have done so.  
 
An additional methodological limitation relates to the collaborative nature of AR, where 
healthcare professionals from various settings were working together with service users in 
the development of the reporting mechanism. Although collaborative working can be a 
process of active construction by the researcher in developing interorganisational learning 
(Huzzard, Ahlberg, & Ekman, 2010), this may not have happened as efficiently as it could 
have within this study. Firstly, the number of organisations involved in this study was 
considerably smaller than Huzzard et al. (2010), and secondly, those organisations that were 
involved in the study do not usually work together; i.e. patient transfers do not usually occur 
between those involved, and so there was no opportunity for them to collaborate to improve 
practice or to reflect upon the transfer processes. Involvement of teams that actively 
discharge and admit patients to the social care homes, community care teams and private 
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nursing homes that were involved in this study would have increased the interorganisational 
learning, so that they could each understand the processes of the other.  
 
8.6.2 Limitations of the Sample 
There were a number of limitations of the study relating to the sample selected in each 
phase of the study. During Phase 1, service users were all elderly from a small number of 
organisations within one region of the country. It may be possible that other service user 
characteristics may impact upon perceptions of safety in a similar manner that they impact 
upon involvement in safety (Davis, et al., 2007). Other characteristics may have included 
different age groups, care settings, medical conditions, ethnicities or socio-economic 
statuses.  
 
Furthermore there are a number of limitations in relation to the sampling methods used. Due 
to the researcher being unable to access service user details, healthcare professionals were 
asked to identify and approach service users on the researcher’s behalf. In most cases, this 
has the potential to introduce considerable bias into the study where healthcare 
professionals may only approach those service users that had positive experiences to tell. 
However the use of AI within this study, focusing on what had made service users feel safe, 
helped to lessen the impact of any such bias. Despite this, it is still possible that 
unintentional bias was introduced in other ways, such as only choosing service users who 
liked to talk the most, thus excluding more quiet service users.  
 
There were also a number of limitations in relation to the development of the reporting 
mechanism. The most apparent of these was that no service users from Phase 1 contributed 
to the development of the reporting mechanism, with the exception of providing their 
experiences of safety in Phase 1 which informed the domains of safety within it. It would 
have been beneficial to have their input into the development of the reporting mechanism 
along with the expert patients so that the links between the two phases were not solely 
artificially created by the researcher via a presentation at the start of each workshop.  
 
Finally there were also limitations to the sample when piloting the reporting mechanism, 
although these mirror many of the same limitations as identified in Phase 1. Again 
respondents were elderly service users who were predominantly White British, with one 
person who was Irish. Full details on medical conditions were not available, likewise there 
was also data missing for where they had transferred to and from. The reporting mechanism 
was also only piloted within a small number of organisations. It is likely that the processes 
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involved in transferring service users change between individual organisations, in particular 
private nursing and social care homes where there are less likely to be standardised 
procedures than in the NHS due to different prioritisations.  
 
Healthcare professionals were also responsible for identifying and distributing the reporting 
mechanism to service users, which had the potential to introduce bias. Unlike Phase 1 
where the AI methodology was used to limit the impact of any such bias, this would not have 
been as apparent within the piloting of the reporting mechanism. Despite this potential bias, 
there were still a large number of reports of feeling unsafe. Bias may have also been 
introduced in the evaluation of the reporting mechanism by the use of a self-selecting 
sample of respondents to evaluate the reporting mechanism. It is possible that only those 
who liked and understood the purpose of it proceeded to respond to it, thus providing a type 
I error, or a false positive. It was originally hoped that participants who did not want to 
complete the mechanism would have sent back an evaluation form saying why, but nobody 
did this. 
 
Furthermore in relation to the evaluation, a very limited number of service users (two in 
Cycle 1, none in Cycle 2) volunteered to participate in an interview. Those that did provided 
very useful feedback that would otherwise have been unavailable using the evaluation form 
provided with each reporting mechanism. More service user interviews would have 
strengthened the evaluation of the reporting mechanism and potentially highlighted issues 
that would limit response rates. 
 
8.6.3 Limitations of the Methods 
The limitations of the methods used in this study particularly relate to the development and 
piloting of the reporting mechanism. During the development of the reporting mechanism 
through the two workshops, there was an apparent lack of direction given to participants as 
to what the expected outcomes were and that the reporting mechanism needed to focus on 
safety and not satisfaction. Also by placing expert patients alongside healthcare 
professionals, individual agendas may have impacted upon both groups of people and their 
willingness and focus on the tasks in the workshops. For example one expert patient in 
workshop 1 often attempted to tell their story of a poor experience apparently in an attempt 
to receive an answer as to why it may have happened.  
 
Alternatively, healthcare professionals may have been overly defensive about their practices 
in an attempt to appear competent (not that being open would make them appear any other 
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way). Although it may have been more beneficial to split healthcare professionals and 
service users, this would actually have been a weakness of the study as there would not 
have been opportunity for collaboration and co-construction of the reporting mechanism 
taking into account both groups’ perspectives and experiences.  
 
With regards to both service user perceptions of safety in Phase 1 and also service user 
reports of safety in Phase 2, it would have been beneficial to compare these findings with 
other methods of incident identification, such as healthcare professional reports or a case 
note review. By doing this, a more detailed analysis of the meaning of the findings could 
have been given whilst not detracting from the importance of individual interpretations of 
reality identified as being necessary in the underlying philosophy of the study. Instead they 
could have provided a comparison to determine the extent to which perceptions and 
interpretations differ, rather than seeking to determine if the differences were due to different 
‘truths’. However due to both time and resource constraints it was not possible to do this; in 
particular as the researcher was not qualified to conduct case note reviews and healthcare 
professional reporting during organisational care transfers has been identified to be very 
limited.  
 
Furthermore as has already been highlighted, it was not possible to explore the direct impact 
that the reporting mechanism had upon practice. As a feasibility, or piloting study this has 
suggested that service users can be and are willing to report on their safety, but further work 
is required on how these patient reports can be built into systems in order to improve 
practice. A discussion on the use of the CQUIN framework (Department of Health, 2008b, 
2010f) is provided in section 8.5. 
 
8.7 Contributions to Knowledge 
This study provides original contributions to knowledge on three levels: conceptual, practical 
and methodological. At the conceptual level, patient perceptions of safety when going 
through an organisational care transfer are presented and applied to the Swiss-Cheese 
model of safety. Patient perceptions of safety, in particular communication and 
responsiveness, formed additional barriers, defences and safeguards. The reporting 
mechanism developed thus allowed patients to report on any holes in these safety barriers 
that may have impacted upon their safety, which offers a new practical solution to patient 
reporting of safety during organisational care transfers. The applicability of the patient 
perceptions of safety to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety have since been published (Scott, 
Dawson, & Jones, 2011, Appendix 15).  
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The use of Appreciative Inquiry offers a unique methodological contribution to knowledge by 
approaching patient safety research from a positive stance, which helps to reduce cultural 
and personal barriers often associated with researchingsafety, where patients may be 
unwilling to be critical of their healthcare. The novel combination of Appreciative Inquiry and 
Action Research adds to the methodological contribution through the process of 
development and piloting of the reporting mechanism, which provided an opportunity for 
healthcare professionals and service users to contribute equally, whilst ensuring it was still 
based upon service user perceptions of safety.  
8.8 Conclusion 
Service users perceived safety differently to healthcare professionals within organisational 
care transfers, including communication and responsiveness alongside other traditional 
safety issues in the definition of safety. These proposed domains of safety formed additional 
safety buffers within the Swiss-Cheese model of safety (Scott, Dawson, & Jones, 2011), 
which in turn would require service users to report on their own safety to identify where any 
active or latent failures may arise within the system.  
 
The reporting mechanism developed in this study performed this function, with service users 
reporting on their own safety during their organisational care transfer, and with incident rates 
similar, or in some cases higher to those that would be expected using other means of 
incident identification. However the political landscape of these findings needs to be taken 
into consideration, in particular how policy changes may affect any future work that builds 
upon these findings.  
 
At the time of conducting and writing this thesis, large political changes are occurring. The 
first coalition government since 1940 is in power, with a Conservative majority and Liberal 
minority. This is unique in itself, as two opposing political parties, with contrasting policies 
and political ideologies are trying to work together. Although the election occurred prior to 
data collection, the resultant impacts of a Conservative-led coalition on health and social 
care were evident in both policy and the resulting impact upon this study. At the point of 
writing, the full impact of the new policies is not fully clear, for example a final version of the 
Health and Social Care Bill is yet to be fully passed through the House of Lords. From this 
point forward, the coalition government shall be referred to solely as the Coalition.  
 
Undoubtedly the largest change to health and social care is the restructuring of the NHS, 
where PCTs are to be abolished in favour of CCGs. An overview of the proposed changes to 
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health and social care is provided on page 26, though the most important point to reflect 
upon is that the White Paper, Liberating the NHS (Department of Health, 2010a), proposed 
large reforms to the structure of the NHS. This section of the thesis aims to discuss the wider 
implications of any such changes to the structure of the NHS on future studies, and in 
particular the future development of the reporting mechanism within a similar political and 
developmental climate.  
 
It was coincidental that the two rounds of piloting the reporting mechanism fell on either side 
of the reforms. Round 1 was conducted prior to the release of the White Paper ‘Liberating 
the NHS’ (Department of Health, 2010a), whilst Round 2 was conducted after the publication 
of the White Paper. One of the outcomes from piloting the reporting mechanism was the 
disparity between the two rounds of piloting. There are a number of potential explanations 
for this outcome, however the two most apparent relate to theories and concepts of 
organisational development, which are also intertwined with policy development and by 
virtue of association, politics. These are Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and Path 
Dependency (PD), which have been described in the discussion.  
 
PET focuses on the actual changes that occur to systems and organisations when policy is 
posited upon them, reflecting upon the impact of such changes. In particular it stipulates that 
organisations develop through small changes that happen during periods of stability which 
are then punctuated by larger, revolutionary periods of change. PD positions itself in a 
similar manner, although instead of focusing on how organisations develop as a means of 
agents’ actions within the system, it focuses on the historical pathways and impacts of policy 
in a deterministic manner, which is neither dependent nor independent of PET, but instead 
occurs alongside of it. According to PD, once an organisation (or institution) begins to travel 
down one path, it becomes more difficult to move away from that path despite diminishing 
returns. I propose that these two different factors impact this study in relation to the research 
outcomes, and also the political context in which any future research based upon these 
findings will operate.  
 
Over the coming months and years the structure of the NHS will change drastically, placing 
a large emphasis of commissioning onto GPs within the CCGs, where they are able to 
outsource the commissioning of healthcare services to private companies. This move is 
coupled with the proposed change in law that no longer requires the Secretary of State to 
provide a healthcare service, but rather to secure its provision. These jointly move the NHS 
further down the path of privatisation, and with the removal of senior NHS managers, the 
‘NHS brand’ may be an unanticipated casualty of the reforms (Macfarlane, et al., 2011). 
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Tracing the steps of this path, it is arguable that the NHS was placed on this path a long time 
ago, with Margaret Thatcher implementing the internal market reforms which have been 
acknowledged to make privatisation simpler (Timmins, 1995). Following these reforms, 
successive governments have continued along the same path with an increasing emphasis 
on the marketisation of the NHS. There are arguments as to how such reforms will impact 
upon healthcare, and in particular in relation to this study; patient safety. One argument is 
that increased competition will drive up the quality of services and improve patient’s safety, 
whilst the other argument is that there is limited emphasis placed upon quality and safety 
unless there is a direct and measurable financial return. Both of these result in the same 
outcome; an increased focus on measuring the returns gained by the NHS, of which 
Thatcher has been identified as being the potential instigator (Ross, 2007).  
 
Regardless of whichever these may be true, there is an opportunity for patient involvement 
in patient safety, through patients reporting their experiences of safety, to be pushed to the 
forefront of both commissioners’ and healthcare providers’ agendas, and rather than seeing 
these changes as an obstacle that needs to be hurdled, they can be seen as an opportunity. 
This primarily comes in the form of changes to the deep structures, as theorised within PET. 
As the deep structures of the NHS, in particular the strategy, structure, power distribution 
and control systems change, there is scope to somewhat influence these and position any 
future research within the new systems that emerge. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
reporting mechanism itself both influences these, via existing systems, and modifies them 
through the potential creation of a new system in order to better achieve the transformed 
goals of the NHS.  
 
These opportunities come from a number of policy documents and frameworks, including the 
NHS Outcomes Framework 2011/12 (Department of Health, 2010d), the NHS Operating 
Framework 2011/12 (Department of Health, 2010e), Equity and Excellence: Liberating the 
NHS White Paper (Department of Health, 2010a), the NHS Future Forum recommendations 
to Government (NHS Future Forum, 2011) and the CQUIN frameworks (Department of 
Health, 2008b, 2010f).  
 
More specifically, two domains of the NHS Outcomes Framework 2011/12 (Department of 
Health, 2010d) are entitled ‘Ensuring that people have a positive experience of care’ and 
‘Treating and caring for people in a safe environment’. The NHS Operating Framework 
2011/12 (Department of Health, 2010e, p. 9) highlights service quality, of which ‘ensuring 
that the voice of patients [T] remains heard at all times’ is a key component. Equity and 
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Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Department of Health, 2010a, p. 13) places an emphasis on 
outcomes that are of importance to service users, stating ‘[healthcare systems] have barely 
started to realise the potential of patients as joint providers of their own care’, in particular 
saying that patient-reported outcomes and patient experience data will be central to an 
information revolution, allowing patients to rate services based on the quality of care they 
receive.  
 
In order to achieve these, it should be possible to incorporate the reporting mechanism into 
CQUIN funding schemes, which commissions quality improvement work that must include at 
least one area of improvement in four domains; safety, effectiveness (including patient-
reported outcomes), user experience and innovation (Department of Health, 2008b). The 
reporting mechanism developed in this study allows for each of these to be achieved by 
trying to improve safety through patient-reporting of experience via an innovative method. 
Further to these, the reporting mechanism, through its development within organisational 
care transfers and subsequent interorganisational links, helps to realise the potential for 
‘integrated care for patients and communities designed around their needs’, as identified by 
the NHS Future Forum (2011, p. 26). 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Invitation letter to service users (P1) 
 
Dear Service User, 
You are invited to take part in this research study 
We are doing some research on your safety when going through a transfer in 
your care. It is a major study funded by the NHS North East Strategic Health 
Authority and Northumbria University. 
What will this study do? 
It will look at what makes you feel safe when you are going through a transfer 
in your care. The aim of the study is to inform and improve practice on both a 
local and national level. 
How could you take part? 
If you are interested in taking part we will ask you about times when you have 
felt safe and what makes you feel safe. To take part, you will be invited to have 
an informal interview with a researcher, which can be anywhere that you feel 
comfortable. If you need support to join in, you can choose to bring someone 
with you.  
What to do if you are interested in taking part and want more information?  
If you would like to find out more information about the SURE CARE study, 
please take the time to read the Information Sheet included with this letter. 
This will give you more information about the study. You may also contact the 
researchers directly to find out more information or to ask questions. The 
contact details of Jason Scott are at the end of this letter and in the 
information sheet. 
Please turn over 
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We would also like family members, carers and advocates to be involved in 
this study. The Information Sheet tells you how they can get involved. 
If you have decided you do not want to take part in the study, you do not need 
to do anything. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
 
Contact Details 







  [email address removed] 
℡  [telephone number removed] 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Information Sheet for service users (P1) 
Part 1 
We would like to invite you to join in this research project. Before you decide if 
you want to take part you need to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following 
information carefully and talk to others about the study if you wish.  
If you have any difficulties, or need other help to understand the information 
please contact us. Your participation could make a real difference to the 
quality of care provided, but take time to decide whether or not you would like 
to participate. 
Below is a list of terms used in this document. 
 
Care transfer:  This is when your care is passed from one service to 
another. Examples of this include being discharged 
from hospital or moving from one hospital to 
another. 
Service user: This is any person who comes into contact with the 
National Health Service (NHS). This includes patients, 
carers, family members and advocates. 
Adverse event: This is an incident or circumstance that could have or 
did lead to unintended or unexpected harm, loss or 
damage. 
Expert Patients: Expert patients have a high level of knowledge about 
health services. This is developed through personal 
experiences. 
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What is the purpose of the SURE CARE study? 
At the moment there has been very little research looking at how service users 
perceive their safety when going through a care transfer. We want to look at 
what safe care feels like to service users going through a care transfer. We will 
then use this information to develop a tool to help service users to identify and 
report adverse events and times that went well when undergoing a care 
transfer. We want to hear from patients, family members, carers and 
advocates about times that they felt safe when going through a care transfer. 
Why have I been invited to take part in SURE CARE? 
You have been invited to take part as you have experience of going through a 
transfer in your care. We are very interested in hearing about your experience 
and how it affected your personal safety during your transfer. 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is completely up to you to decide. We will explain the study to you in this 
Information Sheet. If you would like to take part based on the information 
provided, we will then ask you to sign the reply slip at the end of this 
Information Sheet to show you have agreed for a member of the research 
team to contact you to arrange an interview at a time and place convenient to 
you.  
If you decide to take part and then change your mind, you can withdraw 
without giving a reason. You can do this at any time during the process of your 
involvement.  
If you decide not to take part, or change your mind at any time it will not affect 
the standard of care you receive.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do decide to take part in the study, you will be asked to fill out the reply 
slip at the end of this Information Sheet. A researcher (Jason Scott) will then 
contact you to find out where and when you would like to be interviewed, and 
if you would like a carer, family member or advocate present. You will also be 
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asked your age, gender, ethnicity, and if you have any disabilities or other 
requirements. This is to help us to know if we are speaking to a wide variety of 
people and to accommodate for any needs you may have. The information will 
not be linked back to you as an individual, but you don’t have to answer any of 
the questions if you do not want to. Before the interview, Jason Scott will 
explain the study to you in person and answer any questions you may have. He 
will then ask for your consent for the interview to begin.  
The interview will last approximately one hour and you will be asked questions 
about your experiences when undergoing a transfer in your care, and to think 
about what would make you feel safe in future care transfers. The interview 
will be recorded using a digital voice recorder. 
After the interview, the researcher will summarise what has been said and 
check with you to ensure that it is accurate. At a later date, you will also be 
provided with a summary of the findings, and you can request a full copy of the 
report if you want.  
As this is the first part of a larger project, you may also be approached about 
participating in the second part. You do not have to do this if you want, and 
you will not be pressured into doing so. You will be provided with detailed 
information at the time, or if you would like more information in the 
meantime, please contact Jason Scott.  
Will taking part cost me anything? 
At no time will you be asked for any money or your bank details. Any money 
you spend on travel will be reimbursed.  
How might taking part affect me? 
This study will not involve any physical risks, but talking about your 
experiences might be upsetting or tiring. You can stop or have a break during 
an interview at any time. You will not be left alone until you tell us otherwise.  
You will also be able to speak to another member of the research team in 
person or over the telephone if you wish.  
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If you get tired easily and need regular rests please let us know. 
Will taking part in the project be private and confidential? 
We will follow ethical and legal practice and all personal information about you 
will be handled in complete confidence. Anything that you say will be assigned 
a number that cannot be traced back to you personally. Direct quotes may be 
used, but you will not be identifiable through them. 
When you speak to a researcher it will be recorded using a digital voice 
recorder. If you would not like to be recorded for any reason, you may request 
that the researcher take notes on the interview instead. 
Some of the information that you give us will be used for an educational 
project, as one of the researchers (Jason Scott) is doing a PhD. This will also be 
treated confidentially.  
All information will be stored on a secure computer within Northumbria 
University, and will only be accessible by Jason Scott, the Chief Investigator. All 
personal information will be destroyed when the study ends, and any written 
and recorded information will be destroyed six years after the study ends. 
Breaking confidentiality 
If you tell us something during the study that suggests you, or someone else, 
are at serious risk, we would then have to break confidentiality. We would tell 
you that we are going to do this and we would then report it to someone who 
could help. Doing this would not affect the standard of care that you receive. 
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Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the research? 
You can stop being involved in the research at any time and do not have to 
give a reason why. This will not affect the standard of care that you receive. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy with the research, ask to speak to the researchers and we 
will do our best to answer your questions. If you are still unhappy, and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the NHS complaints procedure or 
by contacting the Principal Supervisor, Dr. Pamela Dawson at Northumbria 
University.  
Contact details 
If you have any concerns or would like further information about the study, 




  [email address removed] 
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
Dr. Pamela Dawson 
[address removed] 
  [email address removed]  
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
What happens now? 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are 
interested in taking part in the study, please fill in the reply slip below within 
two weeks of receiving it. If you need help to fill in the reply slip please contact 
us, or ask the person that gave you the documents.  
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Once the reply slip is completed please return it to the person who originally 
gave it to you. It will then be passed securely to Jason Scott. Alternatively you 
can send it to Jason Scott yourself at the address above. Please do not 
complete the Consent Form at this time. 
 
Jason Scott will then contact you to arrange an interview. Before the interview 
begins, you will be asked to fill out a Consent Form. A copy of the Consent 
Form has been provided for you to view. You do not need to fill this in before 
you have met with Jason Scott. 
 
If you would like to read more about the project or the lay person’s summary 
please contact Jason Scott.  
 
I would be interested in taking part in the SURE CARE study, and hereby give 
permission to be contacted by a member of the research team. I understand 
that before taking part, I will need to fill in a consent form and that if I want I 
can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Name  __________________________ 
Signature __________________________ 
Date  __________________________
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Consent Form for service users (P1) 
Title of project: SURE CARE 
Name of Chief Investigator: Jason Scott 
Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 16/10/2009 (version 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my care 




3. I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at 
by individuals from the North East Strategic Health Authority, from 
Northumbria University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS 
Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 





4. I understand that direct quotes may be used, but that they will 
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5. I understand that if I tell you something during the study that 
suggests that I or someone else is at serious risk, you would then 
have to break confidentiality. I understand that you would tell me if 




6. I understand that my interview will be recorded using a digital 
voice recorder. I also understand that I may request for the 








Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
__________________  ___ / ___ / ____  ________________ 
Researcher Name   Date    Signature 







  [email address removed]  
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Invitation letter to service users (P2) 
 
Dear Service User, 
You are invited to take part in the second part of this research study 
We are doing some research on service user safety when going through a 
transfer in care. It is a major study funded by the NHS North East Strategic 
Health Authority and Northumbria University. 
What will this part of the study do? 
It will create a mechanism that will allow service users such as yourself to 
identify and report safety incidents, based on what you told us in the first part 
of the study. The aim of the study is to inform and improve practice on both a 
local and national level. 
How could you take part? 
If you are interested in taking part you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, where we will ask for your input into a mechanism 
that will enable service users to identify and report adverse events along with 
times that have worked well. This mechanism will be based on the results from 
the first part of the study, and will be developed during the conferences, which 
will include other service users and health professionals. 
What to do if you are interested in taking part and want more information?  
If you would like to find out more information about the SURE CARE study, 
please take the time to read the Information Sheet included with this letter. 
This will give you more information about the study. You may also contact the 
researchers directly to find out more information or to ask questions. The 
contact details of Jason Scott are at the end of this letter and in the 
information sheet. 
Please turn over 
   
 
Version: 1 
Date produced: 16/10/2009 
If you have decided you do not want to take part in the study, you do not need 
to do anything. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
 
Contact Details 







  [email address removed] 











Phase 2 – Service User Information Sheet 
 
   
 
Version: 1 
Date produced: 16/10/2009 
SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Information Sheet for service users (P2) 
Part 1 
We would like to invite you to join in this research project. Before you decide if 
you want to take part you need to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following 
information carefully and talk to others about the study if you wish.  
If you have any difficulties, or need other help to understand the information 
please contact us. Your participation could make a real difference to the 
quality of care provided, but take time to decide whether or not you would like 
to participate. 
Below is a list of terms used in this document. 
Care transfer:  This is when your care is passed from one service to 
another. Examples of this include being discharged 
from hospital or moving from one hospital to 
another. 
Service user: This is any person who comes into contact with the 
National Health Service (NHS). This includes patients, 
carers, family members and advocates. 
Adverse event: This is an incident or circumstance that could have or 
did lead to unintended or unexpected harm, loss or 
damage. 
Expert Patients: Expert patients have a high level of knowledge about 
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What is the purpose of the SURE CARE study? 
At the moment there has been very little research looking at how service users 
perceive their safety when going through a care transfer. We have spoken with 
a variety of service users about what safe care feels like to them when going 
through a care transfer. We want to use this information to develop a 
mechanism to help service users to identify and report adverse events when 
undergoing a care transfer. We are very interested in receiving your input into 
this mechanism which we hope will improve the level of care provided to 
patients. 
Why have I been invited to take part in SURE CARE? 
You have been invited to take part as you were involved in the first part of the 
study and we are very interested in receiving your input into the creation of 
the identification and reporting mechanism. 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is completely up to you to decide. We will explain the study to you in this 
Information Sheet. If you would like to take part based on the information 
provided, we will then ask you to sign the reply slip at the end of this 
Information Sheet to show you have agreed for a member of the research 
team to contact you to discuss the two collaborative conferences.  
If you decide to take part and change your mind, you can withdraw without 
giving a reason. You can do this at any time during the process of your 
involvement.  
If you decide not to take part, or change your mind at any time, there will be 
no undesirable consequences.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do decide to take part in the study, you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, each lasting approximately two hours that will also 
include other service users and health professionals involved in care transfers. 
During these conferences, we will ask for your input into a mechanism that will 
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enable service users to identify and report adverse events. You will also be 
presented with the findings of the first part of this study, which developed a 
service user definition of safety in care transfers. If you do not want to take 
part in this part of the study, you will still receive a summary of the findings 
and you can request a copy of the final report. 
If you decide to take part in the study, a researcher will then contact you with 
information about when and where the conference will take place. You will 
also be asked your age, and if you have any disabilities or other requirements 
again in case anything has changed. This is to help us to know if we are 
speaking to a wide variety of people and to accommodate for any needs you 
may have. The information will not be linked back to you as an individual, but 
you don’t have to answer any of the questions if you do not want to. 
Will taking part cost me anything? 
At no time will you be asked for any money or your bank details. Any money 
you spend on travel will be reimbursed.  
How might taking part affect me? 
This study will not involve any physical risks, and you will be reimbursed for 
any travel that you may undertake. You will not be identifiable from the first 
part of the study. 
Will taking part in the project be private and confidential? 
We will follow ethical and legal practice and all personal information about you 
will be handled in complete confidence. Direct quotes may be used, but you 
will not be identifiable through them. Due to the nature of a collaborative 
conference, it is not possible to ensure that you will remain anonymous. The 
collaborative conference will be recorded using a digital-voice recorder.  
Some of the information that you give us will be used for an educational 
project, as one of the researchers (Jason Scott) is doing a PhD. This will also be 
treated confidentially.  
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All information will be stored on a secure computer within Northumbria 
University, and will only be accessible by Jason Scott, the Chief Investigator. All 
personal information will be destroyed when the study ends, and any written 
and recorded information will be destroyed six years after the study ends. 
Breaking confidentiality 
If you tell us something during the study that suggests you, or someone else, 
are at serious risk, we would then have to break confidentiality. We would tell 
you that we are going to do this and we would then report it to someone who 
could help. 
  
   
 
Version: 1 
Date produced: 16/10/2009 
Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the research? 
You can stop being involved in the research at any time and do not have to 
give a reason why.  
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy with the research, ask to speak to the researchers and we 
will do our best to answer your questions. If you are still unhappy, and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the NHS complaints procedure or 
by contacting the Principal Supervisor, Dr. Pamela Dawson.  
Contact details 
If you have any concerns or would like further information about the study, 




  [email address removed] 
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
Dr. Pamela Dawson 
[address removed] 
  [email address removed]  
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
What happens now? 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are 
interested in taking part in the study, please fill in the reply slip below within 
two weeks of receiving it. If you need help to fill in the reply slip please contact 
us, or ask the person that gave you the documents.  
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Once the reply slip is completed please return it to the person who originally 
gave it to you. It will then be passed securely to Jason Scott. Alternatively you 
can send it to Jason Scott yourself at the address above. Please do not 
complete the Consent Form at this time. 
 
Jason Scott will then contact you to discuss available times for the conference. 
Before the conference begins, you will be asked to fill out a Consent Form. A 
copy of the Consent Form has been has been provided for you to view. You do 
not need to fill this in before the conference. 
 
If you would like to read more about the project, see the original project bid or 
the lay person’s summary please contact Jason Scott.  
 
I would be interested in taking part in the phase two of the SURE CARE study, 
and hereby give permission to be contacted by a member of the research 
team. I understand that before taking part, I will need to fill in a consent form 
and that if I want I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Name  __________________________ 
Signature __________________________ 
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Consent Form for service users (P2) 
Title of project: SURE CARE 
Name of Chief Investigator: Jason Scott 
Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 16/10/2009 (version 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my care 




3. I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at 
by individuals from the North East Strategic Health Authority, from 
Northumbria University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS 
Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 





4. I understand that I may not remain completely anonymous during 
the collaborative conference, but that any information collected 
about me will be confidential. I also understand that the information 
will be collected using a digital voice recorded and note-taking. 
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5. I understand that if I tell you something during the study that 
suggests that I or someone else is at serious risk, you would then 
have to break confidentiality. I understand that you would tell me if 









Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
__________________  ___ / ___ / ____  ________________ 
Researcher Name   Date    Signature 







  [email address removed] 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Invitation letter to expert patients 
 
Dear Service User, 
You are invited to take part in this research study 
We are doing some research on service user safety when going through a 
transfer in care. It is a major study funded by the NHS North East Strategic 
Health Authority and Northumbria University. 
What will this study do? 
It will look at what makes service users feel safe when they are going through a 
transfer in their care, and use this to create a mechanism that will allow service 
users to identify and report safety incidents. The aim of the study is to inform 
and improve practice on both a local and national level. 
How could you take part? 
If you are interested in taking part you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, where we will ask for your input into a mechanism 
that will enable service users to identify and report adverse events. This 
mechanism will be based on service user definitions of safety, and will be 
developed during the conferences, which will include other service users and 
health professionals. 
What to do if you are interested in taking part and want more information?  
If you would like to find out more information about the SURE CARE study, 
please take the time to read the Information Sheet included with this letter. 
This will give you more information about the study. You may also contact the 
researchers directly to find out more information or to ask questions. The 
contact details of Jason Scott are at the end of this letter and in the 
information sheet. 
Please turn over 
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If you have decided you do not want to take part in the study, you do not need 
to do anything. 









  [email address removed] 












Phase 2 – Expert Patient Information Sheet 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Information Sheet for expert patients 
Part 1 
We would like to invite you to join in this research project. Before you decide if 
you want to take part you need to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following 
information carefully and talk to others about the study if you wish.  
If you have any difficulties, or need other help to understand the information 
please contact us. Your participation could make a real difference to the 
quality of care provided, but take time to decide whether or not you would like 
to participate. 
Below is a list of terms used in this document. 
 
Care transfer:  This is when your care is passed from one service to 
another. Examples of this include being discharged 
from hospital or moving from one hospital to 
another. 
Service user: This is any person who comes into contact with the 
National Health Service (NHS). This includes patients, 
carers, family members and advocates. 
Adverse event: This is an incident or circumstance that could have or 
did lead to unintended or unexpected harm, loss or 
damage. 
Expert Patients: Expert patients have a high level of knowledge about 
health services. This is developed through personal 
experiences. 
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What is the purpose of the SURE CARE study? 
At the moment there has been very little research looking at how service users 
perceive their safety when going through a care transfer. We have spoken with 
service users about what safe care feels like to them when going through a 
care transfer. We want to use this information to develop a mechanism to help 
service users to identify and report adverse events when undergoing a care 
transfer. We are very interested in receiving your input into this mechanism 
which we hope will improve the level of care provided to patients. 
Why have I been invited to take part in SURE CARE? 
You have been invited to take part as you are currently part of an advisory 
panel to the Patient Safety Action Team at the North East Strategic Health 
Authority in the form of the Safer Care Patient, Carer and Engagement (PCPE) 
network.  
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is completely up to you to decide. We will explain the study to you in this 
Information Sheet. If you would like to take part based on the information 
provided, we will then ask you to sign the reply slip at the end of this 
Information Sheet to show you have agreed for a member of the research 
team to contact you to discuss the two collaborative conferences.  
If you decide to take part and change your mind, you can withdraw without 
giving a reason. You can do this at any time during the process of your 
involvement.  
If you decide not to take part, or change your mind at any time, there will be 
no undesirable consequences.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do decide to take part in the study, you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, each lasting approximately two hours that will also 
include other service users and health professionals involved in care transfers. 
During these conferences, we will ask for your input into a mechanism that will 
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enable service users to identify and report adverse events. You will also be 
presented with the findings of the first part of this study, which developed a 
service user definition of safety in care transfers.  
If you decide to take part in the study, a researcher will then contact you with 
information about when and where the conference will take place. You will 
also be asked your age, gender, ethnicity, and if you have any disabilities or 
other requirements. This is to help us to know if we are speaking to a wide 
variety of people and to accommodate for any needs you may have. The 
information will not be linked back to you as an individual, but you don’t have 
to answer any of the questions if you do not want to. 
Will taking part cost me anything? 
At no time will you be asked for any money or your bank details. Any money 
you spend on travel will be reimbursed.  
How might taking part affect me? 
This study will not involve any physical risks, and you will be reimbursed for 
any travel that you may undertake. 
Will taking part in the project be private and confidential? 
We will follow ethical and legal practice and all personal information about you 
will be handled in complete confidence. Direct quotes may be used, but you 
will not be identifiable through them. Due to the nature of a collaborative 
conference, it is not possible to ensure that you will remain anonymous. The 
collaborative conference will be recorded using a digital-voice recorder.  
Some of the information that you give us will be used for an educational 
project, as one of the researchers (Jason Scott) is doing a PhD. This will also be 
treated confidentially.  
All information will be stored on a secure computer within Northumbria 
University, and will only be accessible by Jason Scott, the Chief Investigator. All 
personal information will be destroyed when the study ends, and any written 
and recorded information will be destroyed six years after the study ends. 
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Breaking confidentiality 
If you tell us something during the study that suggests you, or someone else, 
are at serious risk, we would then have to break confidentiality. We would tell 
you that we are going to do this and we would then report it to someone who 
could help. 
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Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the research? 
You can stop being involved in the research at any time and do not have to 
give a reason why.  
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy with the research, ask to speak to the researchers and we 
will do our best to answer your questions. If you are still unhappy, and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the NHS complaints procedure or 
by contacting the Principal Supervisor, Dr. Pamela Dawson.  
Contact details 
If you have any concerns or would like further information about the study, 




  [email address removed] 
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
Dr. Pamela Dawson 
[address removed] 
  [email address removed]  
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
What happens now? 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are 
interested in taking part in the study, please fill in the reply slip below within 
two weeks of receiving it. If you need help to fill in the reply slip please contact 
us, or ask the person that gave you the documents.  
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Once the reply slip is completed please return it to the person who originally 
gave it to you. It will then be passed securely to Jason Scott. Alternatively you 
can send it to Jason Scott yourself at the address above. Please do not 
complete the Consent Form at this time. 
 
Jason Scott will then contact you to discuss available times for the conference. 
Before the conference begins, you will be asked to fill out a Consent Form. A 
copy of the Consent Form has been has been provided for you to view. You do 
not need to fill this in before the conference. 
 
If you would like to read more about the project, see the original project bid or 
the lay person’s summary please contact Jason Scott.  
 
I would be interested in taking part in the SURE CARE study, and hereby give 
permission to be contacted by a member of the research team. I understand 
that before taking part, I will need to fill in a consent form and that if I want I 
can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Name  __________________________ 
Signature __________________________ 
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Consent Form for expert patients 
Title of project: SURE CARE 
Name of Chief Investigator: Jason Scott 
Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 16/10/2009 (version 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my care 




3. I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at 
by individuals from the North East Strategic Health Authority, from 
Northumbria University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS 
Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 





4. I understand that I may not remain completely anonymous during 
the collaborative conference, but that any information collected 
about me will be confidential. I also understand that the information 
will be collected using a digital voice recorded and note-taking. 
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5. I understand that if I tell you something during the study that 
suggests that I or someone else is at serious risk, you would then 
have to break confidentiality. I understand that you would tell me if 









Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
__________________  ___ / ___ / ____  ________________ 
Researcher Name   Date    Signature 







  [email address removed] 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Invitation letter to staff members 
 
Dear Member of Staff, 
You are invited to take part in this research study 
We are doing some research on service user safety when going through a 
transfer in care. It is a major study funded by the NHS North East Strategic 
Health Authority and Northumbria University. 
What will this study do? 
It will look at what makes service users feel safe when they are going through a 
transfer in their care, and use this to create a mechanism that will allow service 
users to identify and report safety incidents. The aim of the study is to inform 
and improve practice on both a local and national level. 
How could you take part? 
If you are interested in taking part you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, and to pilot a mechanism that will allow service 
users to identify and report safety incidents when going through a care 
transfer. This mechanism will be based on service user definitions of safety, 
and will be developed during the conferences, which will include service users 
and expert patients. 
What to do if you are interested in taking part and want more information?  
If you would like to find out more information about the SURE CARE study, 
please take the time to read the Information Sheet included with this letter. 
This will give you more information about the study. You may also contact the 
researchers directly to find out more information or to ask questions. The 
contact details of Jason Scott are at the end of this letter and in the 
information sheet. 
Please turn over 
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If you have decided you do not want to take part in the study, you do not need 
to do anything. 









  [email address removed] 












Phase 2 – Healthcare Professional Information Sheet 
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SURE CARE 
[A Research Study] 
Information Sheet for members of staff 
Part 1 
We would like to invite you to join in this research project. Before you decide if 
you want to take part you need to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following 
information carefully and talk to others about the study if you wish.  
If you have any difficulties, or need other help to understand the information 
please contact us. Your participation could make a real difference to the 
quality of care provided, but take time to decide whether or not you would like 
to participate. 
Below is a list of terms used in this document. 
 
Care transfer:  This is when your care is passed from one service to 
another. Examples of this include being discharged 
from hospital or moving from one hospital to 
another. 
Service user: This is any person who comes into contact with the 
National Health Service (NHS). This includes patients, 
carers, family members and advocates. 
Adverse event: This is an incident or circumstance that could have or 
did lead to unintended or unexpected harm, loss or 
damage. 
Expert Patients: Expert patients have a high level of knowledge about 
health services. This is developed through personal 
experiences. 
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What is the purpose of the SURE CARE study? 
At the moment there has been very little research looking at how service users 
perceive their safety when going through a care transfer. We have spoken with 
service users about what safe care feels like to them when going through a 
care transfer. We want to use this information to develop a mechanism to help 
service users to identify and report adverse events when undergoing a care 
transfer. We are very interested in receiving your input into this mechanism 
which we hope will improve the level of care provided to patients. 
Why have I been invited to take part in SURE CARE? 
You have been invited to take part as you are involved in care transfers as part 
of your working practice. Your employer understands the requirements of the 
study and has given us permission to approach you. 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is completely up to you to decide. We will explain the study to you in this 
Information Sheet. If you would like to take part based on the information 
provided, we will then ask you to sign the reply slip at the end of this 
Information Sheet to show you have agreed for a member of the research 
team to contact you to discuss the two collaborative conferences.  
If you decide to take part and change your mind, you can withdraw without 
giving a reason. You can do this at any time during the process of your 
involvement.  
If you decide not to take part, or change your mind at any time, there will be 
no undesirable consequences.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do decide to take part in the study, you will be invited to attend two 
collaborative conferences, each lasting approximately two hours that will also 
include service users and expert patients. During these conferences, we will 
ask for your input into a mechanism that will enable service users to identify 
and report adverse events. You will also be presented with the findings of the 
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first part of this study, which developed a service user definition of safety in 
care transfers. You will then be asked to pilot the mechanism and feedback 
your findings at the following collaborative conference.  
If you decide to take part in the study, a researcher will then contact you with 
information about when and where the conference will take place. You will 
also be asked your age, gender, ethnicity, and if you have any disabilities or 
other requirements. This is to help us to know if we are speaking to a wide 
variety of people and to accommodate for any needs you may have. The 
information will not be linked back to you as an individual, but you don’t have 
to answer any of the questions if you do not want to. 
Will taking part cost me anything? 
At no time will you be asked for any money or your bank details. Any money 
you spend on travel will be reimbursed.  
How might taking part affect me? 
This study will not involve any physical risks, and you will be reimbursed for 
any travel that you may undertake. 
Will taking part in the project be private and confidential? 
We will follow ethical and legal practice and all personal information about you 
will be handled in complete confidence. Direct quotes may be used, but you 
will not be identifiable through them. Due to the nature of a collaborative 
conference, it is not possible to ensure that you will remain anonymous. The 
collaborative conference will be recorded using a digital-voice recorder.  
Some of the information that you give us will be used for an educational 
project, as one of the researchers (Jason Scott) is doing a PhD. This will also be 
treated confidentially.  
All information will be stored on a secure computer within Northumbria 
University, and will only be accessible by Jason Scott, the Chief Investigator. All 
personal information will be destroyed when the study ends, and any written 
and recorded information will be destroyed six years after the study ends. 
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Breaking confidentiality 
If you tell us something during the study that suggests you, or someone else, 
are at serious risk, we would then have to break confidentiality. We would tell 
you that we are going to do this and we would then report it to someone who 
could help. 
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Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the research? 
You can stop being involved in the research at any time and do not have to 
give a reason why.  
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy with the research, ask to speak to the researchers and we 
will do our best to answer your questions. If you are still unhappy, and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the NHS complaints procedure or 
by contacting the Principal Supervisor, Dr. Pamela Dawson.  
Contact details 
If you have any concerns or would like further information about the study, 




  [email address removed] 
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
Dr. Pamela Dawson, 
[address removed] 
  [email address removed]  
℡  [telephone number removed] 
 
What happens now? 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are 
interested in taking part in the study, please fill in the reply slip below within 
two weeks of receiving it. If you need help to fill in the reply slip please contact 
us, or ask the person that gave you the documents.  
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Once the reply slip is completed please return it to the person who originally 
gave it to you. It will then be passed securely to Jason Scott. Alternatively you 
can send it to Jason Scott yourself at the address above. Please do not 
complete the Consent Form at this time. 
 
Jason Scott will then contact you to discuss available times for the conference. 
Before the conference begins, you will be asked to fill out a Consent Form. A 
copy of the Consent Form has been has been provided for you to view. You do 
not need to fill this in before the conference. 
 
If you would like to read more about the project, see the original project bid or 
the lay person’s summary please contact Jason Scott.  
 
I would be interested in taking part in the SURE CARE study, and hereby give 
permission to be contacted by a member of the research team. I understand 
that before taking part, I will need to fill in a consent form and that if I want I 
can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Name  __________________________ 
Signature __________________________ 










Phase 2 – Healthcare Professional Consent Form 
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Consent Form for members of staff 
Title of project: SURE CARE 
Name of Chief Investigator: Jason Scott 
Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 16/10/2009 (version 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my legal 




3. I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at 
by individuals from the North East Strategic Health Authority, from 
Northumbria University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS 
Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 





4. I understand that I may not remain completely anonymous during 
the collaborative conference, but that any information collected 
about me will be confidential. I also understand that the information 
will be collected using a digital voice recorded and note-taking. 
 
 





   
 
Version: 1 
Date produced: 16/10/2009 
 
 
5. I understand that if I tell you something during the study that 
suggests that I or someone else is at serious risk, you would then 
have to break confidentiality. I understand that you would tell me if 









Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
__________________  ___ / ___ / ____  ________________ 
Researcher Name   Date    Signature 
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Phase 1 –Interview Schedule 
 





1. What sort of experience do you have of going through care transfers? 
Prompt: 
• How many have you been through? 
• Have these been quite recently or were they a long time ago? 
o Where were you transferred from and to, and by whom? 
• Who was involved in the care transfer? 
o Were any members of your family present? 
o Which staff were involved at the start, during and after? 
 
2. Did you feel safe during any of these transfers? 
Prompt:  
• Where did you transfer from and to in this instance? 
• What was it that made you feel particularly safe? 
o Is this something of importance to you? 
 If yes, why? 
 If no, why not? 
• What sort of effect, if any, did this have on you? 
• How does this reflect your other experiences of care transfers? 
 
3. Have you had any experiences when you’ve felt unsafe? 
• Where did you transfer from and to in this instance? 
• What was it that made you feel unsafe? 
o What could have been done to make you feel safe? 
 
4. Generally how do you feel about being transferred? 
Prompt: 
• Can you please elaborate on this 
o What makes it good or bad,  
o Was there anything in particular that made it memorable? 
 
5. If someone was to talk about safety or being safe, what does this mean to you? 
Prompt: 
• Can you please elaborate on this? 
• How does this relate to your experiences of care transfers? 
 [If participant doesn’t understand this, try rephrasing the original question] 
 
6. Does safety cross your mind when you are going through a care transfer? 
Prompt: 
• Why do you think this is? 
• Why does it not cross your mind? 




7. Can you think of any other times you’ve felt safe when going through a care transfer? 
Prompt: 
• Where did you transfer from and to? 
• What made you feel particularly safe on that occasion? 
o Was something of importance to you? 
 If yes, why? 
 If no, why not? 
• What sort of effect, if any, did this have on you? 
 
8. [If other people are present] Were you involved in the process of [participant’s name] 
being transferred? 
Prompt: 
• If yes, what was your level of involvement? 
o Was there anything that helped to make you feel that [participant’s name] was safe? 
o Did you have any concerns about [participant’s name’s] safety? 
• If no, can we speak hypothetically about if you were involved? 
o Was there anything that would have helped to make you feel that [participant’s 
name] was safe? 
o Did you have any concerns about [participant’s name’s] safety? 
 
9. [If other people are present] Was [Participant’s name’s] safety something that you 
thought about when they were being transferred? 
Prompt: 
• If yes, in what way did you think about safety? 
o Why were you thinking about [participant’s name’s] safety? 
o Was there anything that could have been done to change this? 








1. If you were to go through a care transfer next week, what could be done to make you feel 
safe? 
Prompt: 
• Why would this make you feel safe? 
• Is this something that is of importance to you? 
o If yes, why? 
o If no, why not? 
 
2. What else would make you feel safe? 
Prompt: 
• Why would this make you feel safe? 
• Is this something that is of importance to you? 
o If yes, why? 
o If no, why not? 
 
3. Can you think of any ways that care transfers could be improved to make you feel more 
safe? 
Prompt: 
• This could be something which is already making you feel safe, but could be slightly 
improved 
• How would this make you feel safer? 
 
4. Are you aware of any means for you to tell someone about how the process has been for 
you? 
Prompt: 
• If yes: 
o How would you go about this? 
o Have you done this in the past? 
 If yes, what exactly did you do? 
 How did you find the experience of telling someone? 
o Is this something that you think is important? 
 Why? 
• If no: 
o Do you think that you should be able to tell someone about how the process has 
been? 
 Why?  
 
5. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
Prompt: 
• Expand on something that you’ve told me 
• You might have remembered something else of importance to you 








Phase 2 – Workshop 1 Agenda 
   
 
Jason Scott 
[email address removed] 
 
SURE CARE Phase 2: Development of a service user identification and 
reporting mechanism 
 
Workshop 1 Agenda 
 
1300 – 1330  Lunch 
1330 – 1400  Introduction to the day and feedback of Phase 1 results 
1400 – 1430  First break-off session: What will the mechanism look like? 
1430 – 1450  Feedback from first break-off session 
1450 – 1500  Overview of first break-off session 
1500 – 1530 Second break-off session: How will the mechanism fit in with current 
systems? / refreshments 
1530 – 1550 Feedback from second break-off session 
1530 – 1600 Overview of second break-off session / closing comments 
 
 








Phase 2 – Workshop 2 Agenda
   
 
Jason Scott 
[email address removed] 
 
SURE CARE Phase 2: Development of a service user reporting mechanism for 
instances of safe and unsafe care 
 
Workshop 2 Agenda 
 
0930 – 1000  Introduction 
1000 – 1030 Break-off session 1: Thinking differently: divergent thinking 
1030 – 1045  Feedback from break-off session 1 
1045 – 1100  Break 
1100 – 1145 Break-off session 2: Convergent thinking: Pulling the ideas back 
together 
1145 – 1200  Feedback from break-off session 2 
1200 – 1230  Summary / Closing points 
 
**Lunch will be provided in the canteen outside of the room at 1230** 
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Do older patients’ perceptions of
safety highlight barriers that could
make their care safer during
organisational care transfers?
Jason Scott,1 Pamela Dawson,2 Diana Jones1
ABSTRACT
Background: Healthcare is a series of complex,
interwoven systems in which any discontinuities of
care may affect the safety of patients, who have been
reported to perceive safety differently to clinicians.
This study aimed to explore patient perceptions of
safety and identify how they can be used to construct
additional barriers to reduce safety incidents within
organisational care transfers, which are known to be
high in risk.
Design: Appreciative Inquiry (AI) methodology was
used to develop semi-structured interviews, using the
Discover and Dream processes of AI. Fourteen patients
(four men, 10 women; average age 76.2 years) were
purposively recruited from NHS community care
teams, social care homes and private nursing homes
based on their experience of going through
organisational care transfers. Thematic analysis was
used to highlight key themes, which participants
verified.
Findings: Communication, responsiveness and
avoidance of traditional safety risks were identified as
being important for patients to feel safe.
Communication and responsiveness were mapped
onto the Swiss-Cheese model of safety, presenting two
new barriers to safety incidents. Traditional risks and
the role of trust are discussed in relation to patients
feeling safe.
Conclusion: Perceptions of safety such as
communication and responsiveness were similar to
those found in previous studies. Mapping these
perceptions onto the Swiss-Cheese model of safety
identifies how further defences, barriers and
safeguards can be constructed to make people feel
safer by reinforcing communication and
responsiveness. Traditional risks are widely published,
but the identification by patients reinforces the role
they can play in identifying and reporting these risks.
INTRODUCTION
Patient safety has received much attention
since the publications of To Err is Human1 and
An Organisation with a Memory,2 which identify
that healthcare as a whole is intrinsically risky.
The exploration and detection of gaps in
healthcare, defined as discontinuities of
care,3 can guide safety improvement efforts.
This is especially important in organisa-
tional care transfers (OCTs) with the rate of
adverse events estimated to be approximately
20%,4e6 twice the rate of other healthcare
settings.1 2 7e9 Falls,10 medication errors11 12
and interprofessional communication defi-
ciencies13 14 are the most common reported
adverse events in OCTs.
Despite an increasing body of literature
exploring safety in transfers, which ranged
from individual handoffs15 16 to organisa-
tional transfers,17 18 there has been no
research known to the authors that considers
patient definitions of safety in OCTs. It is
thought that patients can play a role in their
own safety,19e25 with their definitions of
safety differing to those of clinicians.26e28
There has been no theoretical exploration
of how patient perceptions contribute to
established models of patient safety, such as
the Swiss-Cheese model.29 According to this
model, hazards are a natural occurrence
within healthcare that are continually
changing and moving. To reduce the chances
of a hazard leading to a patient safety inci-
dent, defences, barriers and safeguards are
necessary. It is therefore necessary to identify
different types of defences, barriers and
safeguards that could be implemented into
healthcare organisations to make them safer
(box 1).
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As such, the aim of this study was to
< explore the concepts, explanations and terms used by
patients when talking about safety in OCTs;
< explore how defences, barriers, and safeguards can be
constructed in OCTs through the provision of patient-
defined safe care.
Methodology
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) has been identified as amethod
of organisational development,30 31 but also as an inter-
view tool that is effective at generating rich data both
externally to32 33 and internally within healthcare.34 35
AI is based on the assumption that within any human
system there is always something that works well but can
be further improved,31 32 36 which in this study centres on
an exploration of what makes people feel safe.
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed
based on the Discover and Dream processes31 of AI
which explored the past experiences and future needs of
patients respectively. It is acknowledged that by using an
interpretive methodology, participants may have their
own perceptions of safety that have a negative focus, in
particular as participants will be required to pay atten-
tion to negative experiences in order to identify what is
a positive experience. It was therefore important not to
disregard these negative experiences in the data analysis,
but to build upon them to identify potential barriers.31
The use of qualitative interviews also allows for new
concepts to arise that have previously not been consid-
ered,37 and by conducting dyadic interviews, there is an
opportunity to generate a richer understanding of needs
and experiences than with single participants.38
Participants
Fourteen participants were recruited from three
community care teams spanning two NHS trusts (n¼7),
two City Council Resource Centres (n¼3) and two
private nursing and residential care homes (n¼3). A
further participant, who was not under the care of any of
these organisations, was also recruited via snowball
sampling. She was a family member of a current partic-
ipant who, while acting in the capacity of a family
member and carer during an interview, fulfilled the
recruitment criteria and offered to share her own
experiences of being transferred. The participants were
aged between 56 and 88 years (mean age 76.2), of which
10 were women and four were men. All participants were
white British. Information on the most recent transfer
was not collected as it was important to capture the OCT
that mattered most to the participants.
Recognising that the nature of care transfers means
that often patients do not go through the process alone,
participants were asked to invite family members, carers
or advocates who experienced the journey with them to
participate in the interview. This approach enabled them
to remember aspects of certain events that the patient
had not and to validate what the patients were reporting.
Two participants had family members present, while one
participant had a family friend present. Full consent
was obtained from everyone who participated in the
interview.
NHS community care teams were selected at the point
of the NHS Research and Design (R&D) application by
the respective R&D managers to purposively recruit
patients based on the inclusion criteria (table 1).
A further three participants were approached during
the period of data collection prior to all 14 participants
being recruited, but were not included in the study.
Contact details were incorrect for one, another
cancelled the interview due to illness and a third was
deemed unable to give informed consent prior to the
start of the interview.
Data collection
The data were collected through semi-structured inter-
views conducted between February and March 2010.
Interviews lasted between 20 and 52 min, with an average
length of 39 min. One participant requested that the
interview was not recorded, and instead notes were taken
and verified on interview completion. The interviews were
conducted at a location convenient to the participants,
which was always their current residence.
Box 1 Definition of an organisational care transfer
An organisational care transfer is defined within this study
as the transfer of a patient from one setting to another,
where either or both the organisations are healthcare
providers. This includes the admission, journey and
discharge processes, but not the full stay within the
healthcare organisation.
Table 1 Inclusion and exclusion criterion for participants
in phase 1
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Aged >17 Aged <18












(more than two in the last
5 years)
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A topic guide was developed to give structure to the
interviews. Questions were open ended and encom-
passed the principles of the AI methodology, particularly
the Discover and Dream processes. The interview was
structured to explore the following:
< the types of OCTs participants had been through;
< if participants felt safe during the OCTs;
< what safety means to participants;
< what would make participants feel safer in future
OCTs.
Twenty interviews were anticipated at the outset;
however data collection ceased after 14 interviews
because recurrent themes were being supported rather
than new themes being identified.
Data analysis
The interview recordings were transcribed verbatim, and
NVivo 8 was used as a tool to systematically code and
analyse the data into emergent themes. Although the
interview was split into the Discover and Dream
processes of AI, thematic analysis was used to highlight
key themes from across the two processes. Connections
between the top two levels of subcategories contributing
to each theme were mapped based on interview data.
Data verification and validity
Participant verification has been identified as an
appropriate method of verifying findings and assessing
validity in qualitative research.39 Out of the 14 partici-
pants, six were revisited after data analysis had been
completed. Each of the six verified that the themes that
had been captured were accurate, and they felt that they
did not have anything more to add. From the other
eight participants, two preferred that the findings were
posted out to them and six were not contactable via
telephone. The findings were posted to their last known
address with a letter explaining that if anything was
incorrect then they should contact the researcher. No
contact has been made in the 6 months since the letters
were sent.
FINDINGS
Four key themes were identified: communication,
responsiveness, trust and traditional safety risks.
‘Communication’ included being informed, having
a means to contact a healthcare professional, being
friendly and reassuring, apologising after an incident
and listening. The role of communication is widely
recognised in patient safety literature, particularly within
human factors40 and the role that it plays in ensuring the
safe transfer of patients.13 15 It has also been identified in
previous research exploring patient perceptions of
safety.26
Listening was also an important component of
‘responsiveness’, which included responding to the
individual needs of the patient, having short waiting
times and making the transfer an easy process.
Responding to individual needs is a central part of
providing patient-centred care, which has been reported
to improve health status and efficiency of care.41 Long
waiting times have been reported to have a negative
effect on healthcare,28 potentially relating to how
safe patients feel, while overcrowding of emergency
departments threatens patient safety.42
‘Trust’ was inherent in participants regardless of
experiences of care, originating intrinsically and from
the knowledge that healthcare professionals were suffi-
ciently trained. Another sign of trust was the partici-
pants’ inclination to make excuses for the healthcare
professionals when something went wrong. Patients with
high levels of trust in their healthcare professionals feel
more safe,43 whereas patients with experience of an
adverse event lose trust.44
The ‘traditional safety risks’ discussed included phys-
ical safety during the transfer, falls, healthcare-acquired
infections, receiving an adequate standard of care,
missed diagnosis, medication concerns and excessively
painful procedures. There is an extensive amount of
literature exploring each of these issues, moving towards
including them in a universal definition of safety.45e47
Box 2 provides examples of data illustrating the four
themes.
DISCUSSION
Four dimensions of care related to safety have been
identified when exploring how patients perceive safety in
OCTs, including traditional safety risks, communication,
responsiveness and trust. The use of the term ‘traditional
safety risks’ is acknowledged to be a catch-all theme to
further demonstrate that patients are able to identify
some of the same hazards as clinicians, such as medica-
tion issues, falls and healthcare-acquired infections,
which were recognised in other studies.26 27 48
It has been identified that patient definitions of safety
may be broader than clinician definitions.26 28 The
findings from this study support recent evidence that
communication and patient centredness are important in
making people feel safe.49 It is proposed that communi-
cation and responsiveness are important components to
providing safe care to the patient when going through an
OCT, while there has been a call to apply theories more
widely to patient safety practices.50 Applying communi-
cation and responsiveness to Reason’s Swiss-Cheese
model of safety,29 additional defences, barriers or safe-
guards can be constructed so as to reduce the chances of
a hazard resulting in an adverse event.
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Within OCTs, clinicians should adhere to the indi-
vidual elements of the communication and responsive-
ness themes identified in this study (figure 1), which
would enable them to provide safer care by involving the
patient as an extra safety buffer.20 More specifically,
communicating with and being responsive to the patient
can increase their involvement in their healthcare, thus
encouraging them to become active participants rather
than passive recipients, and subsequently increasing
their safety. When clinicians do not adhere to these,
holes in the Swiss-Cheese may open up, allowing for
a hazard to become an adverse event.
The importance of having the patient as an additional
buffer is emphasised in OCTs, where many gaps in safety
occur,3 and there are fewer technical defences. However
it must be remembered that not all patients are able or
willing to be involved in their own safety,20 such as in
emergency transfers.
The role of trust within safety has previously been seen
to be an outcome of a patient safety incident, with
patients potentially losing trust in their clinicians as
a result of a safety incident,51 although this has been
contested.52 The role of trust within this study was
twofold. First, participants often made excuses for clini-
cians, possibly as a result of cognitive dissonance;
a feeling of unease when considering the people trying
to help them may in fact harm them, or it could be
alluding to their ability to identify latent conditions in
current healthcare systems,29 for example, resource
limitations, that have the potential to result in adverse
events. If the last point is correct it supports the notion
that patients can play a role in identifying and reporting
safety incidents.19 24 27
Second, trust helped to make patients feel safer,
which potentially acts as a hindrance towards becoming
involved in their own safety. By applying communication
and responsiveness to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety,
Box 2 Some examples of how patients perceive safety.
Communication
On that admissions ward they’re so busy they don’t have the time
to come say to you every hour, every couple of hours that, “it
shouldn’t be too much longer,” or, “it’s going to be a while.” Really
just to keep you informed. [P13]
You do feel safe when you’re leaving your home if you’re with
these people. It’s not as if they’re a stranger to you, they actually
put you at your ease so [they] make you feel safe. [P08]
When I say I feel safe, I feel safe with them there so I can call them
at any time, the rapid response team. [P14]
I try to find out as much as I could about where I was supposed to
be going before I say I would go. [P04]
Responsiveness
I felt that they felt “there’s nothing wrong with her” . they didn’t
even open the back door. And bearing in mind I hadn’t a breath
in me. And they’re saying “go on you can do it, go on you can do
it.” Like you know, and I did, but when I got in he had to put an
oxygen mask on me. [P14]
I feel quite safe in their hands. If I don’t I tell them, and whether
they appreciate that or not, I don’t know. I just sort of say “well if
I’m not very happy with that do you think we can do.” and we just
have a little private conversation between the staff and me. And
we arrive at what we both agree on. [P04]
We just had to call out and there’d be somebody there straight
away if you needed them. Quite safe both in the ambulance and in
the hospital. [P03]
Trust
I just put myself in their hands. I know that they’ll get me there
safely. I don’t know why, I just trust people. [P02]
I think that when you’re poorly you’re at your lowest ebb. And the
reassurance in knowing that you have trained people with you, yes
that does make you feel safe. [P10]
Being safe as I say, it’s just something that I assume. I mean, I
presume I’m in capable hands, I presume they’re capable people
that will get me from A to B in a comfortable manner. [P09]
I think they do as much as they can with the resources that they
have. I don’t think they could do any more really. [P13]
Traditional safety risks
I don’t think it should happen to anyone that is incapable of looking
after themselves, to be sent home on their own to an empty house
without any care support in. [P06]
I don’t feel safe in the house now because I’ve been taking epileptic
fits. I can’t remember what tablets I’ve got to take or when I’ve got
to take them. And if I’ve took them, have I took them? [P11]
The nurse or somebody helped [her daughter] to put her in the car,
and she was yelping with the pain. they took her back to A and E
only to find when she’d had that fall three weeks previous, she’d
broke her hip. [P04’s carer]
Figure 1 The patient’s role as a safety buffer in the Swiss-
Cheese model of safety.29
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it can be argued that patients can act as safety buffers in
relation to these. Therefore the same components of
the model, such as active failures and latent conditions,
must also be applied to patient involvement in safety.
Trust can be seen to be a latent condition, defined as an
‘inevitable resident pathogen’, which leads to holes or
weaknesses in the defences,29 potentially reducing how
involved patients become in their safety and subse-
quently their safety itself. The exact relationship
between trust as an outcome of as well as a hindrance to
safety needs further exploration. In addition, the
implications of trust being a latent condition that
influences patient involvement in their own safety
requires investigation.
The findings from this study will inform the develop-
ment of a patient-reporting tool that will enable patients,
family members, carers or advocates to report instances
of safe and unsafe care during OCTs based on the
reported perceptions. This will allow service users to
become involved in identifying strengths and weaknesses
in the communication and responsiveness barriers
contributing to their safety in OCTs (box 3).
Limitations
Patients are not always able to see what occurs out of
their sight, and therefore any perceptions that they do
have of safety may not always reflect those of their
clinicians.27 Further studies are required to help fill this
knowledge gap and to explore how closely patient
perceptions of safety are linked with clinician percep-
tions. This in turn may lead to an identification and
reduction of potential organisational safety issues during
patient transfers. However, regardless of any differences
in perception, if patients perceive themselves to be
unsafe then there is an issue that requires resolving.
A further limitation is that this study recruited from
a small sample of older patients going through OCTs
and therefore the findings may not be transferrable.
Furthermore, the nature of the organisations that
participants were recruited from meant that the average
age of participants was higher than originally planned.
Readers should take these limitations into consideration
when deciding if the findings can be transferred to their
own circumstances.
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